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This dissertation makes two arguments: First, it elaborates a depressive genealogy of the 
Victorian novel that asserts a category of realism rooted in affect rather than period or 
place. Second, it argues for a critical strategy called “depressive reading” that has unique 
purchase on this literary history. Drawing on Melanie Klein’s “depressive position,” the 
project asserts an alternative to novel theories that are rooted in sympathy and desire. By 
being attentive to mood and critical disposition, depressive reading homes in on the 
barely-contained negativities of realism. Through readings of novels by William 
Makepeace Thackeray, Anthony Trollope, Thomas Hardy, and Charlotte Brontë, it 
explores feelings of ambivalence, soreness, and dislike as aesthetic responses and 
interpretations, as well as prompts to varieties of non-instrumentalist ethics. In the final 
chapter, the psychological and literary strategy of play emerges as a creative and 
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Introduction: 
Depressive Realism, Depressive Reading 
 
“Depressive Realism” is an argument for a critical strategy with unique purchase on 
realism. Like Eve Sedgwick’s “reparative reading,” it uses the work of Melanie Klein to 
structure a style of reading. But unlike Sedgwick, who emphasizes that “the more 
satisfying object” inaugurated by the depressive position is “available both to be 
identified with and to offer one nourishment and comfort in return,” I emphasize the 
negative aspects of the depressive position.1 “In the depressive position,” Ruth Stein 
writes, “the person deals with the feelings by bearing (with) them, by acquiring the 
capacity to tolerate their essentially ambivalent and fluid nature.”2 This dissertation 
explores the feeling of “bearing with” ambivalent feelings, such as soreness and dislike, 
as aesthetic responses and as interpretations. Rather than imagining an interpretation to 
be separate from feeling, as Susan Sontag did when she called for the replacement of 
interpretation with erotics, I use feeling as an interpretive strategy. The meaning of the 
novels I write about lies in the feelings they provoke as well as the feelings that structure 
their worlds.  
 My four authors—William Makepeace Thackeray, Anthony Trollope, Thomas 
Hardy, and Charlotte Brontë—share an ethos that my readings try to bring to light. They 
exist on a continuum, representing different degrees of stuckness or woundedness, and 
different strategies for tolerating or rejecting ambivalence. Reparative reading is a big 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Eve Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke 
University Press), 2003: 128. 
2 Ruth Stein, “A New Look at the Theory of Melanie Klein,” in The International 
Journal of Psycho-Analysis 71 (1990): 505  
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tent, and at times depressive reading will find itself beneath its poles.3 But my project 
holds off from theorizing a love-relationship to the object of criticism that is Sedgwick’s 
ultimate concern. The antagonist of “Depressive Realism” is not paranoid reading—it’s 
the discourse around sympathy. The depressive reading style might be a portable one, 
although it has fallen outside the limits of time-to-degree to explore that possibility. One 
reason I call this project “Depressive Realism” and not “Depressive Reading” is that I 
don’t yet know what a depressive modernism, for example, would look like.  
The phrase “depressive realism” was coined by Lauren Alloy and Lyn Abramson, 
two psychologists who in 1979 found that depressed people are more realistic and 
accurate in their perceptions of the world that non-depressed people. Their experiment 
involved asking depressed and non-depressed college students to choose whether or not 
to hit a button. Once the response time had passed, a light would or would not illuminate. 
Then the participants rated their control over the outcome. The non-depressed subjects 
were found to overvalue their control over this contingent situation, while the depressed 
subjects correctly perceived their lack of control. The depressed students were labeled 
“sadder but wiser,” and said to have a firmer grasp on reality than the non-depressed. 
Later researchers, however, have argued that it is the depressive’s negative bias, or 
inherent pessimism, that cause her to rate her control lower. That is, the issue is not one’s 
own sense of contingency, but one’s willingness to make any positive statement at all. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “The reparative reading position undertakes a different range of affects, ambitions, and 
risks.” See Sedgwick, 150.  
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The depressed person is not more attuned to the reality of her lack of control, but simply 
doesn’t want to say “yes” to anything.4  
Like the depressed experimental subjects, depressive readers are nay-sayers—not 
because they are distrustful or suspicious, but because they understand the critical 
enterprise to be incomplete, thwarted, or powerless. Being a depressive reader means 
recognizing the impossibility of scholarly ideals like disinterestedness, and giving up on 
the pursuit of “really” getting to the singular truth of any given text. The emphasis here is 
not so much on the embrace of multiplicity, in the matter of a deconstructive criticism, 
but on the stakes of criticism: What does criticism matter? To whom and for whom does 
it matter? What is the meaning of our insistence that it matter at all? I am not saying that 
the scholarly critical endeavor is a futile one, necessarily; I am asking what we might be 
left with, or even gain, if we relinquish what we have come to rely on as its most obvious 
justifications. (In some especially vocal quarters, this has to do with political purchase; in 
other corners, criteria such as greatness or beauty.) This project begins from a refusal to 
justify its object (the novel); its existence is justified by the novel.  
Depressive reading admits that critical interests and preoccupations are driven by 
temperament and affinities rather than the truth of an object at hand. One could read the 
depressive critical move as a response to a failure to get properly interested in the given 
object of study—in this case, the Victorian period. But a depressive reader would say that 
the object, in any case, is usually an alibi for something else. The depressive reader 
doesn’t try to bury or sublimate moods or dispositions or interests in something more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Lorraine G. Allan, Shepard Siegel, and Samuel Hannah, “The sad truth about 
depressive realism,” in The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 60:3 (2007): 
482-495. 
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respectable, like archival research; the very moods and dispositions of critical writing are 
themselves the subject. Depressive reading, which acts like antennae to search out the 
depressive aspects of the novel, is thus a useful way of dealing with the schizoid-paranoid 
feelings that producing scholarship produces—the feelings of inadequacy and aggression, 
the sense of futility or pointlessness, “the frustration [that] is felt as persecution.”5 On the 
one hand, scholars have largely neglected the negative feelings that are everywhere in the 
Victorian novel, and my dissertation wants to bring attention to what has been neglected. 
On the other hand, I don’t deny that the bad feelings are coming from me.   
While novel theory has been typically interested in sympathy or desire, my work 
takes ambivalence to be both the subject of the novel and a critical orientation towards 
the novel. To be sure, since Franco Moretti wrote The Way of the World, ambivalence has 
been a key concept in thinking about the novel. But this has mostly been grasped in terms 
of the compromises attendant on bourgeois participation in the social order. What about 
the feelings of compromise—feelings that are sometimes “calm passions” but sometimes 
rather more pronounced varieties of pain? In the chapters that follow, I theorize vanity, 
soreness, and dislike, as well as the psychological and literary strategy of play, to work 
towards a post-Freudian psychoanalytic novel theory. In some of the chapters that follow, 
especially the reading of Jude the Obscure, I veer close to what Raymond Williams 
would call a “structure of feeling,” in which a lived and affective formation is in explicit 
relation to a contested social formation. In my chapter on Trollope, I diagnose one way of 
thinking, vacillation, in terms of liberalism. But by and large I have not followed through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Stein, 503. 
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on connecting the feelings that structure the particular novels to a historical or social 
critique. That work can still be done. 
What’s new about any of this? Doesn’t everyone already know that the realist 
novel instructs the reader in accommodating herself to the “reality” of the world as 
given? Isn’t realism by definition, if not depressive, than at least depressing? This sense 
of the depressive side of realism comes from Frederic Jameson, who described the 
mechanics of narrative realism as a “peculiar dialectic, in which the desiring subject is 
forced to enumerate the objections to his or her Imaginary gratification in order to realize 
the latter even on the level of a daydream.”6 What is depressing here—or lazily called 
so—is the lack of gratification, or not getting what you want. Techniques such as 
omniscience, and plot obstacles that the narrative overcomes, are for Jameson in the 
service of a wish-fulfilling fantasy that butts up against the reality principle. That which 
cannot be overcome is the Real. Realism establishes itself as the form that does not grant 
all wishes.  
The Real is thus—virtually by definition in the fallen world of 
capitalism—that which resists desire, that bedrock against which the 
desiring subject knows the breakup of hope and can finally measure 
everything that refuses its fulfillment. Yet it also follows that this Real—
this absent cause, which is fundamentally unrepresentable and non-
narrative, and detectable only in its effects—can be disclosed only by 
Desire itself, whose wish-fulfilling mechanisms are the instruments 
through which this resistant surface must be scanned.7  
 
The novel, in other words, is the structure of desire itself, desire being that which cannot 
be sated; if one were to ever get the thing, desire would move elsewhere.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981: 183. 
7 Jameson, 183-184. 
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But in my work, the depressive—even when understood most crudely, as simply 
bad feeling—doesn’t arise from unmet desires, or from problems of desire at all. 
Classical Freudian psychoanalysis, like that from which Jameson takes his notion of the 
unconscious, emphasizes repression of desire and conflictual drives as the root of conflict. 
This has resulted in narrative theory that overprivileges desire as the activity that occurs 
while reading, and moreover, that neglects readings that are not pleasure-seeking or 
suspense-driven but are bound up in states of duress, unpleasure, or burden.8 (Do we 
insist in the academy that narrative is desire because so much of our own reading is done 
instrumentally or unhappily?) I don’t conceptualize narrative as a form of desire, and 
consequently my readings explore pathologies that arise not from conflictual drives, but 
from dissociation or arrested development. Jody Messler Davies has described how 
relational models of the mind picture the unconscious as “not an onion which must be 
carefully peeled…but a child’s kaleidoscope in which each glance through the pinhole of 
a moment in time provides a unique view.”9  
So rather than arriving at one single truth or originary smoking gun, I am 
interested in readings that might kaleidoscopically co-exist with other scholarship. 
Kaleidoscope is how I think about Trollope’s plotting, too, as well as Thackeray’s. 
Balzac and Dickens move towards a receding object of desire, but Thackeray and 
Trollope rotate, each episode refracting some new light. Almost any scene or situation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “We can, then, conceive of the reading of plot as a form of desire that carries us forward, 
onward, through the text. Narratives both tell of desire—typically present some story of 
desire—and arouse and make use of desire as dynamic of signification.” See Peter 
Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press), 1984: 37.	  
9 See Stephen A. Mitchell and Margaret J. Black, Freud and Beyond: A History of 
Modern Psychoanalytic Thought (New York: Basic Books), 1995: 218.	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can function as an emblem of their novels, because the shape of their plots is not a line 
but a crystal that can be examined from many sides. Progress is not made; likewise, in 
Jude the Obscure, progress is continually un-made. This has very interesting 
consequences for character. Rather than delaying the distribution of knowledge within the 
fictional world to create gaps that must be overcome, Thackeray and Trollope allow 
everyone to know everything all the time. A kind of laziness permeates their worlds. 
There is no real reason to finish their books. If we do, it’s not because desire is at play, 
but other factors, which I explore in my readings—killing time in the case of Thackeray, 
comfort in the case of Trollope. The image of the kaleidoscope is also an image for 
reading itself, and not only reading kaleidoscope-shaped plots. Wolfgang Iser writes that 
“the activity of reading can be characterized as a sort of kaleidoscope of perspectives, 
preintentions, recollections.”10 Depressive reading is always aware that it is only one such 
perspective.     
So while my project bears affective affinities with Lauren Berlant’s Cruel 
Optimism, it ultimately has very different stakes. For Berlant, cruel optimism is a 
structure of failure that exists somewhere between repetition compulsion and false 
consciousness. It involves an attachment that is fueled by desire for a fantasmatic 
(because it is impossible) notion of the good life. I, too, am interested in how subjects 
negotiate the good things that the world presents to them, whether they critique them as 
hollow or false, or cling to them for their comforts. But my work does not give an 
account of “bad desire.” Depressiveness is a form of attachment, not the residue of an 
ungratified longing.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach,” in New 
Literary History 3:2 (Winter 1972): 284 
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 “Depressive Realism” also opposes the commonplace that the novel is the literary 
form that represents consciousness, and, consequently, the project has only a little interest 
in free indirect discourse. For many people, free indirect discourse has become equivalent 
with the novel itself; the notion that what novels do is “represent consciousness” is 
popular wisdom for non-academic readers and academic readers alike. As Dorothy J. 
Hale has written, what brings novel theory and cultural studies together is a joint 
commitment to the study of point-of-view. It is widely acknowledged that the novel 
“instantiates [identity] through its form.”11 From Henry James to Bakhtin and beyond, 
readers have been trained to pick apart “who is speaking” in a hunt for alterity. The 
novel’s ethical project has become the instantiation of alterity itself, and the purpose of 
reading, that of gaining a window into the experience or lives of others. 
My dissertation looks at novels that imagine their ethical work as something 
rather different than the mere assertion of alterity, and that excel in formal techniques 
other than free indirect discourse or dialogue. My authors tend to have very strong 
presences in their novels, and the voices of the narrators are much stronger than those of 
individual characters. In the case of Thackeray, Hardy, and Brontë, there is little effort on 
the part of the author to establish characters as actually distinct thinkers from the novel 
itself. Their novels do not aspire to represent thinking at all. So if I am overly loose in 
whether I ascribe meaning or intention to the narrator or author, that habit arises from my 
conviction that these particular novels blur the distinction. Generally speaking, I’m 
interested in thinking insofar as it is a form of feeling. I prefer the word “feeling” to the 
word “affect” because of its sense of feelers, antennae, that signal, point, perceive, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Dorothy J. Hale, Social Formalism: The Novel in Theory from Henry James to the 
Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1998: 13. 
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receive cues from the environment. In this project, consciousness is that which is literally 
felt out, shaped by feeling.12  
 My first chapter dwells on the mechanics of direct address in Vanity Fair, which 
functions by making appeals for the reader to reflect not on the lives of the characters in 
the novel, but on her own life. The turn from free indirect discourse is hand in glove with 
a turn from the notion of a representable psychological interiority. Rather than represent 
consciousness of characters in language or through patterns or styles of thought, 
Thackeray presents characters as congealed dispositions. In my second chapter, I show 
that even though Trollope is at great pains to narrate thinking, he deploys characters as 
nodes of force who compel one another to act in certain ways over time, rather than as 
“voices” that debate or reason. Though his characters chat on and on, their logorrhea is 
not an invitation for the reader to imaginatively enter their consciousness, but a crisis that 
the reader enjoys or endures (or both). For Hardy, a felt response—dislike—does the 
work of elaborating a space of character that is deprived of clear motives or intentionality. 
In Brontë, my focus shifts away from character and towards her novels’ incorporation of 
the genre of the devoir or school composition. Others might read this in terms of 
heteroglossia, which would foreground the novel as a master genre capable of 
incorporating other genres. Instead, I read the devoir in terms of transitional object and 
play.  
The scholarly conversation on negative feeling has thus far been centered in the 
twentieth century. Sianne Ngai, for example, locates weak negative affects like irritation, 
anxiety, and envy in “what T.W. Adorno calls the fully ‘administered world of late 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “Klein assumes that in psychic reality, feelings create objects… Klein has no theory of 
a mental apparatus, and feelings are not placed in any such frame.” See Stein, 508-509. 
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modernity.’”13 My work argues that actually dissatisfaction and attenuated modes of 
subjectivity are at the heart of realism. I share with Christopher Lane the sense that the 
Victorians have been too often depicted as one-dimensionally industrious, helpful, 
charitable, and dutiful, without enough attention to the seething discontent that 
accompanied and qualified such virtues. But unlike Lane, I am not writing a history of 
Victorian culture; depressiveness is not a theme or object of representation in the 
Victorian novel. I imagine it as part of the novel’s architecture as well as a mood 
generated by reading these novels. Moreover, while Lane imagines that hatred might 
have a function like liberation—he writes in Hatred and Civility that “hatred escapes 
regulation in many literary and cultural texts, forging visions of individual freedom more 
imaginative than Foucauldians and conservatives generally admit”—freedom is not a 
term in my argument.14 I’m not opposed to individual freedom on principle, but the 
authors I study don’t put much faith in it.    
The richest critical inquiry into depressiveness has been in queer theory, in the 
work of Judith Halberstam, Leo Bersani, Lee Edelman, Heather Love, and others. In No 
Future, Edelman goes so far as to embrace annihilation of the species, writing that “we 
do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these 
fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future.”15 In 
Feeling Backward, Heather Love finds in late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
literature an “archive of feeling” produced by modern homophobia: “nostalgia, regret, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 2007: 1. 
14 Christopher Lane, Hatred and Civility: The Antisocial Life in Victorian England (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 3-4. 
15 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke 
University Press), 2004: 31. 
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shame, despair, ressentiment, passivity, escapism, self-hatred, withdrawal, bitterness, 
defeatism, and loneliness.” Love locates these feelings in relation to social 
marginalization and “the historical ‘impossibility’ of same-sex desire.”16 I write about 
similar feelings, but my focus is on how they arise in relation to participation in norms 
rather than in exclusion from them. As I argue in my chapter on Jude the Obscure, the 
psychic and social pain of participation in convention does not manifest as abjection, 
stigma, or shame; instead, it manifests as dislike and repetition, which open up space for 
individuation even within regimes of compulsory participation.  
Since the mid-twentieth century, novel theory has followed two lines of thought, 
one investigating desire and one concerned with sympathy. Depressiveness is an 
alternative to both of these traditions. It resists the sympathetic discourse of the novel’s 
inherent good, which has made a critical comeback in the last ten years, and holds out the 
hope that reading novels may be something other than a healthy way to spend one’s time. 
Sympathy is something like the zombie of literary criticism, already put down in the 
1980s by Foucauldians like D.A. Miller and Nancy Armstrong. The political context of 
the immediate post-9/11 era bears some responsibility for its return: Sympathy promotes 
a moderate liberalism in the face of a rapacious neo-conservatism. A renewed interest in 
Adam Smith and his writing on sympathy and suffering suggests a desire to rescue the 
thinker most closely associated in the public imagination with selfish capitalism and 
greed. Those in the sympathy camp are invested in a model of the self that privileges 
rationality, deliberation, judgment, and moderation—qualities that have been in short 
supply in American political life in the last fifteen years. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 4.	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What’s more, literary critics and professors in the early years of the twenty-first 
century have found themselves in desperate need to justify their readings—and their jobs. 
Fueled by the so-called “cognitive turn” on the one hand and crunched by the “crisis in 
the humanities” on the other, they have attempted through various means to prove that 
the novel is a necessary good because it promotes sympathy or sympathetic modes of 
thinking. If English can no longer be called upon to define or instill “critical thinking,” 
it’s at least “proven” to help students recognize the emotions of others. When faced with 
the always thorny question of what makes literature worth funding, sympathy provides an 
answer; the archive of nineteenth-century discourses of sympathy gives Victorianists 
special purchase on the subject. For readers of the New York Times, any work of “literary 
fiction” can be counted on to improve the moral self; for Victorianists, it is the 
nineteenth-century British novel, and its mechanisms of free indirect discourse, 
metonymy, and characterization, that promotes sympathy. 
Notable sympathetic-minded critics have included Rachel Ablow, Andrew H. 
Miller, and Rae Greiner. Each defends the novel—and they do offer defenses—in terms 
of moral and ethical development. I don’t entirely dismiss the impulse to assign an ethical 
imperative to the study of the novel—in Miller’s words, novel-reading is “an ethical 
practice” that explicitly addresses the meaning of a good life—but my project takes issue 
with the notion that improvement, reform, and sympathy are the form that ethics takes.17 
Whereas Miller’s Burdens of Perfection is a study of “the desire to improve and the 
history of that desire” as it appears in “narratives of ethical development,” my 
“Depressive Realism” is a study of the resistance to improvement, and that resistance’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Andrew H. Miller, The Burdens of Perfection: On Ethics and Reading in Nineteenth-
Century British Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 2. 
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attendant feelings of stuckness or staying-in-place.18 Depressiveness suggests that 
possibility might reside in remaining with what is useless and non-instrumental, rather 
than trying immediately to turn it to account or make it useful, productive, and purposeful. 
“Depressive Realism” is very much in the spirit of Anne-Lise Francois’s Open Secrets, 
which “contest[s] the ideology of improvement,” although it does so by attending to 
narratives of dissatisfaction rather than “nonappropriative contentment.”19 My depressive 
readings do not make claims about nineteenth-century cultural discourses, the history of 
thought, or even transtextual narrative structures. Like Francois, who also turns from 
narrative moments of action (as well as reigning critical modalities of suspicion and 
originality), I want to preserve a space for a non-instrumental ethics that isn’t 
immediately conscripted in “permanent vigilance” to its own partiality.20 To that end, I 
am more interested in the flavor of each author’s vision of what is non-instrumental—
comfort in Trollope, or dislike in Hardy—rather than in the non-instrumental as such. 
Those in the sympathy camp are more or less openly acknowledged 
transcendentalists or idealists. (Miller makes theology a resource for his concept of 
perfectionism.) But my dissertation is resolutely earth-bound: It studies novels that 
investigate this world, novels that do not imagine help or even exemplarity in relation to 
the next one. My work is keyed not to George Eliot, Elizabeth Gaskell, or Charles 
Dickens, all of whom imagined the novel as a tool for facilitating engagement between 
classes, or at least between persons. This worldliness, obviously, informs the project’s 
commitment to divorcing novel-reading from a project of spiritual uplift. So while I share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Miller, 1. 
19	  Anne-Lise Francois, Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press), 2008: 21, xvii.	  
20 Francois, 64.  
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with those in the sympathy camp a deep commitment to thinking about the self in terms 
of inter-relationality, my temperament drives me to very different conclusions. Miller 
writes that moral perfectionism believes that 
we become what we are in response to others… the individual who 
emerges…is not the solitary self familiar from more recent cultural history, 
beating its wings against inescapable regimens of surveillance. Instead, 
moral perfectionism provides a complex, relational understanding of 
selfhood, one that does not reduce human contact to forms of domination 
and subjection.”21  
 
Depressiveness also provides a complex, relational understanding of selfhood that does 
not reduce human contact to forms of domination and subjection—but nor does it rely on 
an unspoken transcendental horizon. 
Scholars of sympathy are well aware that skepticism meets their projects. They 
reject “easy” identifications of the sort that Martha Nussbaum has been prone to, and 
encourage readers to see sympathy as a structure of self-definition rather than an 
emotion.22 They want to rescue the discourse of sympathy from unsophisticated critics, 
and raise it to a philosophical investigation. In Greiner’s analysis, sympathy is social 
reality itself. She writes in Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction 
that for nineteenth-century writers, “reality would depend on the practice, and the central 
proposition, of sympathy—that what is true in a given moment is that which is 
collectively thinkable and can be felt as such.”23 Through sympathetic mechanisms, a 
character and a reader acquire new knowledge about themselves, coming to see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Miller, 15. 
22 See Rachel Ablow, The Marriage of Minds: Reading Sympathy in the Victorian 
Marriage Plot (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 2. 
23 Rae Greiner, Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 50-51. 
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themselves from the other’s point of view. For George Eliot, “only a sympathy that 
maintains a separation between self and other enables ethical choice.”24  
I am interested in characters that create the separation between self and other in 
less nice ways, whether they are explicitly determined by disposition or driven by 
inexplicable dislike. My dissertation draws attention to moments in which sympathetic 
mechanisms break down, fellow-feeling is rejected, and though feelings are shared and 
dispersed, they lack moral justification. Depressive skepticism does not, like Foucauldian 
skepticism, interrogate discipline. One way to think about my project is as a dialectical 
synthesis of sympathetic and paranoid readings, a third point of entry into the theory of 
the novel. My point is not that people are naturally un-sympathetic, but that the 
accommodations to the social order that sympathy celebrates (and that the novel 
undeniably participates in) are achieved by a complex working-through of loss, anxiety, 
guilt, and depression.  
How does the novel come to be a container for these negative feelings? What 
gives shape to this negativity, and prevents it from spilling over entirely? A historicist 
critic might point to liberalism, which, after all, instituted “toleration” as the necessary 
prerequisite for liberty.25 But though liberalism is at play in my readings of Trollope and 
Hardy, in general I’m interested in “toleration” as the relationship that exists between 
reader and novel. The barely-contained negativity that depressive reading homes in on 
and draws out is contained by the reader and by the coherence and persuasiveness of her 
reading, not by a political context, narrative structure, or personified element of form. It 
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25 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.), 1975, and Harriet 
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is not “realism” that is engaged in a process of mourning, fearing, or being anxious; it is 
the reader of realism. 
 But why does the reader have to “tolerate” anything? Of all the verbs used to 
describe that relationship between novel and reader, why have I chosen such a negative 
one? And just what is the object that requires tolerating—is it these particular novels, the 
Victorian period, or scholarship itself? I want to emphasize the latter, because the basic 
moves of academic scholarship—the assumption of expertise, the imperative to generate 
paradigms, even the making of argument itself—are so deeply alienating. But the truth is 
that there is some dislike in this project of the material, as there is dislike and aggression 
in every form of attachment. Besides, the ability to wade deep into unpleasure and stay 
there is a necessary part of institutional membership. Nobody likes all of their work all of 
the time. The novel, of course, is a useful analogue for thinking about the career and the 
deformations it requires.26 One of this project’s tensions lies between the world of 
Thackeray and Trollope and that of Hardy and Brontë. The former hew, cognizant of all 
its disappointments, to liberal bourgeois values; the latter explode them, rejecting what is 
socially safe, without, however, providing any plausible alternatives. It may be that 
liberal bourgeois values are themselves what academic criticism must learn how to 
tolerate, or admit that it does tolerate—the very ideology that critics so often rail against, 
and yet that provides us with the structure and limits within which we work.   
This project, then, is an exploration of different critical possibilities. The chapters 
do not progress chronologically by novel’s publication date, but tell a story about 
evolving attitudes. Each of the chapters very clearly maps onto the last three years of my 
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own moods. Each is exemplary of some discrete struggle with the endeavor to write this 
at all. My first chapter argues that Thackeray’s sharp social critique in Vanity Fair is not 
in the service of rising up against the inadequacies of the world, but rather in depressively 
coming to terms with them—in settling. This is the first move in any long game. The 
heart of the dissertation is the middle two chapters. Chapter Two, “Soreness, Pain, and 
Comfort,” analyzes how Trollope portrays thinking as a kind of soreness in the novels He 
Knew He Was Right and Orley Farm. This soreness helps clarify Trollope’s ethics, which 
seek to ameliorate suffering through comfort. Chapter Three, “What is it you don’t like in 
him?,” theorizes dislike and disidentification in Jude the Obscure, and shows that these 
are mechanisms of individuation in a world of crushing conformity. The final chapter, on 
Charlotte Brontë, resumes the conversation around play inaugurated in Vanity Fair. It 
considers how something like academic writing—Brontë’s own school compositions, 
which I call a form of transitional object—can be smuggled into other forms of writing, 
and allows the project to end on a note of possibility rather than rejection.  
Depressiveness is appropriate for a time in which feelings of political exhaustion 
are everywhere. The post-9/11 era has been marked by the incomplete projects and 
failures of the political left. Whereas earlier generations of critics had to navigate a 
political situation of thwarted utopia, my project exists in a context of base insufficiency: 
We have not been granted even the least that we expected. As Ann Cvetkovich notes in 
Depression: A Public Feeling, the “customary forms of political response, including 
direct action and critical analysis, are no longer working either to change the world or to 
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make us feel better.”27 Depressiveness as a position may help negotiate these 
disappointments by getting to know them better. In a world of increasingly attenuated 
agency—of data surveillance, of compulsory participation in unstable financial markets, 
of political apathy—the answer may not be a naïve return to the celebration of action but 
rather a more nuanced understanding of attenuation itself.  
If a sympathetic reader wants to rescue and a paranoid reader wants to get to the 
bottom of things, a depressive reader is curious about moods, and almost overly sensitive 
to the particularities of individual texts. (Reparative reading shares this sensitivity, 
although its aim of producing an object that provides nourishment means, first, that it 
must seek out certain kinds of objects, or, second, compel resistant objects to provide 
comfort. Depressive reading doesn’t know at the outset what the object will provide, or 
how the relationship will end.) Even though the Kleinian depressive is a unifying position 
that brings order to a disordered psyche, depressive criticism avoids unifying theories. It 
doesn’t treat literary texts as moves in an argument that’s really about something else—it 
doesn’t take literary texts as evidence for some other kind of discourse. Sympathy 
produces knowledge of other minds; Ruskin called Self “our great enemy,” and argued 
that the aim of literature was to focus on the plight and fortunes of others.28 Paranoia 
produces knowledge of the state and ideological repression. Depressive reading inhabits 
literary texts in an act of two-way discovery: the text is at once the thing that the reader 
gets to know, and the thing that allows the reader to know herself by finding her interests 
in it. The gambit is that this isn’t pure solipsism, and that, to paraphrase Emerson, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ann Cvetkovich, Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2012), 1. 
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knowing what is true for you may know what is true for others. Depressive reading 
begins from a place of radical subjectivity and alienation but ends in relationality.   
In each chapter, I struggle to articulate a relationship between individual and 
world, and specifically to grasp what is “inside” the subject and what is “outside” of her. 
I try to think in terms of worldliness, which evacuates some sense of innerness. “Inside” 
the subject is “the way of the world” itself. This doesn’t necessarily mean world-
weariness or disillusion or automatism. I think of worldliness in Heideggerian terms, as 
that which delimits a space of possibility, where a person has certain options for meaning 
available and others, not. To understand a given individual, then, a whole world has to be 
disclosed and known. The range of potentialities of the world will be both all-
encompassing and divisive. Sue Bridehead in Jude the Obscure does not live in the same 
world as Jude, even though they share an apartment.  
Thinking of characters in terms of worldliness leads away from dichotomies of 
active/passive, agentive/non-agentive, and freedom/repression. I draw on terms that de-
emphasize interiority, including disposition, force, and disidentification, and emphasize 
the placement of a subject into a world. I begin from the assumption that affects are 
produced interpersonally and are therefore not “interior” to the character. Insofar as 
affects are part of the definition of one’s identity, they are part of that definition for other 
people. In this I am well in line with contemporary writing on affect. Gregory J. 
Seigworth and Melissa Gregg gloss affect as follows: 
Affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act and 
be acted upon. Affect is an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or 
sometimes more sustained state of relation as well as the passage (and the 
duration of passage) of forces or intensities. That is, affect is found in 
those intensities that pass body to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, 
and otherwise), in those resonances that circulate about, between, and 
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sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very passages or 
variations between these intensities and resonances themselves. Affect, at 
its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces—visceral 
forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, 
vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward 
movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as 
if in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that 
can even leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability.29 
 
This brings to mind the example of Mrs. Gradgrind from Hard Times, which Rachel 
Ablow writes about in the essay “Victorian Feelings”: 
“Are you in pain, dear mother? 
“I think there’s a pain somewhere in the room,” said Mrs. 
Gradgrind, “but I couldn’t positively say that I have got it.”30 
 
Such instances of what Ablow labels affective contagion are an important background to 
my own writing on character. In my reading, however, the externalization and portability 
of feeling are conditioned by negativity: a waning or reduction that imagines the self not 
as motivated, conscious, and agentive but as sensitive, attuned, melancholic, and resistant. 
It could only be a “pain” that Mrs. Gradgrind cannot quite locate in herself, but rather 
finds connected to her but outside of her. 
Much other recent writing on feelings also explores subjectivity in terms of 
attenuation and porousness. Ngai expressly links her “ugly feelings” to what she calls 
“ambivalent situations of suspended agency.”31 Cvetkovich describes her aim as that of 
“generat[ing] new ways of thinking about agency.”32 Somewhat more radically, Teresa 
Brennan’s work on the transmission of affect explores how feelings circulate outside of 
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and between individuals, and associates the notion of the “emotionally contained subject” 
with Eurocentrism.33 Berlant also assumes a shared affective environment. I hope that 
“Depressive Realism” can contribute to ways of thinking about character that complicate 
discourses of rational agency by attending to permeability, suspension, attenuation, mood, 
disposition, transmission, and worldliness.  
This project does not engage in straightforward ideology critique, but it also 
doesn’t wholly participate in surface reading. (The critic is far too implicated in the 
readings for me to claim that I am just reading, or observing, or describing.) I draw freely 
and pluralistically on discourses as they become useful or relevant. Freud, Klein, and 
Winnicott emerge as key figures, but appearances are also made by Schopenhauer, 
Kierkegaard, Erving Goffman, Barthes, Sedgwick, D.A. Miller, Pierre Bourdieu, Elaine 
Scarry, and Stanley Cavell. The point is not to create intellectual chaos but to be sensitive 
to what each text needs. I read deeply and closely but do everything possible to find 
theoretical lenses that match or complement the mood or idea of the novels themselves, 
privileging the specific contours of each case rather than approaching all nails with the 
same hammer.  
Does the academy need yet one more call for “how to read”? Paranoid reading, 
reparative reading, distant reading, surface reading—these are the latest symptoms of the 
perennial confusion about what it is that we are doing as teachers and critics of English 
literature. What is this line of work, anyway? What counts as work in it? And what is it 
that we want to know in the first place? The pendulum has swung very far towards 
portable paradigms and trans-authorial analyses; I am dragging it back towards exegesis 
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and authorial oeuvre. The measure of the value of depressive reading will be if it can 
produce meaningful and persuasive readings, stories about stories that are true, 
interesting, and capable of explaining how these novels work and what they mean. But 
just as important—if only to me—is that it provides a way to tolerate the ambiguity 
around the practice of criticism itself. This is an ambiguity that involves both the 
compulsory and the irrelevant. But rather than imagine an escape or subversion of the 
compulsory, it performs it, all the while insisting on the irrelevance of the task at hand. 
The extent to which this paradox is a perogative of the novel form itself remains an open 
question.  
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“Made to Go On Pleasantly Enough”: 
Settling for Vanity Fair 
 
But is the world, then, a peep show? These things are certainly beautiful to behold, but to 
be them is something quite different.—Arthur Schopenhauer34 
 
In Lukács’s classic formulation, the novel is the form of a hero alienated from the world. 
On the one side stands the individual, coherent and independent and seeking; on the other 
side lies the world, a disconnected totality of disabling institutions and norms. Lukács’s 
phrase for this state of things is “transcendental homelessness.” For Lukács, meaning is 
no longer immanent, and the hero of the novel must, through experience, catch “a mere 
glimpse of meaning,” a glimpse that will make the burdens of living worthwhile.35 
This has been an influential account of the novel, and it describes some novels 
very well. But “transcendental homelessness” does not describe William Makepeace 
Thackeray’s Vanity Fair (1848). Indeed, one of the unusual aspects of Vanity Fair is that 
its characters are introduced as already entirely at home in the world. They handle and 
manipulate the world easily; they are in the world, of the world, and shot through with the 
world. The realm of meaning is not somewhere else, like the Tower Society in Wilhelm 
Meister; there is no transcendence, lost or otherwise. Unlike in Lukács’s examples, 
Thackeray’s characters don’t struggle to learn the world through experience or 
apprenticeship; they are born having inherited the world and they know what to do with it. 
And while the feeling that Lukács ascribes to the novel is alienation, the feeling that 
permeates Vanity Fair is something weaker: disappointment. Disappointment is not the 
result of a dislocation of meaning, but is the deflated feeling of settling into the world as 
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it is given. To find that one already possesses everything that is coming is, 
understandably, something of a comedown. 
From the preface “Before the Curtain” to the equanimous ending, where Amelia 
and Becky meet a joint fate, Vanity Fair positions the human actor and literary character 
not as a person possessing an interiority who makes choices, but as an externalized actor 
who plays or operates a game of strategy. Thackeray’s word to describe the subject of 
this social field is “disposition.” The first section of this chapter attempts to come to 
terms with what Thackeray means by disposition, and what relationship exists in this 
novel between individual and world. In the second section, I explore the ideas of vanity 
and transitoriness, and argue that Thackeray’s sharp social critique in Vanity Fair is not 
in the service of rising up against the inadequacies of the world, but rather in depressively 
coming to terms with them. I pull back from the brink of nihilism by taking up his image 
of gameplay as a way of making sense of the novelistic art of “killing time.” Finally, I 
argue that Thackeray’s use of direct address reveals the possibility of an ethics that is 
based not on justice, but on compassion. 
 
Disposition 
Throughout Vanity Fair, Thackeray is at pains to justify the existence of the novel he is 
writing. It all comes down to Becky and Jos’s inability to get themselves engaged. If only 
he had carried Becky off in marriage when she first arrived at the Sedleys’, we’re 
repeatedly reminded, none of this would have happened. First there is Jos’s failure of 
courage—he stuffed Becky with jam instead of proposing. Then George and Amelia 
made matters worse by untimely returning to the room where the would-be lovers were 
sitting in the dark. But neither explanation sticks. The real culprit is fingered at Vauxhall. 
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“That bowl of rack punch was the cause of all this history,” Thackeray writes of the 
liquor that Jos Sedley orders.36 The punch is definitive. Jos might have screwed up his 
courage and George and Amelia might have stayed out of the way, but he never had a 
chance with the punch. “Everybody had rack punch at Vauxhall.”37  
 The fact that Jos will drink the punch and that the punch will derail the 
engagement is a fait accompli. Neither intention nor reason are operative. Before getting 
into Thackeray’s handling of the scene, it’s worth thinking about how a very different 
realist depicted states outside of reason or choice. Consider as a point of comparison 
George Eliot on Lydgate’s mania in Middlemarch (1874). In that novel, two kinds of 
irrationality are possible: “hereditary constitutional craving” of the kind that drives 
someone to drink or opium, and “that excited narrow consciousness which reminds one 
of an animal with fierce eyes and retractile claws” that characterizes Lydgate at the 
gambling table.38 The latter animalistic trance is the inversion of vocation: both are forms 
of irrational, irruptive, inward gaze. Just as vocation is a moral choice that defines choice 
as responsiveness to a higher calling, the fall into gambling is a choice that Lydgate 
makes to respond to his baser impulses.  
 Eliot is clear that Lydgate’s moral error lies in his first entering the gambling hall, 
where he will be inevitably pulled into its environment and deeper into the darker corners 
of human instinct and desire. But though it is a choice, the temporality of choice is off. 
There is not one clear moment where he chooses badly. Is it when “his thought…began to 
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turn”?39 When gambling occurs to him, as if from outside? He tells himself he’s running 
up to the billiards room to find Mr. Bambridge, but this is hardly an innocent mission. 
His plan is to cheat on a horse trade for a mere twenty pounds. Is that the fall? He slides 
into it smoothly, surreptitiously, hiding whatever intention exists from himself. Once 
inside, there is only one way to bet. And if the fall is slow, the waking up is quick. A 
“sharp concussion” upon recognizing Fred and hearing him speak of Mr. Farebrother 
pulls Lydgate out of the state.40 
In Middlemarch, gambling mania is an opportunity to investigate consciousness. 
Even so, the focalization of the narrative shifts from Lydgate to Fred. Eliot’s narrator 
does not enter the gambling mentality; she observes it through Fred, who is able to 
recognize “something unfitting” because he, at other times, has himself inhabited it.41 
The betting scene is a lesson, and a warning, about losing oneself. In the end, it doesn’t 
reveal anything fundamental about Lydgate—it uses Lydgate to reveal something 
fundamental about the workings of thought and the human inclination to get swept away 
in a hollow of excitement that makes unique men all the same.    
 Thackeray’s use of the rack punch at Vauxhall is entirely different. First, there is 
no sense of his characters entering a world that is separate from that to which they belong, 
no crossing of a threshold from places where they should be to places where they should 
not be. There is no investigation of the process of consciousness that led them to choose 
to go into the bar for supper. There is no consciousness at all. This is not to say that they 
are naturalist brutes; there are also no drives or instincts at work. We simply, suddenly, 
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find ourselves in the bar with not even a preamble to indicate how long the characters 
have been there.  
The two couples were perfectly happy then in their box: where the most 
delightful and intimate conversation took place. Jos was in his glory, 
ordering about the waiters with great majesty. He made the salad; and 
uncorked the champagne; and carved the chickens; and ate and drank the 
greater part of the refreshments on the table. Finally, he insisted upon 
having a bowl of rack punch; everybody had rack punch at Vauxhall. 
‘Waiter, rack punch.’ 
 
How long has Jos been in his glory? It’s a tableaux. It feels like it has always been 
happening, and will go on happening in the background, even as the plot advances. A 
paragraph intervenes in which Thackeray dilates on the consequences of the punch for his 
novel. Then: 
The young ladies did not drink it; Osborne did not like it; and the 
consequence was that Jos, that fat gourmand, drank up the whole contents 
of the bowl; and the consequence of his drinking up the whole contents of 
the bowl was, a liveliness which at first was astonishing, and then became 
almost painful; for he talked and laughed so loud as to bring scores of 
listeners round the box, much to the confusion of the innocent party within 
it; and, volunteering to sing a song (which he did in that maudlin high key 
peculiar to gentlemen in an inebriated state), he almost drew away the 
audience who were gathered round the musicians in the gilt scallop-shell, 
and received from his hearers a great deal of applause.42 
 
Thackeray is far more interested in how Jos acts while drunk on the punch than in what 
he thinks before drinking it or why he drinks it. This is because Jos, “that fat gourmand,” 
does not choose to drink the punch; he is disposed to drink the punch. He’s the kind of 
person who drinks punch and excuses it by saying that everybody drinks it. (Amelia and 
George and Becky don’t have rack punch. Dobbin is never even in the bar.) Eric 
Auerbach wrote that “the fate of Achilles is Achillean”; we could say that in Vanity Fair 
the fate of Jos is Josian, just as the fate of Becky is Beckian and the fate of Dobbin, 
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Dobbinian.43 The question the novel answers is what a Becky Sharp is—and a Dobbin, 
and a Jos, and a Rawdon—and it shows how these fates belong to some overlap between 
internal qualities and the world. The first words Becky speaks in the novel are, after all, 
“I suppose I must.”44 Thackeray’s characters are fundamentally responsive to 
circumstance, not because they desire to be, but because they must—that’s what they’re 
there to do. 
Is there something tautological in this? Becky does X because she is Becky; Jos 
does Y because he is Jos. It’s more complex than that. What is at issue in terms of 
character is the alignment of Jos’s mode of participation in social life (or the world) with 
the structure of social life (or the world) itself. Disposition is frequently invoked by the 
narrator and explains a wide range of behaviors and styles.45 Dispositions can be kind and 
placable, generous and manly, sociable and far from proud, selfish, complying, kind and 
forgiving, good-natured and obliging, generous, simple and demanding protection, soft 
and foolish, or benevolent. Notably, there are not dispositions to greatness or heroism, 
public works or ambition, triumph or warfare. Dispositions are domestic and 
interpersonal. Moreover, dispositions may come into focus at certain moments—as in the 
scene with the rack punch—but they do not function like heroic virtues that come out 
under pressure or duress or in moments of crisis. Dispositions are not revealed in great 
action but in habits. By the time Jos drinks the punch, we’ve already seen him, on an 
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earlier night, drink two-thirds of a bottle of champagne. The scene confirms an 
expectation; it doesn’t challenge or overturn one. Dispositions do not suddenly emerge; 
they are by definition unsurprising. This is not to say that all dispositions are the same. It 
is only to say that disposition—which we could imagine as a horizontal axis, intersecting 
the vertical axis of ethical action—undercuts the ability of someone to change or choose 
an ethical action. Some dispositions are surely better than others, but if your disposition is 
not up to you, then we must rethink our notion of responsibility, as well as 
blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.    
 When Jos sends his parents a bit of money after their bankruptcy, this is also 
chalked up to his disposition. “Jos Sedley had acted as a man of his disposition would, 
when the announcement of the family misfortune reached him.”46 His actions are 
unheroic and barely noticed by the Sedleys. It’s the gift of the Sedleys’ own spoons that 
the stockbrokers buy at the auction of their household property that reduces Mr. Sedley to 
tears. So even though character in Vanity Fair is generally structured as disposition, it’s 
also true that disposition is the background or status quo against which idiosyncrasy 
sometimes appears in relief. (Generosity is an idiosyncrasy in this world.) What makes 
Becky interesting is that she is predictable (insofar as she will always hurtle herself at the 
next obstacle in order to overcome it) while always being unpredictable (her methods will 
be ingenious and surprising).  
 Disposition is always directional: One is put into a position, from which one is 
then disposed towards something or someone. It is disposition to do or behave in a certain 
manner in a social field, an orientation or an opening position in a longer game.  
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It at first seems to be an inborn condition, something like Freud’s notion of constitution. 
But constitution is what the world acts on; it precedes and is separable from experience. 
Freud calls it hereditary. Though Thackeray makes reference to nature and instinct, he 
does not mean to separate those inborn qualities from the social. Disposition is bound up 
in the world; it’s not the stuff that the world molds. It’s more like inheritance than a 
hereditary trait. Interestingly, the only negative disposition that Thackeray specifies is 
“selfishness,” which operates as an umbrella for all anti-sociality: There is no negative 
characteristic in Vanity Fair except the withdrawal from others.  
This world of social play functions very like the rules of habitus and disposition 
that Pierre Bourdieu established in Outline of a Theory of Practice. For Bourdieu, 
disposition “expresses first the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to 
that of words such as structure; it also designates a way of being, a habitual state 
(especially of the body), and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or 
inclination.”47 When reading for disposition, instead of looking for agentive choices, we 
must think about the strategies that certain dispositions allow for or close off, and to how 
disposition is performed bodily. Disposition is Bourdieu’s way into what others call the 
relationship between ideology and subject.  
“Habitus” is Bourdieu’s word for the social field populated by individuals whose 
dispositions have been “inculcated in the earliest years of life and constantly reinforced 
by calls to order from the group.”48 Ideologies (his example is honor) are enacted in ways 
of walking, holding one’s hands, looking others in the eye, speaking, and so forth. He 
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calls the habitus the “immanent law” that is instantiated in each individual “by his earliest 
upbringing” and supplies the “minimum of concordance” in the social field. Disposition 
and habitus are bigger than “subjective intentions and conscious projects.”49 It is not the 
thing that someone brings to the social; it is the way that someone operates in or 
navigates the social. One does not decide to cultivate a certain disposition like honor or 
generosity or courage. The social conditions of the habitus act as “immanent law” that 
lays out the guidelines for playing the games of honor or generosity or courage. You do 
not choose to play or not play; there is no outside the game. 
Bourdieu writes: 
The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of 
consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate 
transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more 
ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and therefore, more 
precious, than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation 
achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of 
instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political 
philosophy, through injunctions as insignificant as “stand up straight” or 
“don’t hold your knife in your left hand.”50 
 
What we see here is that the experience of being in the social teaches the subject, who 
learns a set of practices that then reinforce the rules of the game. This is a model that 
excludes epiphany, the preferred novelistic mode of consciousness-raising or learning. It 
is not vulgar behaviorism, but imagines behavior as a way of knowing the world. What 
one learns in one instance is useful to the next, so that Becky learns, while in the 
company of the Crawleys, to condescend to the Sedleys. But learning in this context is 
more like the dealing of new hands in a game of cards than it is like revelation. Becky 
doesn’t have to think about condescending to the Sedleys, or reflect. She just does it.  
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When Bourdieu describes the habitus as “the feel for the game,” he is explaining 
the coordination of individual and context that allows, in his example, the ball player to 
appear just where the ball appears in time for the catch. The consequence of such training, 
Kent Puckett writes in Bad Form, is “an un-self-conscious and spontaneous display of 
good form.”51 An idea of habitus and the status of the mistake go a long way towards 
explaining Thackeray’s Book of Snobs; Vanity Fair, however, is engaged in a different 
project. To be sure, attention to the habitus explains how mistakes show up as ruptures in 
the coherence of a closed game that should proceed smoothly. It’s undeniable that Jos 
makes a social mistake and exhibits bad form at Vauxhall. He gets drunk; he embarrasses 
himself and the others. For Puckett, “bad form…is bound up with efforts to produce and 
secure narrative authority in the omnisciently narrated nineteenth-century novel.”52 But 
what is interesting about Vanity Fair is how it challenges what Puckett calls the good 
aesthetic form of the nineteenth-century novel, which privileges, in his telling, interiority, 
closure, and omniscience. Vanity Fair refuses each of these: Psychologically it foregoes 
interiority in favor of foregrounding disposition; the many gaps and elisions of the plot 
refuse closure; and the narrator, though he is everywhere the characters are, doesn’t 
always know what is happening with them.  
Thackeray is interested not only in the play of social life in Vanity Fair and the 
accidents that proceed from it, but in something more metaphysical: its capacity for 
world-making.  
Thus the world began for these two ladies [Becky and Amelia]. For 
Amelia it was quite a new, fresh, brilliant world, with all the bloom upon 
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it. It was not quite a new one for Rebecca… But who can tell you the real 
truth of the matter? At all events, if Rebecca was not beginning the world, 
she was beginning it over again.53 
 
This is a world, to be sure, where manners have the power to decide the course of events. 
But the deep melancholy of the narrator hints that something more is at stake than snobs 
and how they eat their peas. The narrator establishes his authority over his characters by 
chastising them or excusing their errors. But unlike in the Book of Snobs, the mistakes 
they make are not matters of etiquette. Nor are they exactly matters of ethics—Thackeray 
states plainly in the prologue that the world of the fair is amoral. He explores what lies 
between etiquette and ethics: something more like ethos, or the spirit of the age. Whereas 
ethics and etiquette both depend on an actor who can be held responsible, ethos is that 
which speaks through the individual. Ethos has consequences but not, strictly speaking, 
responsibility.  
To say that the world began for Becky and Amelia is different than to say that 
they set off to find the world. This world does not exist until Becky and Amelia make it. 
This doesn’t mean that they are free to make the world however they want it to be. This 
isn’t even Becky’s first beginning, just the first we learn of her beginning-agains. She 
will begin the world many times in the novel, and, it is implied, many times outside of the 
story we are told. The fact that Becky is not a virgin is crucially bound to this power of 
beginning: She literally has nothing to lose. There is another instance of “beginning the 
world,” which is after the Sedleys’ bankruptcy, when they also have nothing left to lose: 
“‘We’re ruined, Mary. We’ve got the world to begin over again, dear.’”54 
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There is something Heideggerian in this idea of beginning the world. Heidegger 
also had a concept of disposedness, which has to do with moods. Put simply, for 
Heidegger moods are not to be found “inside” the person or even “outside” her but are 
present in certain situations or positions the person finds herself in. Dispositions to fear or 
anger or happiness or joy disclose the “thrownness” that characterizes being-in-the-
world—the circumstances that reveal some possibilities and hide others.55 To return to 
our example of Jos and the rack punch, we could say that the punch was part of the world 
of Vauxhall that was available for Jos and that he was disposed to use. It was not a choice 
made by a rational actor, but part of a world that appeared for him and through which he 
appeared. It is this sense of character as disclosed by the world that Thackeray relies on 
throughout the novel.  
Making the world is a matter of beginnings that accumulate but don’t develop or 
deepen. In The One Vs. The Many, Alex Woloch made much of the fact that Miss Jemima 
must exit Vanity Fair to make room for Becky.56 But we never get to know Becky in a 
deeper way than we knew Miss Jemima: We just get more of her. Thackeray is not 
interested in deep psychology or character growth or in distinctions between major and 
minor but in a field of exteriorities, episodes, and gestures, such as Becky’s triumphant 
chucking of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary out the carriage window on her way from Miss 
Pinkerton’s School. The illustration is called “Rebecca’s Farewell.” (Thackeray always 
uses Becky’s full name to ironize moments when her low behavior and “proper” name 
clash.) In the drawing, Becky has just flung the dictionary out the window; her arm is still 
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raised, in a closed loose fist that almost looks like a salute. Her eyes are dark and her face 
is pinched, but her lips are just ever so slightly raised in a smile. She relishes the moment. 
Miss Jemima’s hands are open, in shock, as if to catch the book; an unidentified girl hides 
her face in shame at the gate. The dictionary hangs, open, in the air. The drawing freezes 
the action so that, like Jos’s background of drunkenness, it seems to be happening not 
once but always, like there is a temporality in which Becky Sharp has continually just 
thrown the dictionary at Miss Jemima. Such an action is partial but also complete in itself, 
and yields no consequences. It contains all of Becky.57 
The narrative of Vanity Fair emerges as a series of discrete crystallized moments 
or gestures like this flinging of the dictionary. (Another example is Becky’s performance 
as Clytemnestra.) The exchangeability of these episodes and their evenness in terms of 
attention and affect and import seems to have something in common with the form of the 
panorama, which overwhelms, and whose discrete components become something of a 
blur. A panorama, of course, is a painting arranged in the round so that a centrally-
positioned viewer can take in all the images.58 What’s important about the mode of 
display is that while a panorama might contain a lively scene or detail, in general, it is 
experienced in its plenitude; often, there is no detail at all, only plenitude. Just as Percy 
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Lubbock wrote of Thackeray’s narratives, panoramic details emerge out of a 
background.59 Even Becky’s final dispatch of Jos is not really the fulfillment of the 
novel’s arc, but simply one more episode, on par with all the others came before. Because 
we know that Becky’s life in some way exceeds the plot, we have no way of resolving 
this plot or creating hierarchies within it. In order for a painted panorama to look correct, 
the proportions had to be altered at the smallest level. We might say that in order for a 
novel of Vanity Fair’s length and scope to seem proportioned, leveling description must 
be utilized. From a step back, everything comes into focus. (As Lukács wrote, “narration 
establishes proportion, description merely levels.”60) In this way, Vanity Fair shows that 
the bildung structure is not at all necessary for the project that Moretti identified as the 
novel’s reconciliation to the status quo. The process of accommodation is done away 
with; time does not change or fulfill but only passes. 
History still occurs, but the way we receive it is domesticated. The chapter “How 
Captain Dobbin Bought a Piano,” describes the Sedleys’ property being disposed of at 
auction, and the next chapter, “Who Played on the Piano Captain Dobbin bought?,” 
largely eschews any story about the cause of the bankruptcy. “Ventures had failed; 
merchants had broken; funds had risen when he calculated they would fall. What need to 
particularize? If success is rare and slow, everybody knows how quick failure is.”61 Even 
Trollope, who was also given to pronouncements on Society and “the way things are,” 
gives an account of the fears and predicaments of speculation gone wrong in The Way We 
Live Now; he elaborates the mechanics and the consequences and the mental anguish 
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caused by the Ponzi scheme. Thackeray’s disinterest in the details of Sedley’s screw-up is 
remarkable: The particularities—the very details that realism is supposed to be relish—
are not even interesting enough to summarize. In Vanity Fair, the specifics of one’s own 
life are unavailable. From the point-of-view of the narrator, stories are meaningful only in 
the abstract, as cases or examples of general laws. This emptying-out is bound up in the 
melancholy of the novel’s tone. It’s a disappointment to not have a life whose details are 
interesting, a disappointment to have a life that feels like everyone else’s.  
Midway through the chapter, we at last get some cause for the family’s suffering: 
Napoleon. “So imprisoned and tortured was this gentle little heart [Amelia’s],” 
Thackeray writes, “when in the month of March, Anno Domini 1815, Napoleon landed at 
Cannes, and Louis XVIII fled, and all Europe was in alarm, and the funds fell, and old 
John Sedley was ruined.”62 Surely not everyone was ruined. But whatever intermediary 
steps Sedley took, whatever his actions, whatever his unique errors, the ultimate mover of 
this history is History itself. (First John Sedley joked that his champagne is as good as 
“Boney”’s, and then Bonaparte caused his downfall.) The ironizing of these links 
between the individual and history communicates Amelia’s overvaluing of her own 
romantic life and her disinterest in geopolitics. But what is not ironic is Thackeray’s 
understanding that history shows up in daily life in just these ways—that how his readers 
as well as his characters experience history is not as the generals marching, but as a series 
of economic reverberations.  
So although the characters literally run away from the Battle of Waterloo—the 
only “order for march” we get is Jos whipping the horses he has bought from Becky to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid, 214. 
	  
	   38	  
use to flee the city—it’s not quite right to say that the world of Vanity Fair excludes the 
historical.63 Thackeray excuses the gap in narration with something of a kettle defense: 
the history of Waterloo has been told many times before, the commonness of the 
knowledge makes further telling unnecessary, and if he were to tell it, the readers would 
get needlessly worked up and vengeful over it. But it is the novel’s worldliness itself—
the way it imagines the relationship between disposed individual and social habitus—that 
requires the recession of the major events of the world. And if the recession is literal, so 
much the better; it shows the seams of vanity when class is deprived of money.  
 
Vanity 
In the last of his Punch column on Snobs, published in 1847, Thackeray considered the 
case of one Jawkins, tormentor of dinner companions. The author reported sharing a 
secret laugh over the man’s pretensions with a young lady while 
Jawkins, meanwhile, went on blundering, and bragging and boring, quite 
unconsciously. And so he will, no doubt, go on roaring and braying, to the 
end of time or at least so long as people will hear him. You cannot alter 
the nature of men and Snobs by any force of satire; as, by laying ever so 
many stripes on a donkey’s back, you can’t turn him into a zebra.64  
 
Jawkins will go on blundering, bragging, and boring as long as the social world will 
tolerate him, or to the end of time—in one breath Thackeray invokes the possibility of a 
world beyond the social and closes it off. If there ever were a world in which Jawkins 
could not be heard, it would be much the same thing as coming to the end of time. There 
is no hope for Jawkins, and there is, alas, no hope for anyone who comes within earshot.  
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This is the world that Becky and Amelia begin and begin again, and that the reader of the 
novel begins, and begins again. A popular protest slogan claims that “another world is 
possible,” but Thackeray is more interested in the feelings that arise from beginning this 
world than in the structure of that which has not yet come. The problem, for Jawkins as 
well as Thackeray’s other characters and his readers, is not that he won’t learn; it’s that 
the nature of things has nothing to teach. In this world experience is not educative; it 
accrues, but it does not culminate. From the highest to the lowest all are the same.65 We 
are all donkeys, and a donkey can never be turned into a zebra. Now, would it be better if 
you could turn a donkey into a zebra? Probably! But you can’t.  
Jawkins’s vanity—the self-admiration that causes him to jaw away, talking about 
himself and imagining his blunders as charms—is connected to another kind of vanity. 
This is a more Schopenhauerian vanity, the vanity of the world itself. “Ah! Vanitas 
Vanitatum! Which of us is happy in this world? Which of us has his desire? or, having it, 
is satisfied?—Come, children, let us shut up the box and the puppets, for our play is 
played out.”66 Vanity in the sense of futility is a consequence of disposition; character 
cannot be transformed, develop, or reach fulfillment. It becomes what it already was. 
Unlike Trollope, who finds satisfaction in his own notion of worldliness, Thackeray ends 
on a note of elegy, wistfulness, regret. It’s not that things could have been otherwise—to 
think so would be vanity—but it still would have been nice if they could have been. 
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There is, however, a species of freedom, or at least relief, in foregoing happiness as a 
goal and settling for what comes. It involves foregoing futurity.  
When Andrew Miller writes that “to read Thackeray is to experience the world as 
[characters in the late novel Philip] do, able to see but not possess the objects we desire,” 
he assumes that possession as such is an intrinsic good.67 But it seems to me that 
Thackeray paints the dream of possession as just one more vanity. Vanity Fair contains 
the unexpected notion that possession is not a failed end but no longer a desired goal at 
all. At issue is not meaning—Miller writes that “in Thackeray’s view, objects have no 
extrinsic, transcendental meaning”—but ways of passing the time.68 
Sixty years ago, F.R. Leavis dismissed Thackeray from “The Great Tradition” on 
the grounds that his novel was merely a way of passing—rather, killing—time. He wrote 
that 
[Thackeray] has (apart from some social history) nothing to offer the 
reader whose demand goes beyond the “creation of characters” and so on. 
His attitudes, and the essential substance of interest, are so limited that 
(although, of course, he provides incident and plot) for the reader it is 
merely a matter of going on and on; nothing has been done by the close to 
justify the space taken—except, of course, that time has been killed 
(which seems to be all that even some academic critics demand of a 
novel).69  
 
Far from missing some secret essence of Thackeray’s work, Leavis captures it precisely. 
Thackeray’s plots are strings of episodes, panoramic in nature, whose main interest is in 
the “creation of characters” (or dispositions), which go on and on (eight hundred some 
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pages) and “kill” hours of the reader’s time. The only thing that Leavis misses is that the 
project of “killing” time is one worth taking seriously.  
 The expression “kill-time” was born in the context of the novel. Its first recorded 
use is by Samuel Richardson, who used it both in Clarissa and in a letter to Mrs. Barbaud, 
in which he decried entertainments without moral lessons as being “mere kill-time 
amusements to thinking minds!”; later it was later used by Coleridge to describe the 
“habit” of reading novels.70 For Leavis, “killing time” seems to indicate that “nothing” 
happens in Thackeray; for 18th and 19th century writers, “killing time” also connotes the 
moral waste of time spent reading literature. “Something” must “happen” for there to be a 
moral lesson and an ethical pay-off.  
But is time really “killed” in Vanity Fair? Is this the right way to metaphorize the 
act of reading a work of such duration? Time is not so much done away with as it is 
drawn out. Within the world of the novel, time functions to delay, becoming the medium 
of maneuvering, tactics, and strategy. (Bourdieu’s intervention in anthropological 
discourse was, through disposition and habitus, the introduction of time into purely 
synchronic ethnographic models.) Unlike Henry Esmond or Pendennis, which suggest a 
developmental model of time (“mental changes” in Pendennis are likened to the graying 
of hairs), the episodic structure of Vanity Fair suggests that the order of events is not so 
important as their sheer piling up. This piling up is uncumulative, by which I mean it 
does not build to anything other than itself. Time therefore does not yield truths, but is 
instead the medium that reveals the sheer waste and vanity of life. As Schopanhauer 
wrote, 
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The way in which this vanity of all objects of the will makes itself known 
and comprehensible to the intellect that is rooted in the individual is 
primarily time. It is the form by whose means that vanity of things appears 
as their transitoriness, since by virtue of this all our pleasures and 
enjoyments come to naught in our hands, and afterwards we ask in 
astonishment where they have remained. Hence that vanity itself is the 
only objective element of time, in other words, that which corresponds to 
it in the inner nature of things, and so that of which it is the expression.71  
 
Vanity Fair, then, must be a long novel: transitoriness is expressed in duration rather than 
in brevity.  
In Thackeray, there are not experiences of greater or lesser intensities, of more or 
less meaning. Knowledge is not historical knowledge or divine knowledge but 
worldliness itself, knowledge of the game. It is difficult to remember such knowledge. 
Indeed, Thackeray’s frequent admonitions to himself that he must not get too far off topic 
or lose the story do not seem a sign of anxiety that the reader will forget the narrative, but 
rather draw attention to the inevitability of that reader’s forgetting. The knowledge of 
Vanity Fair is not intended for keeping. Like a panorama that exceeds what a viewer can 
take in at any one moment, the episodic structure and the sheer length of the narrative 
indicate that one is not meant to remember all of its details and events; such a thing is 
undesirable, impossible—undesirable because impossible. It is a function of Vanity Fair 
that one passes through it; like its pleasures, it may consume the moment, even threaten 
to overtake it, but it is ultimately fleeting. One returns not with a moral, but only with, as 
the Prologue advises, “a sober, contemplative, not uncharitable frame of mind.”72 This 
frame of mind is the thing that the novel is cultivating. Becky’s story of upward mobility 
and striving is, in the end, a story about the virtues of settling: settling for the terms of 
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this world, settling in for the puppet show, for the given. The virtues of settling are 
endurance, acceptance, and a sporting attitude. We, too, are invited to settle into a 
comfortable chair; reading, not revolution, is on offer. The settling rooted in the 
disappointment of the narrative voice denies the possibility of self-overcoming—what 
Andrew Miller, after Stanley Cavell, calls moral perfectionism—as much as it denies 
political or social change. This is not resignation to the status quo, but a confrontation 
with the irresolvable disappointments of the status quo.  
Time is killed in another sense—that it has not been turned to profit. When you 
settle for something, you give up on making improvements to it. You also give up on 
work. As Miller imagines it, “moral perfectionism” is not a slavish disciplining regime. 
But it is an anxious, ceaseless project of improvement that “propos[es] that we turn from 
our ordinary lives, realize an ideal self, and perfect what is distinctly human in us—and 
that we do so in response to exemplary others.”73 This entire pursuit, of deep 
responsiveness to others and transfiguration, is alien to Thackeray.74 A gentleman, after 
all, is idle. Vanity Fair suggests that if the form of the novel does not of necessity provide 
spiritual or moral uplift, it at least is not of necessity another arena for tireless—and 
hopelessly hypocritical—bourgeois self-improvement. Published at the end of the 1840s, 
a decade of industrial strife and industrial novels that took that strife as subject, Vanity 
Fair shrugs at work, shrugs at piety, shrugs at improvement. Thackeray does not bother, 
like Dickens, to parody the reformers and evangelical do-gooders; he ignores them. The 
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one example of work (at least in the sense of “working it”) that we get is Becky, and even 
if she is everyone’s favorite, she is nobody’s hero.  
 “Well, well,” the narrator clucks, 
a carriage and three thousand a year is not the summit of the reward nor 
the end of God’s judgment of men. If quacks prosper as often as they go to 
the wall—if zanies succeed and knaves arrive at fortune, and, vice versa, 
sharing ill luck and prosperity for all the world like the ablest and most 
honest amongst us—I say, brother, the gifts and pleasures of Vanity Fair 
cannot be held of any great account, and that it is probable… but we are 
wandering out of the domain of the story.75 
 
I want to suggest that here Thackeray, as in all references to Vanity Fair, is invoking both 
the world of the novel and the act of reading it. In this interpretation, the novel itself is a 
gift and pleasure that cannot be held of any great account. By so wryly discounting the 
moral pay-off of the novel, by imagining it as a kill-time, Thackeray is asking the reader 
to reconsider what a kill-time might do. A kill-time is something that might be, if not 
good, then at least good enough.   
“Enough” is a characteristic concept for Vanity Fair; the word is spoken dozens 
of times by different characters and the narrator. There are instances of “spent enough,” 
“good enough,” “handsome enough”; and, importantly, “time enough.” The most 
clarifying instance of “enough” comes late in the novel, when Becky and Rawdon are 
busy entertaining the world with parties paid for by money they don’t have. 
I protest it is quite shameful in the world to abuse a simple creature, as 
people of her time abused Becky, and I warn the public against believing 
one-tenth of the stories against her. If every person is to be banished from 
society who runs into debt and cannot pay—if we are to be peering into 
everybody’s private life, speculating upon their income, and cutting them 
if we don’t approve of their expenditure—why, what a howling wilderness 
and intolerable dwelling Vanity Fair would be! Every man’s hand would 
be against his neighbour in this case, my dear sir, and the benefits of 
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civilization would be done away with. We should be quarreling, abusing, 
avoiding one another. Our houses would become caverns: and we should 
go in rags because we cared for nobody. …All the delights of life… would 
go to the deuce, if people did but act upon their silly principles, and avoid 
those whom they dislike and abuse. Whereas, by a little charity and mutual 
forebearance, things are made to go on pleasantly enough: we may abuse a 
man as much as we like, and call him the greatest rascal unhung—but do 
we wish to hang him therefore? No. We shake hands when we meet. If his 
cook is good we forgive him, and go and dine with him; and we expect he 
will do the same by us. Thus trade flourishes—civilization advances: 
peace is kept; new dresses are wanted for new assemblies every week; and 
last year’s vintage of Lafite will remunerate the honest proprietor who 
reared it.76  
 
Thackeray’s world is not ultimately a Schopenhauerian nightmare of suffering. Still, 
things going on pleasantly enough is not the same as things being good, or even pleasant. 
“Enough” indicates that things are acceptable—merely acceptable. “Enough” also 
indicates that one has stopped hoping and has, instead, settled into what is. Hope isn’t 
interesting in Vanity Fair. Dealing with the world as it is, and co-creating the world that 
is, is what matters. Things are “made to” go on. A novel without a hero is also a novel 
without a villain. The world itself is at fault. This will not be a satisfying reading to those 
who want to say, with good cause, that the world is only the people who make it. But 
Thackeray explores what Schopenhauer calls “man himself”—not particular culpable 
humans, but the fact of humanness, and the state of there being humans, at all.77   
 One of the reasons that principles can be so easily ignored is that they are ipso 
facto “silly.” The so-called principles of Vanity Fair are snobbishness, elitism, gossip, 
and so forth. We are not here called upon to dispense with justice, truth, love, and honor, 
but with the rather less grand practice of socially cutting those whom we dislike. Our 
reasons for dislike are generally not defensible. So even if dislike is something that can’t 
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itself be eradicated, it can be contained. The taste of a good dinner can make social 
distaste tolerable. Toleration is here closely linked to enough-ness: It doesn’t mean 
celebrate or even appreciate; it just means enduring, or allowing to persist. The overall 
good of everyone is therefore protected by this liberal habit of mutual forbearance.  
Of course, we can’t naively trust the narrator, or take everything he says without 
salt. He does nothing but tell us stories about Becky, and then warns us from believing 
stories about Becky. But there is enough in the novel about “enough” to evince that 
Thackeray trades transcendence or futurity for a here-and-now sociability. The reason 
that we must tolerate those we dislike is because there is nobody who we really like all 
the time. This program of shaking hands and enjoying the hospitality of those who are 
imperfect is the only thing between us and utter loneliness, as well as the only guarantee 
that we will not be hanged by our neighbors.  
Writing about vanity creates an interesting critical dilemma, whereby a political 
criticism appears as only one more vanity. What’s the point of writing at all about a book 
that might not be worth reading? One answer is that attentiveness to something like 
disappointment is itself an important critical move; the leap to anger and its 
externalization often covers up the feeling of disappointment, which involves looking 
inward and taking stock of desires and needs that are unsatisfied. But there is another 
other option for how we might approach the world, a rather un-Schopenhauerian solution 
to this otherwise vain scene. Vanity Fair imagines its goings-on in terms of a game, a 
situation of play. (By the end of the 19th century, “killing time” was being used to 
describe games like chess.78) The stakes, to be sure, are of limited value. As Dobbin says 
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of Amelia, whom he has been pining for endlessly, “I knew all along that the prize I had 
set my life on was not worth the winning.”79 Amelia’s worthlessness is not something 
that Dobbin learns from playing—he knew it all along. (This is unlike Henry Esmond, 
who must learn that Beatrix is not worthy of his love: “Is he the only man that has set his 
life against a stake which may be not worth the winning?”) Dobbin plays the game with 
his eyes wide open.80 At the crisis moment, he leaves on the line, “I have spent enough of 
my life at this play,” thus announcing the overlap of the theatrical, the game, and the 
gamble.81  
Moreover, women are not only prizes of questionable value; they themselves 
compete. Lord Steyne tells Becky, “You’ve got no money, and you want to compete with 
those who have. You poor little earthenware pipkin, you want to swim down the stream 
along with the great copper kettles. All women are alike. Everyone is striving for what is 
not worth the having! Gad!”82 (Spoken, to be sure, by the man with money: They are 
always on hand to tell you that money isn’t everything.) It is in the nature of winners not 
to deserve their prizes and in the nature of prizes to be not worth the winning. The game 
does not confer value on the prize; the game passes the time until the prize passes into 
one’s hands. 
Yet to say that a prize is not worth the winning is not to say that the game isn’t 
worth playing. Indeed, playing the game is what staves off nihilism. With his references 
to play, Thackeray moves the conversation away from the idea of a pay-off—a lesson, a 
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trophy, an object—and towards something durational and experiential. Games are a good 
form of the transitory, in which the game itself is what’s at stake. Playing this game well 
means valuing the rules over one’s own success or failure. The “good-humor” that 
Thackeray so often describes Becky as exhibiting is most clear when she is able to enjoy 
“a fun… at her own expense.”83 It’s significant that the otherwise un-wise George 
Osborne distills the message: “There’s no fun in winning a thing unless you play for it.”84 
This is a remark at once caddish and profoundly true.  
 
Compassion and Direct Address 
Where does this leave ethics? What I have been describing—characters without the 
capacity to make choices, panoramic plots, vanity—risks naturalizing inequalities and the 
status quo, mistaking the things that are of the world for those that must be of the world. 
Unlike a Balzacian milieu, which seethes with moral dilemmas, a pensive and amoral 
breeze blows through the Thackerayn habitus. (As I will discuss in detail at the end of 
this chapter, the very first page begins with a declaration of melancholy.) Yet unlike 
Balzac’s moralizing world of injustice, Thackeray describes his amoral climate as itself 
just. 
All the world used [Becky] ill, said this young misanthropist [Becky 
herself], and we may be pretty certain that persons whom all the world 
treats ill, deserve entirely the treatment they get. The world is a looking-
glass, and gives back to every man the reflection of his own face.85 
 
It’s half of justice, anyway. The world of Vanity Fair can’t do away with injustice, but it 
does dole out punishment. It’s worth pointing out that Becky herself succeeds by taking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Thackeray, VF, 528. 
84 Ibid, 145.	  
85 Thackeray, 15. 
	  
	   49	  
up the work of the world and reflecting to all of her marks their own faces: she mirrors 
back their own values, humor, and worldviews. She is herself a vanity mirror. Thackeray 
does not celebrate the status quo, nor does he deny that some nasty rich people eat well. 
But if this passage is true, they will receive nasty treatment in some other way, perhaps 
by coming to recognize themselves, or by meeting their own selves in the form of social 
treatment.  
When looking-glasses are in short supply, it is the narrator who reflects the just 
deserts. In the early part of the book Thackeray frames his habit of direct address as the 
practice of a “moralist.”86 
And, as we bring our characters forward, I will ask leave, as a man and a 
brother, not only to introduce them, but occasionally to step down from 
the platform, and talk about them: if they are good and kindly, to love 
them and shake them by the hand; if they are silly, to laugh at them 
confidentially in the reader’s sleeve: if they are wicked and heartless, to 
abuse them in the strongest terms which politeness admits of. 
 Otherwise you might fancy it was I who was sneering at the 
practice of devotion, which Miss Sharp finds so ridiculous; that it was I 
who laughed good-humouredly at the reeling old Silenus of a baronet—
whereas the laughter comes from one who has no reverence except for 
prosperity, and no eye for anything beyond success. Such people there are 
living and flourishing in the world—Faithless, Hopeless, Charityless: let 
us have at them, dear friends, with might and main. Some there are, and 
very successful too, mere quacks and fools: and it was to combat and 
expose such as those, no doubt, that Laughter was made.87 
 
The narrator is the moral arbiter of this world in which “such people” live vainly; direct 
address is his weapon. The incidents alone can’t be trusted to tell the right story: If the 
manager of the performance didn’t step in to comment, the reader might think that he 
approved of his characters’ poor behavior. This isn’t an especially convincing 
justification—could anyone mistake George Osborne for a gentleman?—and it raises 
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some serious questions about the narrator, given that his main concern is not the absolute 
rightness or wrongness of behavior, but that he might be mistaken for approving of that 
which he disapproves. “Having at” the follies of others is his way of preserving his own 
moral high ground. Thus even the morality of the narrator is a form of vanity in Vanity 
Fair. 
Thackeray claims that direct address is the source of humor. If we had no 
intermediary, we would be sharing the world with Becky, seeing it as she sees it, unable 
to create the necessary space to either laugh or make judgments. These are the same: 
Laughter is judgment. And yet “the moralist, who is holding forth on the cover (an 
accurate portrait of your humble servant)” is hardly a finger-wagger of righteousness. 
Abuse “in the strongest terms which politeness admits of” is not very strong abuse. “As a 
man and brother” was the slogan of abolitionists, which at once exaggerates and deflates 
the moral imperative. On the cover (in my edition, the title page), a man makes a speech 
atop a barrel, but on the frontispiece he reclines backstage, assessing himself in a mirror. 
Is he looking for the reflection that the world has given back to him? 
 Moretti writes that the “accentuated rigidity, which Bergson was to call 
‘automatism’” is the source of “the comic dominant to which the English novel owes 
such a great deal of its popularity.”88 He characterizes the linguistic exchange of the 
heteroglossia of the comic novel as being rooted in misunderstanding. But there is very 
little misunderstanding in Thackeray: A feature of life at the Fair is that things generally 
are what they appear to be. Even the game of charades, which asks a body to dress up as 
another body, is for Thackeray an occasion of surface-level meaning: The events of 
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Becky’s life make her into Clytemnestra; reality conforms to the game. Vanity Fair is not 
a novel in which different centers of consciousness duke it out. Just as there is very little 
free indirect discourse, there is also little in the way of compelling dialogue. These two 
typically go together: Moretti claims that in the English novel, the masters of dialogue are 
Austen and Eliot, who are interested in “social mobility, ‘improvement,’ ‘reform,’ and 
the reciprocal coming to terms of different individuals, social classes, and cultures.”89 
(Austen and Eliot are also, of course, masters of free indirect discourse.)  
“Thackeray, too, has a strong flavor of Thackeray,” Anthony Trollope wrote in 
his 1879 monograph on the elder writer.  
I am inclined to think that his most besetting sin in style,—the little 
earmark by which he is most conspicuous,—is a certain affected 
familiarity. He indulges too frequently in little confidences with individual 
readers, in which pretended allusions to himself are frequent. ‘What would 
you do? what would you say now, if you were in such a position?’ he 
asks.90 
 
Free indirect discourse is a mode that privileges alterity, between fictional characters and 
also between the world of the fiction and the reader; direct address appeals to sameness 
or continuity between the fictional and real worlds. Free indirect discourse and dialogue 
are complements of reformism—is there an ethics of direct address? These “little 
confidences” are questions, but they are not truly opportunities for self-investigation or 
cross-examination. They are moments of authoritative description in which Thackeray 
reports to the reader on the quality of her life, describing to her her own experiences. He 
addresses her not as an individual, but as a member of a group, making appeal to a role 
such as wife or husband or lover. It is as a collection of social dispensations and 
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dispositions that readers are appealed to, not as unique individualities. But frequently he 
invokes his readers en masse, as readers, and assumes for them a set of values. His “who 
questions” take the rhetorical form of Who will not own, Who can say, Who has not, 
Which of us, Who among us, and so forth. Unlike a discourse of alterity, which would 
ask the reader to empty the self and inhabit the consciousness of someone else, 
Thackeray appeals to that which is shared. But he’s not hoping to be answered. The 
questions are rhetorical. The problem with rhetorical questions, of course, is that they end 
conversations just where they could begin. 
As we saw in the Vauxhall example, disposition excludes trains of thought and 
even consciousness itself, privileging ways of handling or manipulating external reality. 
There is nothing to be learned by going “inside” the minds of those who live in Vanity 
Fair. What need have we to enter Becky’s mind when she plainly writes to Amelia lines 
like, “as if I cared a fig about my pupils!”91 This is obviously a thing that Becky 
shouldn’t say to Amelia, if she is to keep Amelia believing that she, Becky, is sweet and 
good. But it is part of the narrative fabric that people show their colors at all times. Since 
Amelia is an angel and Becky is not, Amelia is not necessarily able to understand what 
Becky is all the time telling her. Transparency and yet a lack of communication is the 
rule.  
Pendennis (1850), the coming of age story Thackeray published just after Vanity 
Fair, also assumes a shared experience with the reader. The plot follows Pen from his 
youthful romance with a cheap stage actress to his profligate student days to his 
journalistic success in London and eventual union with his saintly adopted sister, Laura. 
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Thackeray approaches Pen’s youth from the perspective of chastened adulthood. He 
presumes not only shared experience but shared perspective on that experience—a 
perspective that properly views the romance of youth as foolish. Of Pen’s love-fever over 
the actress, Thackeray writes: 
I suppose there is scarcely any man who reads this or any other 
novel but has been balked in love some time or the other, by fate, 
and circumstance, by falsehood of women, or his own fault. Let 
that worthy friend recall his own sensations under the 
circumstances and apply them as illustrative of Mr. Pen’s anguish. 
Ah! what weary nights and sickening fevers! Ah! what mad desires 
dashing up against some rock of obstruction or indifference, and 
flung back again from the unimpressionable granite! If a list could 
be made this very night in London of the groans, thoughts, 
imprecations of tossing lovers, what a catalogue it would be!92 
 
Thackeray addresses a male reader who has been in the same position as Pen—balked, or 
thwarted, prevented from attaining, love. And whatever the nature of “some rock of 
obstruction,” whatever the specifics, the effect is the same. It adds up to the collective 
experience of a catalogue of groaning, cursing lovers spread sleeplessly throughout the 
city.  
What a pang it is! I never knew a man die of love, certainly, but I 
have known a twelve stone man go down to nine stone five under a 
disappointed passion, so that pretty nearly a quarter of him may be 
said to have perished: and that is no small portion. He has come 
back to his old size subsequently—perhaps is bigger than ever: 
very likely some new affection has closed round his heart and ribs 
and made them comfortable, and young Pen is a man who will 
console himself like the rest of us.93 
 
Pen will console himself like the rest of us. In this move, the address incorporates the 
reader into a shared life history and assessment of that history; it also establishes the 
terms of sociality and community as that which requires consolation. “We” the readers of 
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this novel are a community only insofar as we share a sense of world-weariness or 
worldly melancholy. As the author refers to the fates of other real men he has known, the 
text becomes populated with experiences external to its characters—the experiences of its 
readers, and of others the author has known. The narrative accommodates these 
experiences as traces and uses them to justify its own story. The narrator is the privileged 
and melancholic figure who can connect to the reader’s world to the novel’s world. The 
privilege and the melancholy go hand in hand.  
David Kurnick has argued that the unique melancholy of Thackeray’s voice is 
rooted in a longing for the sociality and public world of the theater. The moments where 
the narrator breaks character hearken back to the epilogues and prologues in which actors 
addressed the audience, which were phased out in the 19th century when theater design 
changed and the stage apron was eliminated. Kurnick treats “Before the Curtain” as one 
such moment of breaking character. He writes that the voice of the narrator registers the 
distance between that social world of the theater and the private domestic enclosure, 
capturing that distance as loss.94 Of course, Thackeray’s intrusions into the narrative are 
numerous, and not at all confined to the beginning and ending of the novel. But rather 
than understanding the device as something that breaks or some kind of artifice, as 
Kurnick does, I would like to consider it as that which draws a wider circumference 
around a shared reading space. There is one world that the narrator sutures together.  
Trollope claimed that familiarity breeds contempt; it’s Thackeray’s gamble, 
however, that familiarity breeds a special kind of identification. In Vanity Fair, for 
example, when Mr. Sedley loses his fortune and passes his days in the Tapioca coffee-
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house in The City, the narrator remarks, “My beloved reader has no doubt in the course 
of his experience been waylaid by many such a luckless companion. …Who does not 
know the sad eager half-crazy look which he fixes on you with his hopeless eyes?”95 The 
reader is asked to envision the scene based not on Thackeray’s vivid power of description, 
not on the accumulation of detail, not on an appeal to imagination, and not on the 
emptying of self. We are directed not to think about the scene from Mr. Sedley’s 
perspective, but rather, from the perspective of Dobbin, waylaid by Sedley in the pub. 
The reader is not encouraged to imagine herself luckless and half-crazy, but is directed to 
remember the luckless and half-crazy people she has met. 
In addition to enforcing consensus—direct address permits only one speaker—the 
rhetorical question “Who does not know?” denies the possibility of intercession. Unlike 
Eliot, who included lowly subjects in art so as to insure that they would be included in the 
world’s religion and philosophy, Thackeray does not suggest that the fictive 
memorialization of Mr. Sedley’s predicament has the slightest power to change 
predicaments like it. The reader already knows the Mr. Sedleys of the world; this made-
up Mr. Sedley has nothing new to teach him. On the contrary, it is only by knowing the 
Mr. Sedleys of the world and by being already familiar with how he has reacted to them 
that the reader can hope to know the imaginary Mr. Sedley. There is little room here for 
the typical realist ethic of learning by example. The reader applies what she knows from 
life to the novel, not the other way around. In this way it seems Trollope misses 
something crucial when he claims that Thackeray offers examples to live by. On the 
contrary, Thackeray routinely asks readers to think of the real world before they jump to 
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fictional conclusions. “If every person is to be banished from society who runs into debt 
and cannot pay,” he says of Rawdon and Becky’s woes, “why, what a howling wilderness 
and intolerable dwelling Vanity Fair would be!”96 Thackeray believes that readers are 
harder on fictional characters than they are on the real people they know, and he asks for 
the same flexibility that the reader would show herself.  
The consensual rhetoric becomes a form of tact and protection; it refuses to know 
or to see what is on the stage or just off it. When Becky thinks to herself “I could be a 
good woman on five thousand a year,” the narrator entertains this as a possibility: 
And who knows but Rebecca was right in her speculations—and that it 
was only a question of money and fortune which made the difference 
between her and a honest woman? If you take temptations into account, 
who is to say that he is better than his neighbour?97  
 
The imagination of this compromised communal experience functions as a withdrawal. It 
refuses to judge, and it refuses to know. The humor—temptations are the standard that 
levels, not actions—is here smuggling in a universal that we are meant to take seriously. 
There is a minimalism of both ethics and epistemology: We actually cannot know if 
money or fortune is to blame for Becky’s scheming. There is the wry suggestion that 
honesty and humbleness would have made her just as happy as her relentless upward 
scramble, but this remark doesn’t properly undo the suggestion that money would make 
Becky respectable. Our inability to assign cause or responsibility creates the potential for 
something like compassion to enter. 
It’s one thing not to know a counterfactual; in Vanity Fair, we also do not know 
all of the facts themselves. The narrator seems to know or not know things depending on 
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their savoriness. Of Becky’s “Vagabond” chapter, the narrator claims, “When she got her 
money she gambled; when she had gambled it, she was put to shifts to live; who knows 
how or by what means she succeeded?”98 We do not get the most interesting or 
scandalous episodes of Becky’s life, perhaps because a novel is not a thing that can 
capture the rawest and most serious things of life. This novel isn’t, anyway. As the 
narrator says of Amelia’s grief at giving up her son, “She could say nothing more, and 
walked away silently to her room. Let us close it upon her prayers and her sorrow. I think 
we had best speak little about so much love and grief.”99 The tableaux that the narrator 
most delights in are the perversions of classical or sentimental scenes. He has no trouble 
entering Amelia’s closed bedroom when she is pining for George. But the mother-child 
relationship is a limit of representation, outside the field of vanity. (Becky, he never tires 
of reminding us, has no mother, and has got to marry herself off. This maternal lack is the 
only motivator of plot that carries as much weight as disposition, and in fact ought to be 
considered as a kind of disposition: A placement on the board of life.) 
When Who-questions are not a blunt enough instrument, there is always indirect 
remonstrance. 
The actions of very vain, heartless, pleasure-seeking people are very often 
improper (as are many of yours, my friend with the grave face and spotless 
reputation;—but that is merely by the way); and what are those of a 
woman without faith—or love—or character?”100  
 
No one would claim to be the direct target of the parenthetical aside—the grave-faced 
reader of the spotless reputation. That smug hypocrite must be someone else, some other 
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reader. But the reminder is effective, as when another student is scolded in class and 
everyone feels slightly shamed; anyone could have been called out. 
Direct address works to different ends in Vanity Fair and Pendennis. In the latter 
novel, Thackeray insists on a continuity between the reader’s disappointment in his own 
home and his characters’ disappointments in theirs: 
Thus, oh friendly readers, we see how every man in the world has his own 
private griefs and business, by which he is more cast down or occupied 
than by the affairs or sorrows of any other person. …Mr. Smirke has a 
private care… and is no more satisfied than the rest of us. 
 
Having established the sameness between text and readerly experience, the passage 
continues: “How lonely we are in the world! How selfish and secret, everybody! You and 
your wife have pressed the same pillow for forty years and fancy yourself united.—Psha, 
does she cry out when you have the gout, or do you lie awake when she has a 
toothache?”101 Here we are invited to dwell not on a strange, unfamiliar misery, but our 
own, all too familiar misery. Adam Smith described sympathy in Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, as “changing places in fancy with the sufferer.”102 But for Thackeray’s reader, 
it is the thought of his own situation—the situation of the reader—that is the source of 
feeling. Smith writes that it is by thinking of what I would feel if I were in another’s 
place that sympathy arises. For Thackeray, sympathy—the putting aside of judgment—
arises because I reflect on what I already feel in my own life. Smirke is “no more 
satisfied than the rest of us”—we can relate to him because we, too, are unhappy, unlucky, 
and so forth.  
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While in the Mr. Sedley example from Vanity Fair we were invited to remember 
our usual distance from and perspective on suffering, here we are invited to consider that 
suffering as our own. Significantly, the suffering that Thackeray puts on the reader is not 
the extremity of bankruptcy; it is the daily domestic unhappiness that Kurnick describes 
as “social reduction,” the “withdrawal from the scene of promiscuous publicity,” and, 
most unhappily, “the domestic as death.”103 While the economic vicissitudes may divide 
men from each other, something about the dissatisfactions of romance and marriage are 
universal. It’s not the epoch-making grandeur of history—not Waterloo—but the daily 
let-downs, the transitory pleasures, themselves inflected by that grand history, that have 
the power to knit societies together. This means that commonality is found not in 
individuals having a relationship to an abstraction like a state, but in having direct 
relationships to each other.  
Perhaps it ought not to surprise that an appeal to sameness is the basis of 
Schopenhauer’s ethics, too. 
The virtues of justice and loving-kindness, which [the good man] practices, 
are due to a direct participation in weal and woe external to himself; and 
we have learnt that the source of such participation is Compassion. If, 
further, we pause to consider what is the essential part in this type of 
character, we shall certainly find it to lie in the fact that such a person 
draws less distinction between himself and others than is usually done.104 
 
An egotist insists on his difference from those around him, but the foundation of ethics is 
when “the individual directly recognizes in another his own self, his true and very being.” 
When this person meets the external world, “he thinks of it rather as ‘myself once 
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more.’”105 This ethics of compassion is born out of a conception of the world as suffering 
vanity. “Whatever goodness, affection, and magnanimity do for others is always only an 
alleviation of their sufferings; and consequently what can move them to good deeds and 
to works of affection is always only knowledge of the suffering of others, directly 
intelligible from one’s own suffering, and put on a level therewith.”106  
Is compassion just another synonym for sympathy, which I have been at pains to 
separate my reading from? First, the work of sympathy—its imaginative labor of 
inhabiting the other—is absent here. But more importantly, compassion is not universally 
available, and can’t be imparted where it isn’t already found. (It’s in the nature of 
sympathy that it can be taught: That’s the whole point of Eliot’s “In Which the Story 
Pauses A Little.”) While behavior might be shaped by dogma, true compassion, for 
Schopenhauer, cannot be taught; it is a matter of disposition.  
In themselves, however, all deeds (opera operata) are merely empty 
figures, and only the disposition that leads to them gives them moral 
significance. …Genuine goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue, and 
pure nobleness of mind, therefore, do not come from abstract knowledge; 
yet they do come from knowledge. But it is a direct and intuitive 
knowledge that cannot be reasoned away or arrived at by reasoning; a 
knowledge that, just because it is not abstract, cannot be communicated, 
but must dawn on each of us. It therefore finds its real and adequate 
expression not in words, but simply and solely in deeds, in conduct, in the 
course of a man’s life.107  
 
For Schopenaheur, a disposition may dawn on someone. But for Thackeray, a good 
disposition is only dealt out, as in a hand of cards. This brings together many of the ideas 
that I have been exploring: a kind of knowledge that is not born of experience; habits and 
conduct over time that are more revealing than reasoning or language; compassion that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibid, 190-91; 193. 
106 Ibid, 229. 
107 Ibid, 222. 
	  
	   61	  
rooted in continuity between self and other. He even goes on to describe the kind of 
mirroring that Thackeray had in mind when he talked about Becky’s misanthropy; an 
egoist, Schopenhauer writes, feels himself surrounded by “strange and hostile 
phenomena,” while a good person feels otherwise: “the permanent knowledge of his own 
inner nature in everything that lives…gives him a certain uniformity and even serenity of 
disposition.”108 What distinguishes Thackeray from Schopenhauer is that his dawning 
knowledge manifests itself in pleasant-enough play as well as in the frustrations of the 
will that compound suffering. 
In the end, even compassion doesn’t provide a true alternative to vanity. 
Compassion is only the best way to live in a situation of shared hopelessness. The 
ultimate moral function of the narrator of Vanity Fair is to point to the ultimate shared 
reality: temporality, which leads to death. 
It is all vanity, to be sure: but who will not own to liking a little of it? I 
should like to know what well-constituted mind, merely because it is 
transitory, dislikes roast-beef? That is a vanity; but may every man who 
reads this, have a wholesome portion of it through life, I beg: aye, though 
my readers were five hundred thousand. Sit down, gentlemen, and fall to, 
with a good hearty appetite; the fat, the lean, the gravy, the horse-radish as 
you like it—don’t spare it. Another glass of wine, Jones, my boy—a little 
bit of the Sunday side. Yes, let us eat our fill of the vain thing, and be 
thankful therefor. And let us make the best of Becky’s aristocratic 
pleasures likewise—for these too, like all mortal delights, were but 
transitory.109 
 
The wine and beef are compensations of some kind, the things that, deprived of, would 
make life into death. So even if the reader can’t identify with Becky’s hunger for 
carriages and titles, she can surely understand wanting a glass of wine at dinner. These 
are pleasures and necessities that the narrator wishes for everyone, that he would not 
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deny anyone. Seventeenth-century vanitas still-life painting reminded the viewer of the 
empty (because transitory) nature of material pursuit, and included elements of a world 
like books, art objects, military symbols, scientific instruments, and pastimes like playing 
cards, as well as mortality emblems like skulls, flowers, and burning candles. Art 
historian Sybille Ebert-Schifferer writes that although vanitas are “devoted exclusively to 
the contemplation of the brevity and futility of earthly existence,” the symbols of 
scholarship and artistry “also suggest the conquest of time by way of lasting fame.”110 
Human memory, this thinking goes, will outlast the human body. Of course the vanitas 
also often included symbols of eternity and Christ, and served as meditations on salvation. 
None of these compensations—aesthetics, spirituality, fame—are at stake in Thackeray. 
His idea of compensation is itself material, transient, subject to rot: food and drink. The 
gravy and the horseradish get the stuff down so that the eater can be thankful for “the 
vain thing.” We might say that the compensation is the transitory itself, the knowledge 
that the vanity will come to an end, even if nothing better is to come after. Thackeray’s 
solution—or perhaps just his description—to the problem of time is to eat it while you 
can.  
Another image of equality-in-death is the hatchment that arrives to take the corpse 
of Rose Dawson, the second Lady Crawley, away. 
The arms quartered on the shield along with his won were not, to be sure, 
poor Rose’s. She had no arms. But the cherubs painted on the scutcheon 
answered as well for her as for Sir Pitt’s mother, and Resurgam was 
written under the coat, flanked by the Crawley Dove and Serpent. Arms 
and Hatchments, Resurgam. —Here is an opportunity for moralizing! 
 Mr. Crawley had tended that otherwise friendless bedside. She 
went out of the world strengthened by such words and comfort as he could 
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give her. For many years his was the only kindness she ever knew; the 
only friendship that solaced in any way that feeble, lonely soul. Her heart 
was dead long before her body. She had sold it to become Sir Pitt’s wife. 
Mothers and daughters are making the same bargain every day in Vanity 
Fair.111 
 
The moral is not that “poor” Rose Dawson shouldn’t have married Sir Pitt. Thackeray 
generally doesn’t get too worked up over should and shouldn’t. Rose Dawson, we’ve 
already been told, never had a chance. It’s not Rose or Sit Pitt that are to blame but 
Vanity Fair itself. “Oh, Vanity Fair—Vanity Fair! This might have been, but for you, a 
cheery lass.”112 The tone is ironizing, but it doesn’t truly admit the possibility of things 
having been another way. Rose is no more or less vain and foolish than anyone else. To 
expect her to pass up the unhappiness of being a baronet’s wife for impoverished 
happiness it to expect something inhuman, something superhuman or religious, even. 
Where would one person get the strength to buck the ethos of an age? Thackeray doesn’t 
allow for it; we could go farther, and say that realism—the realist novel—doesn’t allow it. 
That is his conservatism but it is also his compassion. He isn’t hard on Rose; life is hard 
enough for her already. His “moralizing” doesn’t add admonition to her suffering. 
Besides, she’s already dead. 
The reader of this novel, though she is called on to find herself in it, is also 
explicitly imagined as a visitor to its environs, someone who will wander around for a 
time, finding herself in what she sees, before then returning to her own home. This 
wandering around the fair, this peripatetic reading practice, this meeting of self, is 
promised to be restorative; “When you come home, you sit down, in a sober, 
contemplative, not uncharitable frame of mind, and apply yourself to your books or your 
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business.”113 Work is elsewhere—it’s not for those who live in Vanity Fair, or those who 
pass time there. This may be one reason that the pious will avoid the thing altogether. But 
for those who are “of a lazy, or a benevolent, or a sarcastic mood,” they may find 
“satisfaction” like that which the puppets have given others.114  
It is a motley group of readers that Thackeray imagines—those who find 
satisfaction in melancholy; those who are benevolent, lazy, or sarcastic; those who can be 
both touched by sentiment and amused by petty villainy. The key thing, though, is that 
there is meant to be something, if not refreshing, than at least preparatory about the novel. 
Work can only occur after reading, or visiting the show, because it is by reading or 
visiting that one learns how to cope with the world enough to work in it. The work that 
follows an encounter with one’s own vanity, though, ought to have a special flavor. Its 
purpose is not to catalogue what is good and bad, or even to dilate on what is to be done. 
It has other charges: to understand one’s own disposition, to grapple with one’s own 
failings, to share compassionately in the fate of others, and to know one’s own 
irredeemable vanity.  
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Soreness, Pain, and Comfort: 
Feeling and Thinking in Trollope 
 
What does it feel like to think? This question is at the heart of Anthony Trollope’s novels. 
Consider as prologue a passage from the The Small House at Allington (1864), in which 
Lily Dale processes the news that John Eames is staying nearby at Guestwick Manor. 
Despite having been jilted by Adolphus Crosbie, Lily has rejected Eames, preferring to 
stay attached to her broken engagement.  
Lily, who remembered accurately all the passages of her last 
interview with John Eames, said nothing, but felt, in some sort, sore at the 
idea that he should be so near her at such a time. In some unconscious 
way she had liked him for coming to her and saying all that he did say. 
She valued him more highly after that scene than she did before. But now, 
she would feel herself injured and hurt if he ever made his way into her 
presence under circumstances as they existed. … 
A half-formed idea flitted across Lily’s mind, teaching her to 
imagine for a moment that she might possibly be concerned in this 
arrangement. But the thought vanished as quickly as it came, merely 
leaving some soreness behind it. There are certain maladies which make 
the whole body sore. The patient, let him be touched on any point—let 
him even be nearly touched—will roar with agony as though his whole 
body had been bruised. So it is also with maladies of the mind.115 
 
In this passage and many others across Trollope’s works, characters suffer cognitive 
soreness, with all its attendant associations of rawness, woundedness, distress, and pain. 
In this chapter I will argue that the “malady of the mind” to which Trollope attributes this 
soreness is nothing short of thinking itself. We might even say that rather than thinking 
feeling like soreness, thinking is this soreness. Lily’s new thoughts trigger memories, 
acting as a finger probing a bruise, and she “shrink[s] from the finger that threatened to 
touch her sore.”116 But what is Lily thinking? What is the ideational content? Trollope 
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does not say and does not seem to care. At this moment he is less interested in narrating 
what she thinks—her idea is “half-formed”—than in registering what it feels like for her 
to think at all. 
As he never tires of hinting, Trollope’s narrator knows the outcome of the plot 
ahead of time. This is because he knows the characters better than they know themselves. 
His plots are vehicles for characters to come to know themselves as fully as they are 
known by the narrator; that’s why they are so long, and so repetitive. Coming to self-
knowledge does not mean experiencing epiphany, like Dorothea gazing out the window 
and thinking of Will Ladislaw in Middlemarch. Instead, self-knowledge has to do with 
accruing some quantity of repeated experience. (To the question, how much is required?, 
Trollope’s critics would surely say, Too much.) For some of Trollope’s characters, the 
receipt of self-knowledge does ultimately involve making a choice. For others, the drama 
has to do with thinking their way into feelings they already have—with attaching ideas to 
bodily sensations and arriving at a union of the two. Broadly speaking, thinking in 
Trollope takes two forms: vacillation, a mental exercise of indecision, and conviction. 
The first is purely mental and is associated with futile liberalism, and the second is purely 
embodied, often described as “unconscious.” Conviction, however, is not the answer to 
vacillating liberalism. These two modes of thinking pose different sets of questions, and 
operate on different registers. The defining question of vacillation is What should I do?; 
the defining question of conviction is How do I feel?  
 The purpose of introducing these modes is not to anoint one as good thinking and 
deride one as bad thinking. For while vacillation is always bad (insofar as it is punishing 
both to the thinker and to those around him), conviction can be either good or bad (as 
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when principles drive a man to insanity). Taken together, they help us track Trollope’s 
acute interest in how feelings and thinking must be coordinated, and the mental and 
physical imbalances that result when one or the other grows too powerful. Why should 
anyone care about what Trollope thinks about feeling? First, it can help us arrive at a 
clearer understanding of Trollope’s political conservatism by clarifying his critique of 
liberalism as reflection run amok. Secondly, it helps us grasp his ethical project, which 
discredits the pursuit of fairness as liberal futility, and valorizes comfort as a moral good. 
When we understand how sore thinking makes a person, we can gain a deeper 
appreciation of what it is about comfort that is so important to Trollope. His ethics reside 
not in fair distribution but in the consolation of suffering, and the assuagement of injury. 
 
Conviction I: Insanity and Soreness  
He Knew He Was Right (1869) demonstrates the injury that accompanies being “right.” 
The plot concerns Louis Trevelyan, who, by the end of chapter one, has become 
convinced that his young wife Emily, whom he met in the Mandarin Islands where her 
father is a colonial governor, is carrying on an inappropriate relationship with her old 
family friend, Colonel Osbourne. They are both right and both wrong. On the one hand, 
the colonel is, technically, older than Emily’s father, by a year or two; on the other hand, 
the colonel is dashing and vigorous. On the one hand, he is an old family friend, and, 
maybe, Emily’s godfather (no one can remember). On the other, when he surfaces in 
London, Emily hasn’t seen him for twenty years.  
The quarrel, which blooms in the first chapter, results in the dissolution of the 
household. The novel’s sympathy is clearly with Emily, who, as a woman, is forced to 
bear the burden of her husband’s accusation without recourse. There is much discussion 
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of the abuse of women in marriage, and Trollope goes so far as to call the novel’s vocal 
man-hater, the never-will-marry Priscilla Stanbury, his heroine. Louis’s conviction 
eventually takes on the quality of insanity, as he enlists the aid of a down-market private 
detective named Bozzle and insists that Emily can return to him only if she will 
“repent—repent—repent.”117  
 While vacillation is concerned with choosing, conviction is concerned with 
rightness. The peccadillo of “liking one’s own way”—which everyone in this novel 
suffers, from Louis and Emily, to Emily’s sister Nora Rowley, to Priscilla and Dorothy 
Stanbury, and their aunt, Miss Stanbury, and even the much put-upon Rowley relation Mr. 
Outhouse—can easily snowball into obsession. (The name is only an additional insult.) It 
is not necessarily pleasurable or easy to be right. Enjoying being right is the first step to 
suffering from it. Conviction produces just what Lily Dale was subjected to when she 
thought—soreness.  
Emily Trevelyan felt acutely that she had been ill-used, not only by her 
husband’s suspicion, but by the manner in which he had talked of his 
suspicion to others—to Lady Milborough and the cook, and she was quite 
convinced that she was right herself, because he had been so vacillating in 
his conduct about Colonel Osbourne. But Trevelyan was equally sure that 
justice was on his side. Emily must have known his real wishes about 
Colonel Osbourne; but when she had found that he had rescinded his 
verbal orders about the admission of the man to the house,—which he had 
done to save himself and her from slander and gossip,—she had taken 
advantage of this and had thrown herself more entirely than ever into the 
intimacy of which he disapproved! When they met, each was so sore that 
no approach to terms was made by them.118  
 
As Emily notes here, Louis’s conviction that he was right produced some vacillating 
behavior—first he forbids Emily from seeing the Colonel, and then insists that she does, 
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in order to avoid a scene, when the Colonel won’t quietly take the hint. But the overriding 
mental framework at stake is their opposing convictions. These convictions are not 
cognitive. Reason proliferates around them in the form of rationalizations, but they were 
not arrived at with reason. They were insisted, asserted, felt. 
The soreness in question is, of course, anger and resentment. But soreness is also, 
I want to argue, the feeling of this kind of thinking, of conviction itself, what Louis’s 
friend Lady Milborough calls being “self-willed.”119 Louis’s clinging to his conviction 
causes him to become “rather a bore to his friends. He could not divest his mind of the 
injury which had accrued to him from his wife’s conduct, nor could he help talking of the 
grief with which his mind was laden. And he was troubled with sore suspicions, which, as 
far as they concerned his wife, had certainly not been merited.”120 Conviction is sore like 
an overworked muscle, that has been subjected to one way of sitting for too long.121  
The novel emphasizes the embodied dimension of Louis’s conviction, which is 
referred to as an illness. As he becomes more unshakeable in his rightness, he grows 
frailer, and his clothes hang off him. In the end, Emily “thought the state of his mind was 
diseased in a ratio the reverse of that of his body, and that when he was weakest in health, 
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then were his ideas the most clear and rational.”122 The doctor “admitted that his patient’s 
thoughts had been forced to dwell on one subject till they had become distorted, untrue, 
jaundiced, and perhaps mono-maniacal; but he seemed to doubt whether there had ever 
been a time at which it could have been decided that the law should interfere to take care 
of him.”123 But the medical experts find that he is sicker in body than in mind. “In his 
case the weakness of the mind has been consequent upon the weakness of the body”—of 
course, by weakness of the mind we must understand strength of obstinacy.124 Louis 
eventually dies from his rightness, though not before he makes a sign to Emily that he 
does not think her a “harlot.” The sign is that he kisses a finger that she holds, trembling, 
over his lips. Thus he has the satisfaction of not yielding in speech, of never saying aloud 
that he was not right; she has the satisfaction that he yielded in body, absolving her of the 
wrong she did not commit.   
The illness places Louis is in a mental abeyance: “a man might be in such a 
condition as to be neither mad nor sane;—not mad, so that all power over his own actions 
need be taken from him; nor sane, so that he must be held to be accountable for his words 
and thoughts.”125 He is at once capable and not responsible. Soreness surrounds this 
suspended cognitive state. When Louis winds up living in a shack outside Siena 
surrounded by dingy olive groves, his wife follows him and remains in Florence to be 
near him. “She was his wife, and nothing should entirely separate her from him, now that 
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he so sorely wanted her aid.”126 Emily can finally recognize Louis’s soreness and 
prioritize it over her own only after she has accepted him in de-idealized form.  
Her husband had shown himself to be weak, suspicious, unmanly,—by no 
means like a god. …But still he was her husband, and the father of her 
child; and thought she could not dare to look forward to happiness in 
living with him, she could understand that no comfort would be possible 
to her were she to return to England and to leave him to perish alone at 
Casalunga. Fate seemed to have intended that her life should be one of 
misery, and she must bear it as best she might.127 
 
Emily doesn’t exactly take comfort in being near the man whose paranoia has driven both 
her and him to misery, but she acknowledges that comfort is not to be found anywhere 
else. She insists on both their bond and their separation. Both Louis and Emily use the 
child (who is passed between the two like a football) to insist that they cannot be divided. 
That shared conviction narrows their options, so the only course available to her is to 
depressively bear with what has happened.   
 
Conviction II: Knowing 
There is also a good style of conviction. This is conviction not as zero-sum conviction, 
associated with being right at another person’s expense, nor conviction as a misguided 
fact-finding mission. Rather, this is conviction as an embodied moment of knowing that 
is immediate, profound, and truthful. This good conviction is not associated with 
suspicion, which breeds paranoia, but with instinct, which is bodily, and unable to be put 
into language. As Stuart Hampshire has it, “it is an overriding truth that deciding what I 
want, like deciding what I am going to do, is distinguishable from finding the correct 
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words to say or express what I want.”128 Good conviction does not produce soreness; 
soreness, after all, is a sign that something in the thinking is wrong. There is a powerful 
example of good conviction in He Knew He Was Right in the character of Dorothy 
Stanbury. 
Dorothy Stanbury is presented with an offer of marriage by the upstanding but 
entirely unworthy Mr. Gibson, a vacillator who has spent ten years wavering between the 
affections of the fashionable French sisters. If Dorothy accepts Mr. Gibson’s hand, her 
aunt Stanbury will reward them with two thousand pounds—a sum very necessary to the 
Stanbury family, who teeter on the brink of respectability.  
And what was she that she should scorn the love of an honest gentleman? 
She would take him, she thought,—if she could. But then there came upon 
her, unconsciously, without work of thought, by instinct rather than by 
intelligence, a feeling of the closeness of a wife to her husband. Looking 
at it in general she could not deny that it would be very proper that she 
should become Mrs. Gibson. But when there came upon her a 
remembrance that she would be called upon for demonstration of her 
love,—that he would embrace her, and hold her to his heart, and kiss 
her,—she revolted and shuddered. She believed that she did not want to 
marry any man, and that such a state of things would not be good for 
her.129  
 
Trollope habitually critiques abstractions and generalities—the universal rules that are all 
well and good until one must live under them. This is an exemplary moment of excuse. It 
would be proper for Dorothy to marry Mr. Gibson. It would also be revolting to be kissed 
by him. The bodily instinct—the shudder—is privileged over the reasonable rules that 
ought to govern marriage. Crucially, this insight “came upon” Dorothy like a headache. It 
did not flash on her like an epiphany, and it did not appear in language. It appeared in an 
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involuntary physical resistance that is experienced in the present moment. It does not 
consider the past or the future, but what is happening right now. Unlike an epiphany, 
which demarcates a clear moment in time, one can never say exactly when an ache begins. 
It spreads until it has always been there.  
 Still, the moment has the air of discovery. (Hampshire again: “Coming to know 
what one wants is partly a decision and partly a discovery, the proportions varying in 
different cases.”130 In the case of good conviction, the balance is tipped very far towards 
the pole of discovery.) Dorothy is, sanely, right: Mr. Gibson is not the man for her. And 
this insight has remarkable sticking power, even in the face of disapproval from the rather 
terrifying Miss Stanbury. She cannot be reasoned or argued out of this decision because it 
is not a decision she made with reason or even with her mind. Dorothy’s instincts tell her 
what is wrong, but also, what is right, as when she finds herself in a conversation with 
(her future husband) Brooke Burgess that has become rather intimate.  
But there had come something of a personal flavour in their conversation 
which prompted her, unconsciously, to leave him. She had, without any 
special indication of herself, included herself among that company of old 
maids who are born and live and die without that vital interest in the 
affairs of life which nothing but family duties, the care of children, or least 
of a husband, will give to a woman. If she had not meant this she had felt 
it. He had understood her meaning, or at least her feeling, and had taken 
upon himself to assure her that she was not one of the company whose 
privations she had endeavoured to describe. Her instinct rather than her 
reason put her at once upon her guard, and she prepared to leave the 
room.131 
 
Here again we find her unconscious fast at work. We might want to call this a Freudian 
unconscious of repressed desires. But we could also imagine it as an antenna, an animal 
instinct. Trollope preserves the word “meaning” for that which is mental or language-
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based, and calls what Dorothy has “feeling.” Feeling knows more. Nora Rowley’s 
decision to accept Hugh Stanbury is also a decision based on feelings, and is similarly 
rewarded by the novel. 
Of course, sometimes even this valorized, non-paranoiac mode of conviction is 
misplaced, or wrong. As Dorothy’s mother says of Nora’s suitor Mr. Glascock: “Her 
conviction was strong in Mr. Glascock’s favour,—thinking, as she expressed herself, that 
everything was right and proper,—but she could hardly explain why she thought so.”132 
Mrs. Stanbury’s conviction is almost like that of Dorothy’s—it is non-symbolic, and 
unable to be explained—but it lacks that physical proof, that embodied feeling. Absent 
embodiment, conviction is merely social convention, the universal rule that a woman 
ought to marry whichever well-to-do gentleman asks. Conventional conviction is the 
bedrock of material success and social stability. Privileged by class and gender, 
Trollope’s patriarchs possess this style of unshakeable conviction, rooted not in logic or 
debate but in daily life. As Judge Staveley in Orley Farm (1862) says, “On any matter 
that is near a man’s heart, he is convinced by the tenour of his own thoughts as he goes 
on living, not by the arguments of a logician, or even by the eloquence of an orator.”133 
Judge Staveley presents himself as a thinker, but he is a thinker embedded in the routines 
of living, not one who has stepped back and looked at his life from a detached 
perspective or from multiple points of view. Judge Staveley is at one with his station in 
life, and his privilege is to think phenomenologically; his thinking takes the form of his 
living. Trollope rewards thinking when it is driven by feeling rather than governed by 
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reason. This is part and parcel of his conservative critique of liberalism, which would 
favor the well-reasoned choice and the rhetoric of debate.   
 
Vacillation: The Critique of Liberal Thinking 
Can You Forgive Her? (1865) tracks the vacillations of three women: Alice Vavasor, 
who volleys between the unworthy George and the gentleman John Grey; Lady Glencora, 
who can’t decide whether to abscond with Burgo Fitzgerald in the moonlight or remain 
married to Plantagenet Palliser; and Mrs. Greenow, who toys with the affections of Mr. 
Cheesacre and Captain Bellfield. It would be neat to find textual evidence of soreness in 
one of these plots. It seems intuitive—wouldn’t ping-ponging back and forth create such 
a feeling? In this novel, however, Trollope doesn’t use the word “soreness” in connection 
with thinking. (Digital searches of The Way We Live Now (1875) and Barchester Towers 
(1857), classics of vacillation, also fail to turn up soreness as a description of cognition.) 
He instead uses related words, with almost family resemblances—“pain” and “suffering.” 
When George asks Alice, who has promised herself to him (again) but is treating 
him coldly, for a kiss, she instead remarks, “I wonder you cannot understand that I have 
suffered much.”134 In anger he throws a ring he had brought for her into the fire-grate. 
She picks through the ashes to find it—one of the smaller stones was knocked out by the 
throw and can’t be found—and wraps the ring in paper. “After that she sat herself down 
at the table to think what she would do; but her head was, in truth, racked with pain, and 
on that occasion she could bring her thoughts to no conclusion.”135 
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“Pain” is vague, almost too broad of a category to signify. But perhaps that very 
vagueness is at issue with this kind of cognition. There is a diffusion to the vacillating 
mind: the thinker can’t achieve clarity of thought, and can’t achieve clarity of feeling. We 
might also want to conceive of this head racked with pain in terms from Wittgenstein. For 
Wittgenstein, there is no “I” who can be “in pain”—a subject or soul separate from the 
body, analyzing the experiences of the body. A Wittgensteinian subject would not say “I 
am in pain,” but rather, “It is pain” — like “It is raining.” The condition of being in pain 
is the subject. This is the situation of the vacillator, who toggles in the pursuit of 
painlessness, but who can’t escape, because vacillation itself is the pain.  
Vacillation in Trollope occurs when a character is faced with a binary problem—
this or that job, this or that spouse—that presents itself as a tactical decision. It is 
obsessional, logorrheic, and goal-oriented. It is a mechanism of deciding that puts 
decision in abeyance, a perverted mode of reason and objectivity. Like liberalism, which 
pursues fairness, it weighs all sides of an option, sees all sides of the case, and is unable 
to press the thumb on the scale that would tilt the choice one way or the other. Vacillation 
is abstract and future-oriented—and since the future is continually receding on the 
horizon, it means that one has a very hard time seizing any moment at all. (“Something, it 
was said, might be done at some future time,” the Rowleys concede in a period of 
inaction, “but the difficulties were so great that nothing could be done now.”136) A 
symptom of vacillation is that the thinker is unable to feel much of anything other than a 
generalized pain, discomfort, or nervousness. It is thinking as anxiety, which runs on its 
own steam, floating freely from one fixed reality. Kierkegaard described anxiety as pure 
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possibility, and Trollope thinks along similar lines, though he is less beholden to the idea 
of absolutes, including freedom.137 His characters are placed in circumstances, often 
beyond their immediate control, that present definite options to them. Engagement is the 
usual example of this structure: a strategy that keeps one attached but not foreclosed, and 
is committed but open to be broken if/when something else—not necessarily something 
better, but often something more suitable—comes along. Restlessness or uneasiness is the 
constant mental background of vacillation, but the vacillator doesn’t jump before there’s 
a new concrete thing to attach oneself to. It’s the appearance of new choices, not, strictly 
speaking, possibility itself, that best describes what’s at stake. 
Conviction is sticky, sometimes dangerously so. In vacillation, choosing loses its 
sticking power. Whatever decision occurs is less “made” than reached, momentarily 
accepted, acquiesced to, or settled on. It is only an interruption from outside the thinker 
that has the power to force a commitment one way or the other. Hampshire writes that 
“even if I cannot decide that one of the only two courses open to me is right and that the 
other is wrong, I must decide to do either one or the other.”138 In Trollope, the thing that 
decides is very rarely the vacillator, but is the intrusion of some other person or event. 
Whatever the vacillator has thought in her own head does not help to make the decision; 
it only delays it.  
Like insane conviction, vacillation isolates the thinker from other people, but it is 
also dissociating. Alice Vavasor “sat there, thinking of her fate, as though it belonged to 
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some other one,—not to herself; as though it were a tale that she could read…”139 
Vacillators see themselves from the outside. This is the negative, the inverse, of 
sympathy. When the character empties herself, she does not experience life as others lead 
it, but as no one leads it. This paralysis is induced by the point-of-view of the choice 
itself, which asks the chooser to envision two entirely unlike courses of life, calling to 
mind Andrew Miller’s “lives unled.”140 But whereas for Miller the optative mood is 
mournful and isolating, for Trollope, it can be anxious, sometimes manic, and 
inveterately social. A Trollope novel is crowded. It contains not only all the characters 
and plots that actually occur but also all those potential futures that are continually 
considered in each present moment.  
As Miller writes, this optative situation can produce regret. Nora, for example, 
regrets rejecting the wealthy Mr. Glascock, the son of a peer—she was already regretting 
rejecting him while he was still in the room being rejected, though she would do it as 
many times as necessary to make him go away. But less obviously, Trollope’s characters 
are capable of regretting things they have not yet done. Dorothy puts off accepting 
Brooke’s marriage proposal because she worries “what he would feel ten, twenty years 
hence, when he would know that his children would have been all provided for, had he 
not lost his fortune by marrying me.”141 Anticipatory regret is not associated with good 
outcomes. Dorothy’s decision is wrong here, as is her reasoning, and both are corrected 
when she marries Brooke.  
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Adela Pinch writes that the Victorians believed thinking to be a powerful “mental 
force.”142 It is intriguing, then, that mental life in Trollope is so useless. Why does it have 
such little power? Why does it make nothing happen, or, at best, make the wrong things 
happen? Perhaps the explanation is that Trollope’s portrait of vacillation doubles as a 
critique of liberalism. It is a comic perversion of what Elaine Hadley calls “liberal 
cognition,” an umbrella under which she groups 
disinterestedness, objectivity, reticence, conviction, impersonality, and 
sincerity, all of which carried with them a moral valence. Included under 
this category of cognition are also what seemed to [Victorian liberals] 
quite specific techniques of thought production and judgment, such as 
“free thought,” reflection, abstraction, logical reasoning, and internal 
deliberation. Such attitudes and techniques produced liberalized ideas in 
the individual, whose ideas then entered the political domain as 
“opinion”—liberalism's version of political agency.143 
 
It may seem counter-intuitive to claim that the indecision of Trollope’s vacillators is an 
example of the rather dignified habits of abstraction and logical reasoning. But this is my 
point. Trollope’s vacillators show the absurdity of the attempt to logically reason one’s 
way through the world. The deciding mind is characterized as dysfunctional, nigh useless, 
even obsessional.144 The attempt at liberal “free thought” leads one in circles. It is a 
sickness of reflection. As Kierkegaard writes in The Present Age, “the urge to decision is 
precisely what reflection dispels or wants to dispel.”145 
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Like liberals, vacillators always mean well. Intention, particularly good 
intentions, are a hallmark of both forms. The fickle cleric Mr. Gibson provides a good 
case of the best intentions. After dithering for ten years between the two French sisters, 
he at last engages himself to the younger, Camilla—and at once reconsiders. He would 
have proposed to Arabella had he not taken a dislike to the “abortion” of a chignon that 
she wore on her head. But now that he has some distance, the chignon seems less 
offensive. He passes his engagement to Camilla postponing the wedding. When he is 
obliged to visit the family, he spends more time with the sister than with the fiancée.  
Mr. Gibson, as he walked into Exeter, endeavoured to justify his 
own conduct to himself. There was no moment, he declared to himself, in 
which he had not endeavoured to do right. Seeing the manner in which he 
had been placed among these two young women, both of whom had fallen 
in love with him, how could he have saved himself from vacillation? And 
by what untoward chance had it come to pass that he had now learned to 
dislike so vigorously, almost to hate, the one with whom he had been for a 
moment sufficiently infatuated to think that he loved? 
But with all the arguments he did not succeed in justifying to 
himself his own conduct, and he hated himself.146  
 
In what sense did Mr. Gibson “endeavour to do right”? We could say that he intended to 
do right and was then prevented by something—Arabella’s chignon, some distasteful 
behavior of Camilla’s. As Hampshire puts it, “one might believe that someone had 
seriously and sincerely intended to do something, and at the same time be very doubtful 
whether he would in fact have done it, or even have tried to do it, if and when the 
occasion for action occurred.”147 But could we really describe Mr. Gibson’s state of mind 
as sincere and serious? Hampshire claims that if an intention is not put into practice, it 
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cannot be considered a genuine intention. I suppose we could say that Mr. Gibson’s 
genuine intention is to be engaged to Camilla (he succeeds at that) but to marry Arabella.  
One way to think about vacillators is that they suffer from some kind of cognitive 
defect that creates difficulties in two areas: timing, or when knowledge is produced; and 
narration, or what knowledge is able to be put into language. Mr. Gibson knows that he 
will not marry Camilla French, but this knowledge only becomes available to him after 
he has engaged himself to her. Vacillation is therefore a structure or indirect route for 
getting to know one’s intentions. But when does Mr. Gibson know that he will not marry 
Camilla French? It is impossible to say. As we saw with Dorothy’s headache, the 
knowledge does not arrive in a transcendental flash but comes upon him in lived time. 
Since, as Hampshire writes, “‘knowing’ does not necessarily imply ‘being able to state 
correctly,’” it is almost impossible to say when Mr. Gibson knew it.148 How could we be 
able to pinpoint it? Even if he was always knowing it, he was not able to state it correctly, 
or made mistakes about stating it. None of this, by the way, eradicates Mr. Gibson’s 
responsibility. He was not ignorant of his intentions, even if he could not say what he 
meant. But does “endeavouring to do right” even qualify as an intention? Doesn’t that 
describe a belief Mr. Gibson holds about himself—he’s the kind of person who always 
tries to do what’s good—rather than a particular intention, which seems to be wrapped up 
in a specific thing or achievement? Might it actually be that Mr. Gibson didn’t have any 
intentions—but then how would that be possible? We can judge this as hypocrisy and bad 
faith or we can chalk it up to some kind of mental damage or impairment. Trollope, I 
think, does both.  
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Miss Stanbury assesses Mr. Gibson’s situation as such: “Such people can’t be 
happy, and can’t be unhappy. I don’t suppose it much matters which he marries, or 
whether he marries them both, or neither.”149 The stakes seem enormous to the vacillator, 
but this is a way of covering up what is inconsequential about the decision: this woman, 
that woman, this woman over there. The vacillator makes all objects arbitrary, and after 
getting stuck with something, he will vacillate over something else the next time. Of 
course, when one considers the portrait of marriage in He Knew He Was Right—insanity, 
discord, a baby snatched outside cabs and stolen away to Italy—such equivocation seems 
downright pragmatic. The thing you can count on is not person A or person B but one’s 
own indecisiveness. 
 Here a picture of vacillation as obsessional neurosis begins to emerge. In his case 
history of the Rat-Man, Freud wrote, “the truth was not that the patient still had an open 
mind upon this subject, but that he had two separate and contradictory convictions upon it. 
His oscillation between these two views quite obviously depended upon his momentary 
attitude towards his obsessional disorder.”150 Trollope’s vacillators are not actually trying 
to reach new conclusions (with an open mind) but are only moving between previously 
determined conclusions, and thus can never think but only (fail to) choose. The 
perspective or choice that the vacillator clings to at any one moment has to do not with 
the object at stake, but with the vacillator’s attitude towards the structure of his own 
obsessional thinking. The primary relationship is of the thinker to his own mind.  
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What of Trollope’s own relation to liberalism? He stood for election on the 
Liberal ticket in Beverley in 1867, mostly to get back at an uncle whose taunt that post 
office clerks seldom make Members of Parliament rankled him. (Is liberalism a punitive 
form, good for showing others that they are wrong?) He found himself out of step with 
his potential supporters on two issues: the expansion of the franchise, which they wanted 
and he did not; and the Permissive Bill, which he opposed, favoring “the gradual effect of 
moral teaching and education” to restraints of law.151 He lost. He attacked the liberals of 
Beverley for confusing the means and ends of politics: Instead of tolerating elections for 
the sake of politics, they tolerated politics for the sake of elections.  
The gradual is a privileged mode in Trollope’s worldview. Even a correct action 
cannot be seized suddenly, but must be approached carefully and slowly. When Hugh 
Stanbury proposes marriage to Nora out of nowhere, it is not a success. 
In truth, had he come more gently to her, his chance of a happy answer,—
of an answer which might be found to have in it something of 
happiness,—would have been greater. He might have said a word which 
she could not but have answered softly;—and then from that constrained 
softness other gentleness would have followed, and so he would have won 
her in spite of her discretion. She would have surrendered gradually… But 
when she was asked to come and be his wife, now and at once, she felt 
that in spite of her love it was impossible that she should accede to a 
request so sudden, so violent, so monstrous.152 
 
People react not to each other’s ideas or choices, but to each other’s manners or styles of 
proceeding. Gradualism is a strategy, identified with softness. It is not enough to be right, 
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if one wants success. One must be right in the right way. (Of course, if one wants grief—
as we are told Louis does—then the violent or monstrous is perversely logical.153) 
Trollope described his political ideology as “an advanced, but still a conservative 
Liberal,—which I regard not only as a possible but as a rational and consistent phase of 
political existence.”154 By way of explaining this position, he declares that the “inequality” 
that gives rise to “some feeling of injustice, some sting of pain” is “the work of God. 
Make all men equal to-day, and God has so created them that they shall be all unequal to-
morrow.”155 His political goal is 
not equality, for the word is offensive, and presents to the imaginations of 
men ideas of communism, of ruin, and insane democracy,—but a tendency 
towards equality. In following that, however, he knows that he must be 
hemmed in by safeguards, lest he be tempted to travel too quickly; and 
therefore he is glad to be accompanied on his way by the repressive action 
of a Conservative opponent.156  
 
Trollope seems to be talking not only about the unequal distribution of material resources, 
but about the unequal distribution of talents and gifts. Even if we corrected financial 
disparities, he writes, men would make themselves unequal. His conservatism privileges 
things we would want to hold on to—idiosyncrasy and difference—as well as that we 
would want to rid ourselves of—naturalized hierarchies. It is easy enough to see what is 
objectionable in this statement. Political progress is fine but not now, exactly; moving 
slowly towards some future smacks of the eternal moving of goalposts. This is the move 
of the vacillator, who forestalls the decisive moment. What is a “tendency towards 
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equality,” anyway? There is some kind of equivalence at work here between how 
Trollope imagines human nature—as we will see, people are for him complexes of 
constitutional essences that we could call dispositions or “tendencies”—and how he 
imagines history. But the difference between a tendency towards equality and a tendency 
to loquacity or a tendency to obstinacy is that the former is less guaranteed. A loquacious 
person by definition will talk a great deal, but a tending towards equality is a kind of 
asymptotic calculus, a promise that may never arrive.  
 One potential model of gradual change that could be palatable to this “tendency” 
comes from Roland Barthes’s writing on the ship Argo.  
A frequent image: that of the ship Argo (luminous and white), each 
piece of which the Argonauts gradually replaced, so that they ended with 
an entirely new ship, without having to alter either its name or its form. 
This ship Argo is highly useful: it affords the allegory of an eminently 
structural object, created not by genius, inspiration, determination, 
evolution, but by two modest actions (which cannot be caught up in any 
mystique of creation): substitution (one part replaces another, as in a 
paradigm) and nomination (the name is in no way linked to the stability of 
the parts): by dint of combinations made within one and the same name, 
nothing is left of the origin: Argo is an object with no other cause than its 
name, with no other identity than its form.157 
 
This is a comforting picture of change—slow, modest, almost secretive—as well 
as a terrifying one—in the final Argo, nothing remains of what was, and the whole 
world could be changed without you noticing. But maybe not noticing the change 
is the key to tolerating it. It replaces the elements but preserves the structure. It 
allows everything to be different and everything to be the same. 
Calling liberalism a neurosis may be extreme. Perhaps we should say that 
Trollope’s idea of liberalism is a profoundly ambivalent formation. Here Freud also has 
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light to shed. Of the Wolf-Man’s ambivalence, he wrote, “No position of the libido which 
had once been established was ever completely replaced by a later one. It was rather left 
in existence side by side with all the others, and this allowed him to maintain an incessant 
vacillation which proved to be incompatible with the acquisition of a fixed character.”158 
The ambivalence of conservative-liberalism—its hope for equality, eventually—might be 
its strength. Even if Trollope is interested in what is essential or constitutional, 
ambivalence prevents the rigid fixing of reality that makes reform possible. Moreover, 
whatever the essence is is less important than the ways in which it is incessantly leaned 
into, refined, or performed.  
 
Consequences for Character 
What is here emerging is not the usual picture of character in Trollope. He is often 
given credit for the credit he gives himself when, in the Autobiography, he repeats 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s praise that his characters are “solid and substantial, written on the 
strength of beef and through the inspiration of ale, and just as real as if some giant had 
hewn a great lump out of the earth and put it under a glass case.”159 Leaving aside the fact 
that nothing could be less real than an imaginary giant hewing a lump out of the earth and 
putting it under a glass case like some episode of the Twilight Zone, it is worthwhile to 
dwell on just what this description privileges. Hawthorne’s remark has been enlisted in 
claims that Trollope’s characters are participants in what Amanda Anderson calls 
Trollope’s “vitalist realism,” but what is the effect of being a giant looking at a play 
world through glass? Isn’t it true that Trollope’s supposedly solid characters are curiously 
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slippery and often rather demented? That, rather than being open or dissected or available 
to us, they are in some way radically inaccessible? It’s not the minds of Trollope’s 
characters that are substantial—we have already seen that the minds are, in key ways, 
absent—but two other things: one, their profound adherence to the embodied feelings 
they insist on; and two, the stuff of their worlds, armchairs and frying pans and potatoes 
and hearth and dogs. I will address the material stuff at the end of this chapter, but for 
now I want to consider what it means to privilege feeling as “realer” than thinking.  
So much discourse around the novel adheres to the notion that the novel is a form 
of representing consciousness. In Trollope we find that consciousness, though 
representable, is somehow unsatisfying or incomplete. He never claims to be able to 
adequately represent the conscious, vacillating mind. Even at his most dilatory, when he 
is most dedicated to tracking every turn and bend of the mental churn, he will pause to 
admit that he has given the reader a mere fraction or taste of thinking, not the full account. 
Of Mrs. Hurtle’s vacillation in The Way We Live Now, he notes that it is “impossible to 
describe adequately the various half resolutions which she formed, and the changing 
phases of her mind before she brought herself to this conclusion.”160 Feelings have the 
advantage that if they cannot be described, they can at least be asserted. They often have 
a surface-level correlate: a blush, a sweat, a convulsion of the body. They brook no 
argument. 
What Trollope values is not the exchange of ideas, but the exercise of power. 
Characters in Trollope’s world acquire significance not because they talk well—talking 
well is mocked—but insofar as they exert force or pressure on one another. Likewise, the 
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“depth” or complexity of a character’s thought is not at issue, nor is her independent 
development, progress, or change over time.161 Everything is interdependent. Alex 
Woloch’s theorizing of character has made it possible to see how a text “implies” the 
presence of a deeper (rounder) character off the page, and how space and attention are 
apportioned to various levels of recognizable psychology. But a spatial model cannot 
help us understand Trollope. If Trollope’s characters are not round or flat, they are also 
not, in Woloch’s updating of Forster, major or minor. Whatever is memorable in his 
novels has little to do with “ordinary human interiority.”162 Trollope’s characters compel 
one another to act in certain ways, and it is the fact of being compelled or compellable 
that defines one’s importance to the novel. They operate in terms of force; they are not 
reducible to the marks on the page.  
Force cannot be measured quantitatively or “counted”; it is a place where close 
reading parts ways with computational analysis. A computer can only track words on the 
page—how often characters speak each other’s names, or how often the narrator speaks 
characters’ names, or who thinks about who. Character in Trollope works as a series of 
collisions that generate affects (often embarrassment) that radiate in the text in ways that 
may not be reflected quantitatively because the consequences appear in what other 
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characters do, not what they say. Can you persist in persuading an aunt to invite your 
brother to your wedding—not by making a speech, but just by slowly forcing the issue? 
When does the change occur? What does it look like? That is a problem of force. The 
ways that characters press on each other is subterranean and roundabout, and defies easy 
summary.  
A theory of character as force will necessarily turn away from a theory of 
character that is attentive to internal development. Again, this is not to say that force 
excludes change. Rather, force imagines that whatever change occurs is due to some 
intersubjective experience. Trollope’s remarks on the subject are well-known: “Your 
Achilles should, all through, from beginning to end, be ‘impatient, fiery, ruthless, keen.’ 
Your Achilles, such as he is, will probably keep up his character. But your Davus also 
should be always Davus, and that is more difficult.”163 But Trollope is also aware of “the 
necessity, not only of consistency… but also of those changes which time always 
produces. 
There are, perhaps, but few of us who, after the lapse of ten years, will be 
found to have changed our chief characteristics. The selfish man will still 
be selfish, and the false man false. But our manner of showing or hiding 
those characteristics will be changed,—as also our power of adding to or 
diminishing their intensity.164 
 
Change consists of employing different strategies, more appropriate to this or that 
circumstance or position, to manage one’s dispositions or tendencies or qualities. This is 
a deeply social process. Dorothy Stanbury, for example, is changed by life at Exeter. 
“Her character had become changed, as does that of a flower when it opens itself in its 
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growth.”165 This cannot happen in isolation. Character can only be revealed in a social 
field, because Trollope’s very notion of reality is social.  
An exemplary instance of social reality occurs two-thirds of the way through He 
Knew He Was Right, when Hugh Stanbury arrives at the hotel where the Rowleys have 
gathered. Hugh has not been formally explained as Nora’s lover, and neither he nor she 
know how to act in front of her family.  
Hugh also [in addition to Nora] felt that conversation was difficult. 
He had soon come to perceive,—before he had been in the room half a 
minute,—that the atmosphere was not favourable to his mission. There 
was to be no embracing or permission for embracing on the present 
occasion. Had he been left alone with Sir Marmaduke he would probably 
have told his business plainly, let Sir Marmaduke’s manner to him have 
been what it might; but it was impossible for him to do this with three 
young ladies in the room with him. Seeing that Nora was embarrassed by 
her difficulties, and that Nora’s father was cross and silent, he 
endeavoured to talk to the other girls, and asked them concerning their 
journey and the ship in which they had come. But it was very up-hill work. 
Lucy and Sophy could talk as glibly as any young ladies home from any 
colony,—but now they were cowed. Their elder sister was shamefully and 
most undeservedly disgraced, and this man had had something,—they 
knew not what,—to do with it. …Stanbury had just determined that he 
must go, that there was no possibility for him either to say or do anything 
to promote his cause at the current moment, when the circumstances were 
all changed by the return home of Lady Rowley and Mrs. Trevelyan.166  
  
What is important here is the way in which everyone picks up on—feels out—the 
discomfort in the air. This feeling—let’s call it a vibe—is the reality of the situation, 
which is that Hugh is something of an outsider and something of an intimate, that he had 
“something to do” with the family troubles, and is intent on making more trouble before 
he’s done. The feelings are transmitted in several ways: through Hugh holding Nora’s 
hand a second longer than would be appropriate, through Nora’s formality of address. It 
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takes all these player-observers to reveal Hugh’s standing with the family to himself. 
That standing is not a fact that can be stated but only a feeling that can be experienced. 
Equally important to social reality is how everything is changed by the introduction of 
new persons—here, Lady Rowley and Emily—into the environment. 
Social knowledge is produced collectively, and is more dependable than what is 
gleaned from going inside a character’s mind. Indeed Trollope often refuses to narrate 
from within a character’s mind, or claims that it is impossible to do so. These are two 
different problems. In the first, Trollope suggests that his own will is at issue when 
thoughts and conversations seem to threaten tact and congeniality. But at other times, 
Trollope himself acts like he does not know what his characters are doing—they who he 
knows so much better than they know themselves. This kind of radical inaccessibility 
may be granted for narrative purposes to preserve the semblance of interest in the plot. 
But at other moments it seems a privilege that Trollope bestows on his favorite characters 
to enhance their life-likeness. The privacy that he permits them insists on an interiority 
without filling it in: what counts for Trollope is the assertion of that interiority as a fact. 
The effect is formal, drawing attention to the shape of character as such. Whatever is 
“inside” comes to the surface and gets represented or made real by social interaction, 
usually in the form of faux pas.  
This is not the same as “ordinary human interiority,” because it has no content. 
Indeed, the lack of content becomes a guarantee that some content is, in fact, there, if 
forever unknowable. My point here resonates with Hadley’s description of the 
contradiction between abstraction and embodiment in J.S. Mill’s liberal subject which, 
she says, “runs the risk of rendering each subject indistinguishable from other subjects, 
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generic in his objectivity, not just like everyone else but interchangeable with everyone 
else.” Mill solves this problem by “evok[ing] an embodied and agential, if not exactly 
personal, dimension in a subject otherwise dedicated to cognitive practices of 
abstraction.”167 Trollope does this, too: He elaborates feeling as the mark of 
individuation. He also emphasizes the interactions between the subjects. But Trollope’s 
characters fall short of the ideal of liberal personhood, which Hadley glosses, in Mill’s 
terms, as “a man of decided interests, a man of ‘tastes and pursuits,’ who can yet view his 
opinions disinterestedly and calmly see them debated.”168 Disinterest—being outside 
oneself, examining the position from multiple sides—is a kind of mental illness in 
Trollope. Characters like Dorothy Stanbury and Judge Staveley acquire moral weight 
because they act on the basis of feelings that cannot be seen disinterestedly or calmly, 
that cannot be debated, that defy circulation as topics or pursuits, that are non-discursive 
and yet transmittable through touch, tone, and habit. 
 
Conviction III: Doubt 
A chart comparing vacillation and conviction might look like this: 
  Vacillation    Conviction 
Mode   Cognition    Feeling 
Direction Oscillation    Deepening 
Psychology   Regret     Doubt 
State   Indecision    Certainty 
Affect   Pain     Soreness 
 
Certainty and indecision are not quite antonyms: the opposite of indecision for Trollope 
is not decision, but the refusal to participate in the mechanics of choosing. One should 
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think of vacillation and conviction as existing on a continuum or scale of degrees of 
certainty. Vacillation is on one extreme, and on the other is insane conviction. In this 
section, I will discuss a more positive form of conviction, doubt, and try to answer the 
question of how something called doubt can be contained under something called 
conviction.  
First, doubt serves as a release valve, a way of making the thinker bend by 
encouraging her to hold two conflicting possibilities simultaneously. This is not merely 
an example of bad faith, but is a release from the soreness of insanity as well as the pain 
of vacillation. To be sure, insanity entertains doubts, but these are pro forma. Louis “told 
himself from hour to hour that he knew he was right; —but in very truth he was ever 
doubting his own conduct.”169 Louis’s doubts, however, never become pronounced 
enough to change anything. They are not strong enough to counter the pull of the law, 
which justifies his “rightness” in demanding the vow of obedience from his wife. 
 Another version of doubt, in which doubt is able to prevent the rigor mortis of 
Louis’s thinking, operates with Miss Stanbury. “She had believed herself to be right, and 
would not, even now, tell herself that she had been wrong; but there were doubts, and 
qualms of conscience, and an uneasiness,—because her life had been a failure.”170 In 
Miss Stanbury’s case, doubt is the crack in her conviction, that which allows her to have 
the conversation with herself that Hannah Arendt defined as thinking: “It is this duality of 
myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who 
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ask and the one who answers.”171 Arendt insists that the “partner” of thought must be a 
friend; another way to think about Louis’s doubts is that they are too antagonistic to be of 
use. A friend can be critical. For Miss Stanbury, the ability to hold these opposing ideas, 
even uneasily, provides the flexibility to prevent or soothe soreness. There’s some 
productive friction at work. Vacillation moves between positions but occupies each 
fiercely and desperately with no wiggling, which causes strain. Good conviction isn’t 
conscious. Bad conviction is illness. Only doubting is thinking.  
Orley Farm is a case study in thinking doubt. The plot concerns a secret that its 
protagonist, Lady Mason, has successfully guarded for some twenty years, namely, that 
while her elderly husband lay dying, she forged a will that bestowed the land Orley Farm 
on her infant son. When that son, Lucius Mason, comes of age, he expels from the 
property the long-term tenant, a penny-pinching attorney saddled with sixteen children 
tellingly named Dockwrath. Eager for revenge, Dockwrath rustles up a document that he 
believes will prove that Lady Mason forged the will. For hundreds of pages this guilt is 
never in doubt, though it is not until well into Volume II of the novel that she confesses 
the secret to her protector, Sir Peregrine Orme. 
 Doubt falls under the umbrella of conviction because doubt is a form of 
conviction. Unlike vacillation, which goes back and forth and back and forth again, doubt 
is unidirectional. It involves a settling into and a deepening of knowledge, not a shuttling 
between poles. The person who doubts Lady Furnival happens to be the person who is 
charged with her defense: her lawyer, Mr. Furnival. Doubt in Orley Farm means doubt as 
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to Lady Furnival’s innocence; doubt, in this case, is the knowledge that she is guilty. 
How does Mr. Furnival come to be aware of his own doubt? Trollope explains: 
But when [his assistant Crabwitz] had gone, Mr. Furnival again raised his 
eyes from the papers on the table, and leaning back in his chair, gave 
himself up to further consideration of the Orley Farm case. Crabwitz he 
knew was a sharp, clever man, and now the opinion formed by Crabwitz, 
after having seen this Hamworth attorney, tallied with his own opinion. 
Yes; it was his own opinion. He had never said as much, even to himself, 
with those inward words which a man uses when he assures himself of the 
result of his own thoughts; but he was aware that it was his own opinion. 
In his heart of hearts, he did believe that that codicil had been fraudulently 
manufactured by his friend and client, Lady Mason. 
Under these circumstances, what should he do? He had the handle 
of his pen between his teeth, as was his habit when he was thinking, and 
tried to bring himself to some permanent resolution. 
How beautiful had she looked while she stood in Sir Peregrine’s 
library, leaning on the old man’s arm—how beautiful and how innocent! 
That was the form which his thoughts chiefly took. And then she had 
given him her hand, and he still felt the soft silken touch of her cool 
fingers. He would not be a man if he could desert a woman in such a strait. 
And such a woman! If even guilty, had she not expiated her guilt by deep 
sorrow? And then he thought of Mr. Mason of Groby Park; and he thought 
of Sir Peregrine’s strong conviction, and of Judge Staveley’s belief; and he 
thought also of the strong hold which public opinion and twenty years of 
possession would give to the cause he favoured. He would still bring her 
through! Yes; in spite of her guilt, if she were guilty; on the strength of her 
innocency, if she were innocent; but on account of her beauty, and soft 
hand, and liquid eye. So at least he would have owned, could he have been 
honest enough to tell himself the whole truth.172  
 
Mr. Furnival can identify his opinion because it has been spoken aloud, but it was 
already his own, in non-linguistic form. He does not reach a conclusion in this passage, 
or deliberate on the subject; he does not come to believe or suddenly seize on a belief that 
the codicil was forged. He accepts and receives that which was already his. As 
Hampshire writes, “One might intelligibly speak of oneself as discovering, or realising, 
that one had for some time believed a certain story to be true, without having explicitly 
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acknowledged to oneself that one did believe it. The acknowledgement is then 
acknowledgment of an existing state of mind.”173 
The passage begins by referencing the “either-or” mode of vacillation, which 
consists of “those inward words which a man uses when he assures himself of the result 
of his own thoughts.” Then it moves into a different kind of thinking. A vacillating Mr. 
Furnival would think “She did it, she didn’t do it, she did it, she didn’t do it, she did it, 
she didn’t do it.” This Mr. Furnival thinks: “Did she do it?” and, pen in teeth, knows that 
she did. Trollope, for what it’s worth, is very taken with the image of conviction as biting 
down. Emily Trevelyan describes her sister’s refusal of the wealthy Mr. Glascock as 
follows: “She took the bit between her teeth and would not be turned an inch. Of course 
she was in love.”174 These teeth are not clenched, or anxiously grinding against each 
other til the jaw is sore. There’s an obvious oral fixation at work. The biter finds 
satisfaction in meeting another object that is imagined as inert or inanimate. But what are 
the details? Is the object pliant or resistant, intact or mangled? Is the pen chewed up? He 
“had the handle of the pen between his teeth.” Is he even chewing, or just sitting there 
drooling? 
 There’s a simple explanation we could turn to: Mr. Furnival deceived himself, and 
then he becomes undeceived. In his “heart of hearts” he desired his client, and protected 
himself from that knowledge by averting his eyes and insisting on her innocence. In that 
light, this passage would not give us a new mode of thinking but rather, as Richard 
Dellamora might say, a familiar mode of stupidity. Dellamora analyzed Trollope’s 
portrayal of himself as a “slow boy” in the Autobiography’s recounting of his trouble at 
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174 Trollope, HKHWR, 866.	  	  
	  
	   97	  
school over a nameless incident involving three other boys—an incident that is obviously 
homoerotic in nature. “Incomprehension, an inability to respond, silence, and opacity 
serve both tactical and strategic purposes,” Dellamora wrote in “Stupid Trollope.”175 
Trollope can’t admit that he knows the charges against him, because to have understood 
the charge would be to “acknowledge that he was not as innocent as a babe.” The price of 
loyalty to the group of boys and to the school itself in this instance is the performance of 
stupidity, of a willful naiveté that buries the “schoolboy vice” that went into the 
“production of the English gentleman.”176  
 One could follow Dellamora’s lead and read Mr. Furnival’s silence-to-himself as 
stupidity, the willful refusal to admit his desire for Lady Mason, a desire that threatens 
his professional integrity as well as his relationship with his wife. To read Mr. Furnival 
this way is no stretch: The narrator is very much in on the joke of Mr. Furnival’s 
affection for his client. Moreover, if Mr. Furnival were too ready to proclaim Lady 
Mason’s guilt, he would be no better than Mr. Aram, who delights in getting clients off 
without Mr. Furnival’s high-minded affections—or protestations—as excuse. Mr. 
Furnival cannot admit his motives, or he would not be able to defend Lady Mason and 
maintain his integrity in his own eyes. It is better, in Trollope, to be stupid than to be 
hypocritical.  
 And yet I think it’s worthwhile to read this passage in different terms. My reading 
dispenses with the structure of repression that underlies Dellamora’s analysis, and the 
defenses as they are usually understood. This moment, after all, lacks any of the trauma 
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that accompanies a real psychoanalytic revelation. Mr. Furnival doesn’t confront an 
unpleasant truth or remain in a delusion: Something in-between is happening. Moreover, 
Mr. Furnival is hardly a neurotic who has been suffering over his repression; his silence 
toward himself has been asymptomatic, and adaptive. So much energy in Trollope is 
spent in trying to decide between one thing and its opposite—in this case, innocence and 
guilt. Mr. Furnival has sidestepped that process and all of its agony of deliberation. He is 
hardly obsessional, though he is obviously ambivalent. But what about the last lines, that 
indicate that Mr. Furnival has not submitted his feelings of desire—for the soft hand, for 
his own gentlemanly self-image—to a full reckoning? Let’s resist the impulse to 
immediately catch Mr. Furnival out as being an uncooperative analysand. We will deal 
with his desire soon enough. 
 How does Mr. Furnival evade the traps of either delusional conviction, which 
would make him refuse Lady Mason’s guilt, or vacillation, which would cause him 
anxious indecision? Kierkegaard wrote, under the name Johannes Climacus, that doubt 
cannot be “overcome” by reason, since doubt is the discovery of the contradiction 
between reality—let’s call it Lady Mason’s guilt—and ideality—let’s call it her beauty. 
Doubt represents to the mind the contradictions of consciousness between these two poles. 
“If there were nothing but dichotomies,” he wrote, “doubt would not exist, for the 
possibility of doubt resides precisely in the third, which places the two in relation to each 
other.”177 Reason would not help here. “It would be a misunderstanding for someone to 
think that doubt can be overcome with so-called objective thinking,” Kierkegaard writes. 
“Doubt is a higher form than any objective thinking, for it presupposes the latter but has 
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something more, a third, which is interest or consciousness.”178 I argued earlier that 
vacillation is bound up with a sense of alienation or removal from one’s own subjective 
experience. For Kierkegaard, the objective reasoning of systemic philosophy is removed 
from interest, whereas doubt is interested.179  
James Kincaid, following J. Hillis Miller, has described Trollope’s mixed open 
and closed novelistic form as one of doubt. He quotes Miller to the effect that doubt is 
“the state of mind [that] refuses to rest in either of the alternate comforts of security or 
denial.”180 This is a definition that is closer to the vacillation I have been at pains to 
separate Mr. Furnival from. I am not speaking about doubt as a mixed form or a capacity 
for toggling on the level of plot; I am speaking of doubt as a capacity for interested 
thinking and as a quality that belongs to character. This mode of thinking is one way that 
character can exert force or push on the plot. Doubt in this case is synonymous with 
certainty.  
Doubt does not take shape in language. Mr. Furnival does not narrate or talk 
through his doubt to himself. This is part of the structure of conviction, and also a 
refraction of Orley Farm’s theme of silence. (One way to think about Trollope’s novels is 
that they are each symphonies organized around a key term or concept—silence in Orley 
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find Trollope to be keenly interested in doubt, I concur with Ruth apRoberts when she 
writes that Trollope is “hardly an alienated Victorian, wracked with doubt and the 
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180 James R. Kincaid, The Novels of Anthony Trollope (Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon  
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Farm, forgiveness in Can You Forgive Her?, speculation in The Way We Live Now, 
conviction in He Knew He Was Right—and ramify and multiply the many meanings 
generated by that central notion.) If silence is, as Anderson has written, a response to a 
crisis in rule, silence also presents a crisis of rules. There is no commonly agreed-upon 
“move,” in the Wittgensteinian sense, that an interlocutor or observer can make when 
someone falls silent in Trollope. The meaning of any given silence, and the behavior that 
responds to it, is entirely contextual. Trollope finds the possibilities of these new 
situations immensely appealing.  
Kierkegaard helps us see that doubt is not the content of Mr. Furnival’s thought—
not a representable stream—but a structure, that which makes it possible for him to think 
at all. Vacillators can’t make a relation out of the dichotomy that confronts them, and can 
only swing between poles; doubt creates the possibility of putting a dichotomy in relation. 
Mr. Furnival’s doubt is a way of letting himself get near to an idea or truth or 
possibility—or of letting the idea get near to him—without logical parsing, which only 
produces logical fallacies. The problem in Trollope is never what you know, but always 
how you think. This is why “knowing more” is so useless. When the detective Bozzle 
looks for “facts” to prove the suspicions of Louis Trevelyan in He Knew He Was Right, 
he only discredits facticity. “Facts are things which may be found out,” is Bozzle’s 
mantra, and that’s true as far as it goes—but the truth isn’t a fact.181 A fact is that Emily 
Trevelyan received Colonel Osbourne as a visitor, but a truth is that she did not receive 
him in the spirit of a lover. Facts can be found for any side, so they can’t ever help a 
Trollope character stick to a course.  
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Instead of reasoning, Mr. Furnival mentally conjures the memory of Lady 
Mason’s soft hand, which pulls, directs, claims, commands, shelters, and instructs him. 
His thinking is tactile, closer to what we usually call feeling than to speech. Speech is 
bombastic, empty, formal, and anxious—legalese. Feeling is trustworthy, sensitive. This 
ought to raise eyebrows, if not hackles, in two dimensions. First, it betrays a clear 
preference for the unexamined life. If feeling is valorized over speech, how is anyone 
ever to change their mind? Is life really just a matter of confirming what has already 
occurred? If thinking consists in receiving an idea you already have, where do new ideas 
come from? (The ship Argo might be the answer again.) Second, Lacanians will note that 
Trollope disregards the symbolic realm. He is more interested in the observable 
disruptions of the body, in blushes, sweats, and tics, in shudders and feelings of revulsion 
and physical pain, than in generating interpretations. The body’s material shuts down 
interpretation, closing the case with irrefutable evidence, rather than opening it to 
language.  
 
Fairness and Comfort 
After Mr. Furnival comes into an awareness of Lady Mason’s guilt, he is faced with a 
practical and ethical question. “What should he do?” What is the right course of action?  
The choice that faces him does not concern judgment (is she guilty?) but action (how will 
he proceed?). In fact, to say that Mr. Furnival “decides” to defend a woman he knows to 
be guilty is to sidestep the truth, which is that Mr. Furnival comes up with reasons to do 
the thing he is already doing. A vacillator would consider on the one hand Lady Mason’s 
worthiness, and on the other, the fact that the land legally belongs to James Mason. But 
Mr. Furnival sees only one side of the issue; his vision is limited to Lady Mason’s 
	  
	   102	  
character. He settles the issue of whether he should defend a woman he knows to be 
guilty not by reference to the absolute ethical standard of her innocence or guilt of the 
action in question, and not even by considering her intention at the time she committed 
her action—notably, not one of his reasons concerns a maternal instinct to provide for her 
son. He does not deal in motives, or intentions, at all.  
The passage ends by revealing that the critical factor, the proverbial thumb on the 
scale, was the literal “soft silken touch of her cool fingers,” which Mr. Furnival met some 
eighty pages back in the library at the Cleeve. When he entered the room, he was 
“startled by the pallor of her face, but nevertheless he thought [Lady Mason] had never 
looked so beautiful.”182 Recognizing Sir Peregrine’s priority in his own home, he 
“contented himself at the first moment with touching her hand and hoping that she was 
well.”183 This is all that we learn of the touch in this scene until the very end, when Mr. 
Furnival dissuades Sir Peregrine Orme from bringing in his own attorneys, Slow and 
Bideawhile. (Mr. Bideawhile, by the by, is also Louis Trevelyan’s lawyer, and lives up to 
his name by refusing to help Louis abduct his son from his estranged wife’s care.) 
Mr. Furnival feared that [Slow and Bideawhile] were too respectable. 
They might look at the matter in so straightforward a light as to fancy their 
client really guilty; and what might happen then? Old Slow would not 
conceal the truth for all the baronets in England—no, not for all the pretty 
women. The touch of Lady Mason’s hand and the tear in her eye would be 
nothing to old Slow.184  
 
Earlier in the scene, Mr. Furnival has had to choose whether to “lie” to Lady Mason or 
not. The lie in that case concerns her chance of getting off, not her guilt, though the 
meditation on Slow substitutes the question of guilt for the question of verdict. But just 
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who is “getting off”? Mr. Furnival knows that he is susceptible, in a not entirely 
“respectable” way, to the touch of Lady Mason’s hand. This touch acquires more power 
the longer it lingers in memory. Thinking, we saw earlier, create soreness; here, the hand 
soothes. (Indeed this hand seems to come straight from Heidegger, who wrote that “what 
calls on us to think demands for itself that it be tended, cared for, husbanded in its own 
essential being, by thought.”185) At first it is just a touch, then it is a touch that 
compromises respectability, and by the time we get to the post-Crabwitz meditation, it is 
rich with adjectives, soft and silken, and the workaday hand has become the more 
suggestive “fingers.” As for the beauty that Mr. Furnival is remembering, the library 
scene characterizes Lady Mason as “soft meekness,” “feminine dependence,” and “a 
proneness to lean and almost to cling as she leaned”; “she was a woman to know in her 
deep sorrow rather than in her happiness; one with whom one would love to weep rather 
than rejoice.”186 Her beauty itself cries out to be taken care of, sheltered, aided, defended. 
Her beauty is sorrowful, and she makes sorrow beautiful.  
Lady Mason’s hand is a synecdoche, drawing Mr. Furnival wordlessly in. Her 
beauty is not to be looked at or spoken of; it is a beauty of promised and prohibited 
touch—Mr. Furnival is not permitted to feel her hand, nor dry the tears that the “liquid” 
eye portends. But he clearly longs to do so; if he cannot touch her beauty, he will settle 
for providing her the service of a defense. For Mr. Furnival the admiration of beauty 
leads necessarily to administering to beauty, in the sense of giving aid or help. He would 
doubtless concur with Elaine Scarry that “the fact that something is perceived as beautiful 
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is bound up in an urge to protect it, or act on its behalf, in a way that appears to be tied up 
with the perception of its lifelikeness.”187 In this case it is Lady Mason’s very injury that 
emphasizes her fragile lifelikeness. 
Mr. Furnival shares with Scarry a belief in the necessary relationship between 
beauty and justice. But Orley Farm also poses a challenge to Scarry’s On Beauty. 
Scarry’s many critics have charged her with vagueness, elitism, and solipsism; indeed, 
her arguments rest entirely on assuming that what is true for her is true for other 
people.188 (In the nineteenth-century Emerson called this genius, but it is not so widely 
encouraged anymore.) But Trollope presents a conservative critique of Scarry, parting 
ways over something very different—her aspiration to fairness. 
Scarry writes that beauty is related to fairness because it encourages us to 
distribute attention across the world. 
The structure of perceiving beauty appears to have a two-part scaffolding: 
first, one’s attention is involuntarily given to the beautiful person or thing; 
then, this quality of heightened attention is voluntarily extended out to 
other persons or things. It is as though beautiful things have been placed 
here and there throughout the world to serve as small wake-up calls to 
perception, spurring lapsed alertness back to its most acute level.189 
 
This does not at all describe Orley Farm, neither in themes nor form. To be sure, 
Trollope’s form is nothing if not fair: equal parts, plots each evenly paced, the chapters 
each about ten pages. But rather than planting wake-up calls to perception, Trollope 
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seems keen to even everything out. Furthermore, this equality of attention is not, 
ultimately, in the service of fairness. (Besides, could a baggy monster like a Trollope 
novel ever truly be called “beautiful”?) Mr. Gibson may get just as much narrative time 
as Mr. Glascock, but we know for sure that Mr. Glascock is decent and Mr. Gibson not. 
What is achieved by the formal equality is not fairness but comfort. There are no 
surprises, no ruptures, no dangling sentences to be picked up at a later point. There are no 
narrative surprises, no suspense. You can set your watch to the reading of Trollope. 
Comforts, of course, are best delivered in small doses. One feels a kind of rage if one 
spends the whole day reading Trollope. But the next day, the familiar again takes on a 
soothing quality; that cycle itself, of irritation and soothing, becomes soothing. Reading 
Trollope is not only, as D.A. Miller would have it, boring. It may also be comfortable.   
Comfort rather than fairness is also the ethical good that Trollope’s novels hold 
up thematically. Lady Mason’s beauty marks her as an exception—Mr. Furnival is not 
now going to seek out other forgers to defend, or even other clients. The justice of Orley 
Farm is entirely bound up in the notion of Lady Mason as exceptional. While Scarry 
glosses both beauty and justice as “fairness,” for Trollope, beauty is something else: 
weakness or sorrow or woundedness or suffering, not a Scarryan “symmetry.” It is tactile 
(the soft hand), not visual. Symmetry is not of ethical or political interest to Trollope. 
“Fairness” is, remember, the liberal tendency that gets vacillators into so much trouble: 
that pathological, paralyzing ability to attend to all sides of an issue, to see both points of 
view too well. Trollope’s narrator is not a Rawlsian judge, negotiating and correcting 
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imbalances.190 He assumes, as Trollope himself does, unfairness. He takes this world, the 
one we have right now, that tends towards an as-yet-unachieved equality, with an unequal 
distribution of talents, opportunities, inheritances, and gifts, and asks how it is possible to 
proceed ethically in it.  
In this world some people are bound to be better off than others, and exceptions 
are privileged over rules. Trollope is not sanguine about the state of things. In the 
Autobiography he complains about the prevalence of dishonesty, which he had in mind as 
a target when he sat down in his “new house” to write The Way We Live Now. (He took to 
writing novels “to make an income so that I and those belonging to me might live in 
comfort,” and it worked.191) But he defines progress as an increase of comfort, which is 
fueled by a trickle-down selfishness.192 “All material progress has come from man’s 
desire to do the best he can for himself and those around him, and civilization and 
Christianity itself have been made possible by such progress.”193 Civilized he may be, but 
he is the least Christian of novelists. His novels offer no horizon or transcendence to look 
to for hope. The unequal distribution of goods is for him is due not to grace or divine plan 
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but to contingency. Ethics therefore requires that one understand that one has not 
deserved anything—not because one is a sinner or fallen but because luck rules all. His 
well-known disregard of “merit” means that hard work and perseverance are all, most 
famously in the example of his own diligent authorial production. 
In the Autobiography Trollope writes that the aim of his realism is to 
impregnat[e] the mind of the novel-reader with a feeling that honesty is 
the best policy; that truth prevails while falsehood fails; that a girl will be 
loved as she is pure, and sweet, and unselfish; that a man will be honoured 
as he is true, and honest, and brave of heart; that things meanly done are 
ugly and odious, and things nobly done beautiful and gracious.194  
 
His novels, of course, do the opposite of this purported aim: They take a bit of moral 
cliché or convention, and then produce excuses or justifications that exempt a certain 
character from judgment for having violated (or tried, or wanted, to violate) the tenet. If 
they communicate the feeling that these abstract policies are best, it is only to the extent 
that those policies have not been applied. Perhaps they would be best in other scenarios; 
or, perhaps the reader learns of how difficult it is get the exemption, and how it may be 
wiser not to submit to the test. His magnanimous narrator attempts to persuade the 
reader—imagined, ironically, as a petty stickler for absolutes and rules—by example.  
Everybody will of course say that Felix Graham was base in not telling 
[Mary Snow] that all this arose, not from her love affair with Albert 
Fitzallen, but from his own love affair with Madeline Staveley. But I am 
inclined to think that everybody will be wrong. Had he told her openly that 
he did not care for her, but did care for some one else, he would have left 
no alternative… 195 
 
The narrator is not “everybody”; he is not governed by preconceived notions or inflexible 
ironclad laws about honesty being the best policy. Sometimes a little white lie is good. 
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“There are circumstances always,” Mrs. Orme informs her father-in-law—circumstances 
in which she could not stand by a friend, and circumstances in which she can.196  
Yet this theorizing of partiality is not quite the same as “situation ethics,” which is 
how Ruth apRoberts characterized Trollope. The problem with situation ethics is not only, 
as James Kincaid argued, that Trollope never entirely abandons standards, and instead 
codifies them in unwritten rules of gentlemanly conduct. Both apRoberts and Kincaid 
locate ethics in how one acts or behaves, whereas ethics for Trollope have to do with how 
one thinks. Along with good conviction, the most ethical way to think is to forgive. 
Trollope is obsessed with forgiveness. He will go so far as to directly plead with the 
reader to forgive a character, and to explain his own rationale for forgiving. Forgiveness, 
like doubt, seems to provide a way of escaping the pressure of binary choice—guilt or 
innocence are no longer the only available options. 
Forgiveness is a softening, which is the way that Trollope very often measures 
moral growth—as a soothing or comforting slackening or relaxing. This is because 
softening is the prelude to reconciliation, which is what his plots are usually working 
towards. Of course one wouldn’t want to soften to mush or sink like a useless cushion, 
but a little softening will usually make things easier. So it is that Sir Peregrine Orme 
softens towards Lady Mason, and Emily Trevelyan softens towards her husband; soon 
after, Hugh Stanbury declares his belief that if she acts submissive, Louis will soften 
towards her. (He’s wrong, but he has the right idea.) Nora Rowley “softens” to Lady 
Milborough, and this gratitude is a sign of her maturity; indeed, she copes with the 
disappointment of missing out on the grandeur of life as Lady Peterborough by saying 
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that she would have been “hardened” by it.197 Orley Farm, not incidentally, pairs the soft 
hands of a woman with soft men who love her (and are too soft—too old—to have sex 
with her). A sign of her favored status is that Dorothy Stanbury’s life is marked with 
“soft showers of success.”198  
The comfort of forgiveness is only available if the person in the wrong does not 
stop experiencing extreme discomfort. Lady Mason is forgiven because she puts on the 
proverbial sackcloth and ashes. Alice Vavasor is worthy of forgiveness for the same 
reason: “I think that she may be forgiven, in that she had never brought herself to think 
lightly of her own fault.”199 This giving of forgiveness is a power game. There is 
something of Prospero’s aggressive, coercive forgiveness in the narrator’s stance: a 
condescending “I forgive you, I forgive you” that nobody asked for and can never be 
answered and can only be counted on if one is careful not to consider oneself too worthy 
of it. (It calls to mind Neil Hertz’s quip that “it may seem as though the best advice to 
give someone on the receiving end of George Eliot’s narrator’s sympathy would be: 
“Duck!”200) The characters are well aware of the power that lies in being the one to 
forgive rather than the one being forgiven.  
[Louis Trevelyan] felt that in all that she said there was an assumption that 
[Emily] had been right, and that he had been wrong. She was promising to 
forgive. She was undertaking to forget. She was willing to take him back 
to the warmth of her love, and the comfort of her kindness,—but was not 
asking to be taken back. This was what he could not and would not endure. 
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… It was for him to forgive;—and he was willing to do it, if she would 
accept forgiveness.201  
 
As the doctor puts it, Louis’s fidelity to his “hallucination… did not really consist of a 
belief in her infidelity, but arose from an obstinate determination to yield nothing.”202 
Emily is more pliable. “All feeling of anger was over with her now. There is nothing that 
a woman will not forgive a man, when he is weaker than she is herself.” The shape that 
her forgiving of him takes is for her to ask for his forgiveness. “She was down on her 
knees before him instantly. ‘Oh, Louis! Oh, Louis! say that you forgive me!’ What could 
a woman do more than that in her mercy to a man?”203 She later compares her false 
confession to the tortures of the Inquisition, though she rebukes her sister for being so 
upset over it: “If I can bear it, cannot you?”204 Up to a point, comfort can make it easier 
to bear up under injustices like these. When Emily and her sister Nora arrive at 
Nuncombe Punty, their first safe-house, where they are cared for by Mrs. Stanbury and 
Priscilla, she says this: “[Our position] cannot be remedied, but we could not be 
anywhere more comfortable than we are here.”205 
A good marriage provides comforts: 
In live stock he was not so well provided as the Irish gentleman to whom 
we allude; but in regard to all other provisions for a comfortable married 
life, he had, or at a moment’s notice could have, all that was needed. … 
He had already insured his life for a thousand pounds, and, after paying 
yearly for that, and providing a certain surplus for saving, five hundred a 
year was the income on which they were to commence the world. ‘Of 
course, I wish it were five thousand for your sake,’ he said; ‘and I wish I 
were a Cabinet Minister, or a duke, or a brewer; but, even in heaven, you 
know all the angels can’t be archangels.’ Nora assured him that she would 
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be quite content with virtues simply angelic. ‘I hope you like mutton-
chops and potatoes; I do,’ he said. Then she told him of her ambition about 
the beef-steak, acknowledging that, as it must now be shared between two 
the glorious idea of putting a part of it away in a cupboard must be 
abandoned. ‘I don’t believe in beef-steaks,’ he said. ‘A beef-steak may 
mean anything. At our club, a beef-steak is a sumptuous and expensive 
luxury. Now, a mutton-chop means something definite, and must be 
economical. 
‘Then we will have the mutton-chops at home,’ said Nora, ‘and 
you shall go to your club for the beef-steak.’206 
 
Comfort has two powers: First, it ameliorates the soreness and pain that thinking 
leaves as residue in Trollope’s characters. (And in the reader, who must keep up with the 
twists and turns of thought, and—no small feat—stay seated for the fifteen hours it takes 
to read the book.) Second, comfort is at the center of a constellation of virtues: regularity, 
stability, security, the economical. Everyone won’t get a mutton-chop, but for everyone 
who does, a mutton-chop is always a mutton-chop: there is no inflating its value. That is 
what makes it so comfortable. You know what you are in for when you are dealing with a 
mutton-chop. Also, you eat mutton-chops at home. Comfort is a domestic virtue, so 
powerful that Nora gives up on the idea of eating the beef-steak at all. This had been a 
fantasy of hers only dozens of pages back, but she now cedes the beef-steak to the men’s 
club, and contents herself with the homey mutton.  
  When Trollope dwells on material comforts—cushy armchairs, potatoes, pleasant 
candlelight, clean caps—he does so with full awareness of the social discomforts that his 
characters regularly endure. These social discomforts are usually predicated on 
misunderstandings, as when characters speak across each other, or uncomprehendingly. 
Thus mutual understanding is grasped as a comfort. “I think that you take it as it is meant, 
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and that makes me quite comfortable,” Lady Milborough says to Nora Rowley.207 But 
when understanding is not on hand—and it often is not—the “good things of the world” 
can go some way for him towards setting discomforts right. Trollope has no conception 
of noble poverty. (Hugh Stanbury, bohemian thought he may be, has more money than 
Nora’s father.) Wealth is not the same as comfort—comfort is not aristocratic excess. But 
even so, the critique of material wealth we get in He Knew He Was Right is put into the 
discredited mouth of an American poetess. 
Acknowledging material comforts permits the softening of principles that are 
necessary to create reconciliation. Sir Marmaduke never expressly gives his permission 
for Nora to marry Hugh. But he talks about where Nora will live, and how comfortable 
she will be there, and that is a way of bending while maintaining his principles. These 
practical considerations create the context for a stubborn individual to be “brought round 
by degrees.”208 To be sure, a deus ex machina appears to bring Sir Marmaduke round all 
the way: Emily Trevelyan sends a telegram saying she needs Hugh Stanbury’s help in 
Italy. Trollope’s maxim is as ever, to “take the goods the gods provide you.”209 Take the 
chairs and the tables, and take the twists and turn of fate—which show up as demands 
pressed by other people—too.  
I will close with a scene from Orley Farm in which comfort is symbolically 
threatened by two forces: greedy miserliness and shoddy craftsmanship. The former is 
represented by Mrs. Mason, wife of James Mason, who hogs the meat for herself and 
cheaply rations out food and drink to the rest of the family and servants. The latter is 
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represented by Mr. Kantwise, a travelling salesman intent to off-load a set of cheap 
metallic furniture on behalf of the dubious Patent Steel Furniture Company. Could his 
name be an invocation of Kant, the bearer of the categorical imperative, the very notion 
of universal ethical conduct that Trollope is so keen to overturn? Mr. Kantwise, at any 
rate, is a peddler of cheap tricks, of mass-produced goods that by being good enough for 
everyone are worthy of—and comfortable for—no one.  
These two forces come together when Mrs. Mason purchases the furniture and 
gives it as a present to the curate’s wife. When the time comes to give the gift, Mrs. 
Mason doesn’t want to part with the set, even though the table is broken, and its top will 
not screw on properly. It is worthless but she clings to it.  
She knew that the table would not screw on; she knew that the pivot of the 
music stool was bent; she knew that there was no place in the house in 
which they could stand she must have known that in no possible way 
could they be of use to her or hers,—and yet she could not part with them 
without an agony. …She knew in her heart of hearts that they could never 
be of use to anybody, and yet she made up her mind to keep back two out 
of the eight chairs.210   
 
The hour draws nearer, and Mrs. Mason pays a visit to the furniture, deciding to keep one 
more chair for herself. She presents the insult to her guests, and the curate insincerely 
compliments the pile while “wondering in his mind for what purpose such utter trash 
could have been manufactured, and endeavouring to make up his mind as to what they 
might possibly do with it.”211 The Christmas dinner fares no better: Mrs. Mason has 
subtracted a mince pie and “mutilated” the sirloin of beef, so as only to serve a meager 
portion of it.212 “The comfort” of the guests “was limited.”213 Lady Mason is a forger and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Trollope, Orley Farm, I, 234. 
211 Ibid, 235. 
212 Ibid, 236. 
	  
	   114	  
a liar, but Mrs. Mason and Mr. Kantwise are the real villains of Orley Farm. The harm 
they perpetuate is social and bodily; that is, real. They wring soreness from the very 
things that are on hand to alleviate it.  
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“What Is It You Don’t Like In Him?”: 
Dislike in Jude the Obscure 
 
Midway through Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure (1895), Sue Bridehead confesses to 
her cousin Jude Fawley, who has long suffered from love for her, that she is miserable in 
her marriage. Only eight weeks after marrying Richard Phillotson she loathes the man 
and shrinks from contact with him. It isn’t entirely Phillotson’s fault. She is, the narrator 
drily informs us, “quite unfitted by temperament and instinct to fulfill the conditions of 
the marital relation with Phillotson, possibly with any man.”214 The marital relation 
outside of marriage, however, is another story: She derives guilty satisfaction from 
holding Jude’s hand, and confesses so her to husband, asking his permission to leave him 
and live elsewhere with Jude. Phillotson allows her to move into a separate part of the 
house, but one night, dazed from hours of reading on Roman antiquities, he forgets the 
arrangement and enters the room they used to share, a room from which he is now 
forbidden. 
He entered, and unconsciously began to undress.  
There was a cry from the bed, and a quick movement. Before the 
schoolmaster had realized where he was he perceived Sue starting up half-
awake, staring wildly, and springing out upon the floor on the side away 
from him, which was towards the window. This was somewhat hidden by 
the canopy of the bedstead, and in a moment he heard her flinging up the 
sash. Before he had thought that she meant to do more than get air she had 
mounted upon the sill and leapt out. She disappeared in the darkness, and 
he heard her fall below.215  
 
By the end of the novel, Sue will have returned, a broken melancholic, to the very man 
that she threw herself out of the window to avoid, just as Jude will have found himself 
remarried to Arabella, with whom he has nothing in common, who derailed his education, 
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and who, wherever she goes, seems to leave a trail of dead pigs in her wake. In between, 
Sue and Jude will lose jobs, wander homeless from town to town, and resort to selling 
cookies in the shape of the city of learning to which they both came with hope. Most 
bleakly, the son of Jude and Arabella will kill himself and all his half-siblings. It is an 
understatement to say that Hardy’s last novel is one that many readers have found 
difficult to like. On first reading, one’s reaction may not be so different from Sue’s when 
confronted with the sleepy Phillotson—only the reader is more likely to throw the book, 
not herself, out the window.  
 I begin by thinking about Sue’s distaste for Phillotson because it is the argument of 
this chapter that Jude the Obscure is a novel that is fundamentally about dislike. This 
dislike is concentrated in Sue’s character, in her inarticulable, insistent, bodily sensations. 
Her dislike is the mechanism of individuation, a crucial function in a novel that is so 
concerned with conventions and how to survive them. How, Jude asks on every page, is it 
possible to be unique or true to one’s own self—to maintain a self at all—in a world of 
crushing conformity? Dislike is the resounding answer. Dislike does not produce 
“agency,” per se, but only because Hardy has no use for agency. It produces an attenuated 
subjectivity.  
This notion of an individuating or character-constituting dislike is a throughline in 
Hardy’s work. In Far From the Madding Crowd (1874) he wrote of Bathsheba Everdene 
that 
Her emblazoned fault was to be too pronounced in her objections, and not 
sufficiently overt in her likings. We learn that it is not the rays which 
bodies absorb, but those which they reflect, that give them the colours they 
are known by, and in the same way people are specialized by their dislikes 
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and antagonisms whilst their goodwill is looked upon as no attribute at 
all.216 
 
In the first sentence the narrator describes Bathsheba’s objecting temper as her own 
conspicuous and individual fault, a unique attribute. But by the end of the second 
sentence a different idea has come into focus: that people, across the board and generally, 
are “specialized by their dislikes,” which are more specific and personal than their 
“goodwill.” This has something to do with how dislike operates as a reflection: While 
goodwill takes in or absorbs the world, dislike rejects and reflects back, marking the 
disliker with known attributes (and perhaps blinding on-lookers) in the process. Dislike 
provides “color” or life, a range of hues in the “grayish” world of “neutral tones.”217 In 
other words, a character is a composite of the things she dislikes—by their dislike ye 
shall know them.  
In recent years the critical conversation around taste has become overtly 
sociological, largely due to the influence of Pierre Bourdieu. In Bourdieuian readings, 
taste is that by which we instantiate, emit, or perform a socio-economic or class position. 
It is not personal at all, but impersonal; not a matter of expressing one’s embodied 
preferences, but of reproducing relations of power. “Taste classifies,” Bourdieu writes in 
Distinction. “And it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by their 
classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make, between the 
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beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in which their position in the 
objective classifications is expressed or betrayed.”218 
My argument is adjacent to Bourdieu’s aesthetics. Like Bourdieu, I am interested 
in the power of taste to classify subjects, but my reading does not assess how the novel 
assigns “objective classifications” to its field of players. Mine is not a sociological 
analysis insofar as I am not writing about how taste, in Bourdieu’s words, “legitimate[s] 
social differences.”219 Nor am I writing about the faculty of judging or justifying one’s 
tastes; my reading highlights the interested and embodied, not the disinterested and 
contemplative. I am not, for example, concerned with how Hardy treats aesthetic objects 
like the icons, stone masonry, and photography that figure prominently in the novel. To 
use Kantian terms, I could say that I am writing about the agreeable and disagreeable 
rather than the beautiful and ugly. What matters for me is how this rather crude 
phenomena of liking and disliking operates in a formal or literary sense: how Hardy uses 
like and dislike to create character itself. I am looking not at the motive for certain 
tastes—why a Bathsheba or a Sue dislikes a given thing—but at the phenomenology and 
effect of dislike. What does dislike feel like for Sue? What does it get her? If we say that 
character itself is the effect of dislike for Hardy, does that open ways of thinking about 
realism and naturalism? Does that open ways of thinking about reading?  
 Likes and dislikes involve what objects one will take into one’s own body—think 
of Jude inhaling Christminster from afar, or Sue’s panic about “taking in” the body of 
Phillotson sexually. I anticipate that for some readers, dislike may not be a strong enough 
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term to justify jumping out a window. Some might want to say something stronger—that 
Sue is repulsed by Phillotson, or disgusted by him.220 But according to Sianne Ngai, 
disgust aims to negate its object; what is disgusting “is always that which is insistent and 
intolerable.”221 In what follows, we will see that Sue does not want to negate Phillotson—
she requires Phillotson to exist so that she may define herself against him. What’s more, 
Phillotson does not insist; Sue runs after him in pursuit, attracted by the promise of 
becoming herself through dislike of him. She is attached to him and invested in his 
survival. She must be in relation to him.   
 Perhaps, instead of dislike, we should say that she is irritated by Phillotson? As 
Ngai notes, “irritation is a mood, distinct from emotion in that it lacks an explicit 
occasion or subject.”222 Indeed Sue’s negative feelings are mobile, and seem to emanate 
as much from her as from whatever she happens to be looking at; like a mood, they come 
from both inside and outside.223 Irritation is a bodily state as well as a mental one, which 
invokes Sue’s nearly pathological nervousness. Ngai writes, “In addition to 
‘inflammation,’ ‘rawness,’ and ‘chafing,’ for example, ‘irritation’ qua ‘soreness’ also 
signifies ‘hypersensitivity,’ ‘susceptibility,’ and ‘tenderness,’ words with explicitly 
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affective dimensions easily turned, as we have seen, into signifiers of social distinction in 
the late nineteenth-century discourse of ‘nerves.’”224 Irritation, for Ngai, is an excess of 
anger but also a deficiency and misdirection of it, so that an irritated person will have the 
same experience of a chipped teacup and a major social injustice. Sue’s negative affects 
are mobile but—this is where she parts ways with Ngai’s irritation—they are not 
arbitrary. Her ire is focused around a set of related social complaints. She is a 
misanthrope, alienated from the reigning gender norms, religious conventions, and social 
beliefs, but her feelings are not out of proportion to their cause. Furthermore, while the 
word irritation captures something of how Sue feels, it doesn’t get at the structure of 
character that feeling produces. The word dislike is useful because it contains the idea of 
likeness—of resemblance, form, and differentiation. Unlike Ngai’s “ugly feelings,” 
which muddle the subject-object divide, dislike creates it. 
 
Dislike and Individuation 
Roland Barthes has offered one way to think about how the individuation of the body 
occurs through taste. In Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, the author lists his likes and 
dislikes in the style of a celebrity questionnaire.  
I like: salad, cinnamon, cheese, pimento, marzipan, the smell of 
new-cut hay (why doesn’t someone with a “nose” make such a perfume), 
roses, lavender, champagne, loosely held political convictions, Glenn 
Gould, too-cold beer, flat pillows, toast, Havana cigars, Handel, slow 
walks, pears, white peaches, cherries, colors, watches, all kinds of writing 
pens, desserts, unrefined salt, realistic novels, the piano, coffee, Pollock, 
Twombly, all romantic music, Sartre, Brecht, Verne, Fourier, Eisenstein, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Ngai, 184. As Christopher Lane has shown, Victorian doctors and psychologists were 
known to characterize misanthropy as a “nervous disease” or outright insanity, and 
prescriptions included slow eating and a diet free of salty, fatty foods. See Christopher 
Lane, Hatred and Civility: The Antisocial Life in Victorian England (New York: 
Columbia University Press), 2004: 21. 
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trains, Médoc wine, having change, Bouvard and Pécuchet, walking in 
sandals on the lanes of southwest France, the bend of the Adour seen from 
Doctor L.’s house, the Marx Brothers, the mountains at seven in the 
morning leaving Salamanca, etc. 
 I don’t like: white Pomeranians, women in slacks, geraniums, 
strawberries, the harpsichord, Miró, tautologies, animated cartons, Arthur 
Rubinstein, villas, the afternoon, Satie, Bartók, Vivaldi, telephoning, 
children’s choruses, Chopin’s concertos, Burgundian branles and 
Renaissance dances, the organ, Marc-Antoine Charpentier, his trumpets 
and kettledrums, the politico-sexual, scenes, initiatives, fidelity, 
spontaneity, evenings with people I don’t know, etc.225 
 
The repeated etcetera is a clue that these lists could go on forever; there is no reason for 
them to stop or start where they do. In the aggregate, the list is arbitrary—every item 
could be substituted and, like the ship Argo, the list would be the same.226 But each like 
and dislike is specific, and if they are arbitrary as a whole they are irreplaceable as 
particulars. Barthes really does like Handel, slow walks, and the Marx Brothers; he really 
does dislike evenings with people he doesn’t know. 
 With the exception of walking and “having change,” Barthes’ likes are things—
nouns. His dislikes introduce the social: women in slacks, initiatives, “the politico-sexual.” 
And indeed the social is what is at stake in liking and disliking. The passage continues: 
I like, I don’t like: this is of no importance to anyone; this, 
apparently, has no meaning. And yet all this means: my body is not 
the same as yours. Hence, in this anarchic foam of tastes and 
distastes, a kind of listless blur, gradually appears the figure of a 
bodily enigma, requiring complicity or irritation. Here begins the 
intimidation of the body, which obliges others to endure me 
liberally, to remain silent and polite confronted by pleasures or 
rejections which they do not share. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Barthes, 116-117. 
226 Barthes compares his work studies, one in the country and one in the city, to the Argo. 
“These sites are identical. Why? Because the arrangement of tools (paper, pens, desks, 
clocks, calendars) is the same: it is the structure of the space which constitutes its identity. 
This private phenomenon would suffice to shed some light on structuralism: the system 
prevails over the very being of objects” (46). 
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(A fly bothers me, I kill it: you kill what bothers you. If I had not 
killed the fly, it would have been out of pure liberalism: I am liberal in 
order not to be a killer).227  
 
Liking and disliking produce the individual, social body, and they produce the body 
politic. Liking and disliking is a structure of power in that the body that likes and dislikes 
intimidates other bodies into tolerance. Notice, too, that irritation appears not as the 
affective corollary of disliking but as how one’s disliking affects the other people who 
have to put up with it. Since we are beyond the realm of argument—literally, there is no 
accounting for taste—others must be silent and polite and endure what they themselves 
do not share. As Kant put it, “To one person the color violet is gentle and lovely, to 
another lifeless and faded. One person loves the sound of wind instruments, another that 
of string instruments. It would be foolish if we disputed about such differences with the 
intention of censuring another’s judgment as incorrect if it differs from ours, as if the two 
were opposed logically. Hence about the agreeable the following principle holds: 
Everyone has his own taste (of sense).”228 
Sue’s dislikes also produce her body as singular. But Hardy parts ways with 
Barthes, interested in a different fate of “I like, I don’t like.” Sue’s dislikes are not really 
on the order of Vivaldi or Pomeranians, white or otherwise. They are social problems: 
She doesn’t like marriage laws, or divorce laws. They are also premonitory or predictive: 
She doesn’t like the thought of sex with her husband, or with the person she leaves her 
husband for.229 (Dread is very deeply connected to disliking in Jude.) What’s more, while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Ibid, 117. 
228 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), 
1987: 55. 
229 Aaron Matz’s reading of Hardy emphasizes that the irony of Jude is that “characters 
are compelled to have sex; they have no contraception; they find themselves in a novel 
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to some extent Phillotson and Jude must endure Sue’s dislikes, these dislikes do not 
produce her as a liberal subject; her body is intimidated, not intimidating. Her body 
diagnoses and suffers, but cannot adequately address her complaints. And while she 
attaches herself to what she dislikes, she is not really able to tolerate it. Tolerance, both 
in a political sense and a psychological one, is a quality of Jude’s. Jude is a liberal, 
unwilling to hurt a fly. Sue is a killer.   
Barthes does not bother to explain or account for the origins of his likes and 
dislikes. They are presented on the order of facts or first principles, starting premises. 
Throughout Jude, though, Sue struggles to explain the reasons for her dislikes. These 
reasons are legion, and often contradictory. Sometimes she says that her dislike is caused 
by the other person making claims on her, demanding her to be responsive: “What 
tortures me so much is the necessity of being responsive to this man whenever he wishes, 
good as he is morally!—the dreaded contract to feel in a particular way, in a matter 
whose essence is it voluntariness!”230 Sometimes she blames temperament: “Domestic 
laws should be made according to temperaments, which should be classified,” she says. 
“If people are at all peculiar in character they have to suffer from the very rules that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that seems hostile to procreation.” See Aaron Matz, “Hardy and the Vanity of 
Procreation,” 10. I do not deny that Sue and Jude have sex, and perhaps a lot of it, and I 
will turn to compulsion as an idea later in this chapter. However, despite the sexual 
coupling with Jude that Sue is, however furtively, compelled to, the fact remains that she 
does everything in her power to put this coupling off—to delay it. Hardy does not narrate 
sex; when Sue jumps out the window, he jumps, too. This is a meaningful choice, 
because we know from Tess that he was more than capable of writing sex and sensuality. 
My conclusion is that there is something about sex that Sue seems to dislike, at least 
intellectually, and that the novelistic world of Jude must expel to the sidelines along with 
the representations of nature and agricultural labor that characterize Hardy’s other novels. 
Thus we can speak of compulsion and repetition in Jude, but not of fulfillment or 
gratification. 
230 Hardy, Jude, 212. 
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produce comfort in others!”231 Sometimes she says that her dislike is caused by the law 
itself: “I have just the same dread lest an iron contract should extinguish your tenderness 
for me, and mine for you, as it did between our unfortunate parents.”232 Following the 
death of Father Time, it seems that the fault is the universe itself: “There is something 
external to us which says, ‘You shan’t!’ First it said, ‘You shan’t learn!’ Then it said, 
‘You shan’t labour!’ Now it says, ‘You shan’t love!’”233 As she points her finger at 
various causes, the ground of her identity moves. Her dislike is constant but various, a 
shifting space of relatively useless resistance, no foundation for reform or even survival, 
seeming to come from everywhere at once.  
Barthes has no problem articulating his likes and dislikes; if anything, the threat is 
that he will speak them too well, and will become unable to stop speaking them. But in 
Jude, dislike is fundamentally inarticulable. On Sue’s second wedding night to Phillotson, 
the Widow Edlin asks her, “What is it you don’t like in him?” Sue responds, “I cannot 
tell you. It is something… I cannot say. The mournful thing is, that nobody would admit 
it as a reason for feeling as I do; so that no excuse is left to me.”234 While there would be 
some utility to a common or shared feeling—it would serve as a rule or excuse to spring 
her from her marital duties—Sue’s dislike isolates her. It can’t be spoken; it can only be 
experienced. What’s more, it is actually unreasonable—if she could state it, which she 
can’t, no one else would concede to its claims. This may be another explanation for her 
inability to come up with a justifying reason: Something in the nature of dislike actually 
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excludes reason. This is not to say that dislike is irrational or hysterical, only that is 
embodied and non-discursive. 
This incommunicability of dislike participates in Jude’s wider suspicion of 
language and representability. Though Hardy’s narrator makes plain that motivation and 
interior thoughts can never be known to others, Sue holds onto the belief that she will be 
transparently known without speaking. Take her and Phillotson’s habit, before they marry, 
of doing arithmetic in the evenings. “Sometimes as she figured… she would involuntarily 
glance up with a little inquiring smile at him, as if she assumed that, being the master, he 
must perceive all that was passing in her brain, as right or wrong.” Phillotson is not 
thinking of math, but of her, but where she stands in relation to his desire is not clear: 
“Perhaps she knew that he was thinking of her thus.”235 
This is clearly an epistemological problem, and on multiple levels: First, the 
narrator himself is unable to explain what is transpiring inside Sue’s mind. She smiles as 
if she thinks Phillotson knows her thoughts: Does she actually think this is the case? If 
not, why does the narrator read her face as such? Perhaps she knows that he’s actually 
thinking of her and not math: Which is it? Are Sue and Phillotson experiencing a 
communication breakdown, in which a) she thinks he knows what she’s thinking, and he 
doesn’t, and b) she doesn’t know he’s thinking of her? Or is Hardy suggesting that desire 
itself is radically unknowable—that the narrator can’t even know what’s happening 
here?  
When Trollope denies the reader access to a mind or conversation, the feeling that 
is evoked is often tact. We have been excluded from something that we are not meant to 
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see, that no one is meant to see. But something is there, even if it must remain hidden. 
Hardy is up to something else, which involves a wide-scale refusal of first causes. 
Despite the invocations of cosmic or deterministic rationales, Hardy is never really 
interested in explaining why anything happens the way it does, or why humans do any of 
the things they do. He characterizes motives as always once overdetermined and 
unknowable. This does not necessarily lead to nihilism, however. It leads outward. He is 
interested in consequences—how people treat and mistreat each other, given the limits of 
our ability to know each other’s states of mind. 
The multiple possible sources of dislike also suggests that dislike is continuous 
and ongoing, and necessarily so. There is no end to the project of creating oneself as a 
subject who is different from other subjects. Dislike is a motor or life force. As William 
Hazlitt wrote, 
Nature seems (the more we look into it) made up of antipathies: without 
something to hate, we should lose the very spring of thought and action. 
Life would turn to a stagnant pool, were it not ruffled by the jarring 
interests, the unruly passions, of men. …But so it is, that there is a secret 
affinity, a hankering after, evil in the human mind, and that it takes a 
perverse, but a fortunate delight in mischief, since it is a never-failing 
source of satisfaction. Pure good soon grows insipid, wants variety and 
spirit. Pain is a bittersweet, which never surfeits. Love turns, with a little 
indulgence, to indifference or disgust: hatred alone is immortal.236 
 
 
Dislike and Disidentification 
Dislike is a mechanism of expulsion. But what exactly is Sue getting rid of? One possible 
reading is that she is an example of Harry Stack Sullivan’s theory of the “not-me.” 
Sullivan, who developed his theory of interpersonal psychiatry in the mid-twentieth 
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century, argued that the infant experiences three “personifications”: the good-me, the 
bad-me, and the not-me. Each of these are wrapped up in her increasing awareness of 
“my body,” which is “an organization of experience…distinguished from everything else 
by its self-sentient character.  
Good-me is the beginning personification which organizes experience in 
which satisfactions have been enhanced by rewarding increments of 
tenderness… Bad-me...is the beginning personification which organizes 
experience in which increasing degrees of anxiety are associated with 
behavior involving the mothering one in its more-or-less clearly 
prehended interpersonal setting.237 
 
These lay the foundations for adult consciousness—for the adult’s awareness that there 
are aspects of herself that are good, and other aspects that she is better off not showing. 
The not-me is a special category, familiar to schizophrenics, that most people only access 
in nightmares. It is inaugurated by an extremely anxious situation and is “practically 
beyond discussion in communicative terms.”238 The not-me is the consequence of an 
experience that is entirely overwhelming to the infant, who later in life will have an 
“uncanny” feeling of “awe, dread, loathing, and horror” whenever triggers are present.239 
It can eventually lead to dissociation and the inability to learn from experience.  
 The not-me is an enticing concept, particularly in its separation from 
communicative possibilities and its connection to repetition, but there are a few problems 
with using Sullivan to think about Sue. One of these problems, it’s worth stating, isn’t the 
fact that the not-me isn’t explicitly political or social. I would be happy to adopt the not-
me metaphorically and say that the anxious situation Sue faces is institutional, or is, more 
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precisely, the overlap between institutional and private life. The problem is that Sullivan 
encourages us to think in terms of originary traumas, which is not Hardy’s interest in this 
novel. Secondly, it’s really the issue of likeness and not essence that is at stake in Jude. 
While Sue clearly displays signs of anxiety about being taken over or swallowed up by 
Phillotson, Jude, and the institution of marriage, there is far more talk in the book about 
who or what is like something else than about who or what is something else. 
It is more useful to think of Sue vis-à-vis a different term, disidentification. 
Disidentification is not a thoroughly theorized concept, but it’s often used to describe the 
process of separating from a group, race, or gender identity. One recent article in the 
American Journal of Psychoanalysis connected disidentification to a patient’s move from 
relating to herself as an object to relating to herself as a subject. The analyst described 
that case as follows:  
Our feeling to exist does not derive only from the way others see us, 
irrespective of how important they are, but also from our subjectivity, 
from our perception of ourselves as agents…. 
 The crises that broke out during analysis made this identification 
alive again and again. The fact that we were able to overcome the crises 
favored a process of disidentification, restoring the capacity of 
experiencing oneself as both a subject and an object, moving back and 
forth between these two perspectives of the self and integrating them into 
the representational world, as it has been stressed by the authors who have 
elaborated a model of the mind based on self-reflexivity (among many 
others: Bach, 1985, 1994; Auerbach, 1993; Auerbach and Blatt, 1996; 
Aron, 1998, 2000).240 
 
In the above example, disidentifying meant abandoning an over-identification that had 
caused the patient to experience herself from an externalized perspective. By 
disidentifying, she was able to gain the ability to experience herself as both a subject and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Carlo Bonomi, “Fear of the Mind: The Annihilating Power of the Gaze,” in American 
Journal of Psychoanalysis 68: 173 
	  
	   129	  
an object, and to move across that divide. This seems an apt description of Sue’s situation. 
By disliking marriage laws, religion, and the work opportunities available to her, she is 
able to experience herself as both the object the law and other people make her out to be, 
and as a subject. 
Disidentification is not accomplished once and for all. It is a constant process of 
relating to self by changing relations to others. Indeed, dislike in Jude is deeply relational. 
Even the aggressive rejection of another person, for Hardy, is a way of holding onto that 
person, and of coloring oneself. This is not to say that Sue achieves an “interiority”; the 
characters of Jude the Obscure are among the least psychologically “deep” that Hardy 
ever wrote. But Sue achieves difference, from Jude and Phillotson and the Widow Edlin, 
and from the reader.241 She holds tightly to an essential or absolute nugget of self, a kind 
of proto-modernist or Lawrentian gem, as a bulwark. 
 Sue’s aggression, which seems to attack her even as she lashes out, calls up 
something Kleinian. We would not want to be too literal about this: Sue is not rejecting 
parts of her own psyche that she has projected onto the world.242 She is rejecting social 
forms, and even if she is also rejecting her own desire for those conventions, to simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 I have company in my reading of Hardy in relational terms. See Alicia Christoff, 
“Alone with Tess,” forthcoming in Novel. Christoff pairs Tess of the D’Urbervilles with 
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that the character of Tess is structured by a “diffusion” of self. “The question of whether 
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watchful presence of another, like the child does with her mother. “The personal,” 
Christoff writes, “is a set of interpersonal relations” (Christoff, 10). 
242 See Melanie Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946) in Envy and 
Gratitude and Other Works: 1946-1963 (New York: The Free Press), 1975: 1-24. 
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call her a paranoid-schizoid would be to reduce the power of that political critique. In 
broad strokes, though, the Kleinian positions illuminate what is at stake for each of them. 
Ruth Stein sums up the situation as follows: “In the paranoid-schizoid position, the 
anxiety is fear for the survival of the ego (or the self): it is the fear that persecutors will 
destroy the ego and its ideal object. In the depressive position, anxiety is of the loss of the 
object or the injury done to it.”243 As we have seen, Sue is anxious to survive a world that 
is hostile and inhospitable to her; dislike and disidentification are her means. The 
paranoid-schizoid position may be a thoroughly rational way of meeting a world whose 
institutions are so deforming.  
 Sue’s aggression also has Winnicottian echoes of “testing” objects. In his work on 
transitional objects, Winnicott found that in order for objects to be meaningful, they must 
have their own reality, not simply be projections from the subject herself. Instead of 
“relating” to the object as a projection, the infant learns to “use” the object by placing it 
outside of her power. This means that she must destroy it; if it survives, then it is 
autonomous, and an object that she can relate to, or use.  
The subject says to the object: ‘I destroyed you’, and the object is there to 
receive the communication. From now on the subject says: ‘Hullo object!’ 
‘I destroyed you’. ‘I love you’. ‘You have value for me because of your 
survival of my destruction of you’. ‘While I am loving you I am all the 
time destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy. Here fantasy begins for the 
individual. The subject can now use the object that has survived.”244  
 
Sue never gets to the stage of loving Phillotson—she remains in the stage of aggressively 
destroying him, a project that all the while creates her difference from him. We shouldn’t 
discount Phillotson’s participation in Sue’s subject-creation; he is the context or 
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environment that permits it. He receives the full blast of her hatred, again and again, and 
survives.  
Dislike and disidentification are important ways to think about literary character 
because they complicate the conversation around so-called “sympathetic realism.” While 
contemporary scholars rarely speak of identification, a supposedly naïve reading practice, 
theories of sympathy continue to percolate. In Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth-
Century British Fiction, Rae Greiner writes that for nineteenth-century writers, “reality 
would depend on the practice, and the central proposition, of sympathy—that what is true 
in a given moment is that which is collectively thinkable and can be felt as such.”245 
Through sympathetic mechanisms, a character and a reader acquire new knowledge about 
themselves, coming to see themselves from the other’s point of view. A capacious term 
for Greiner, sympathy ultimately has to do with “going along with” the other and with the 
novel; it’s something like theory of mind. “Sympathetic realism” is bound up in a theory 
of the subject that privileges rationality, deliberation, judgment, and moderation. None of 
these terms seems appropriate to a discussion of Hardy.  
 
Idealization and Identification 
“Lonely and impressionable” Jude shares with Clym Yeobright, Dick Dewy, and Angel 
Clare a habit of turning like into idealization, especially with respect to female love 
objects.246 When he meets objects of desire—including Phillotson, Arabella, Sue, and the 
city of Christminster—he is not practiced at dealing with them as anything other than the 
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projections of his own imagination.247 Indeed, the relationship with Sue begins as one in 
which Jude makes a still image speak words he wants to hear. Thus inspired by his own 
animation of the picture, he finally moves to Christminster. When he meets her, he 
experiences her as not only belonging to him in the way of kin, but as somehow 
emanating from his own self. (This indicates not the reflective process of dislike but 
rather introjection.) “She was so pretty that he could not believe it possible that she 
should belong to him. Then she spoke to one of the two older women behind the counter; 
and he recognized in the accents certain qualities of his own voice; softened and 
sweetened, but his own.”248 As time passes, “she remained more or less an ideal character, 
about whose form he began to weave curious and fantastic day-dreams.”249 Fatally, he 
decides that “so would she be to him a kindly star, an elevating power, a companion in 
Anglican worship, a tender friend.”250 The narrator and reader share the knowledge that 
“she was almost an ideality to him still.” Jude does not desire to overcome this ideality: 
“Perhaps to know her would be to cure himself of this unexpected and unauthorized 
passion. A voice whispered that, though he desired to know her, he did not desire to be 
cured.”251  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Distance from Phillotson causes Jude’s childish misreading of the schoolteacher’s 
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transferable; Christminster “acquired a tangibility, a permanence, a hold on his life 
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Simple idealization can be shattered, as in Tess’s confession of her affair with 
Alec. She felt her confession was appropriate because she had wrongly identified her and 
Angel’s shared experience—they both had affairs—with a shared social position: “He 
seemed to be her double.”252 Angel explains the break as follows: “You were one person; 
now you are another.” He goes on to say that “the woman I have been loving is not you,” 
and when Tess asks who he has loved, he responds, “Another woman in your shape.”253 
When the ideality turns to reality, the transformation is so total that the object is not the 
same, even if is in the same shape; the change, of course, is in Angel. Likewise, Jude is 
able to overcome his idealization of Phillotson: “That after all these years the meeting 
with Mr. Phillotson should be of this homely complexion destroyed at one stroke the halo 
which had surrounded the schoolmaster’s figure in Jude’s imagination ever since their 
parting.”254 Jude is even able—and rather quickly—to overcome his idealization of 
Arabella. In none of these cases did Angel or Jude mistake the object for their own self, 
falling, as Tess did, from idealization into identification. That’s what is fatal, and that’s 
what happens between Jude and Sue.  
Freud first explored identification in the essay on Leonardo da Vinci: “The boy 
represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her place, identifies himself with her, 
and takes his own person a model in whose likeness he chooses the new objects of his 
love.”255 Richard Wollheim has explained that the identifying subject has constraints on 
his imagination, so that when imagining doing something, he draws not on his own 
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“repertoire” but upon another’s. This other repertoire does not necessarily have anything 
to do with the psychic reality of the other person: “It is likely that identification will 
follow directly upon some other psychic mechanism, such as projection or idealization,” 
Wollheim writes.256  
Identification makes its first appearance [in Freud’s writings] as a 
mechanism of defence: as a means by which the ego deals with 
objectionable, or (an expression with changing meaning) “incompatible,” 
wishes or desires. Soon, however, identification assumes a further role. 
For it becomes a method by means of which a trait or feature of the 
personality is fixed. Nor are these two functions unrelated: on the contrary, 
the most intimate connection between the two may be observed. For a 
defence which is constantly iterated conditions or constitutes the 
character.257  
 
Dislike produces singularity by disidentifying, so Sue’s “I don’t like you” becomes a way 
of saying “I am not like you.” But identification binds the identifier to his projection and 
then onto the other person. The personality gets “fixed,” and becomes static. Even when 
Sue rejects her own theories of marriage and turns from atheism to Christianity, Jude is 
still a faithless radical. He has become Sue. For Wollheim as for Hardy, identification is a 
(futile) effort “to change the real world through the resources of the psychic world”—an 
effort that fundamentally “misconceives” the “efficacy” of “psychic mechanisms.”258 The 
over-identifying character and the disidentifying character are both stubbornly non-
developmental. In both cases, a “defence which is constantly iterated” is what constitutes 
the character, rather than a socially “normal” temporal progression, with appropriate 
milestones at apprenticeship, trade, marriage, children, and grandchildren.  
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Jude is eager to communicate his identification. After Sue’s first marriage to 
Phillotson, Jude pays her a visit. Waiting for her in the schoolroom, he plays the hymn 
that moved him so the week before—on the piano, the very instrument Phillotson never 
learned in Marygreen. Jude refuses to play in front of her, so they switch roles: she plays 
the song for him. 
‘It is odd,’ she said, in a voice quite changed, ‘that I should care 
about that air; because—’ 
‘Because what?’ 
‘I am not that sort — quite.’ 
‘Not easily moved?’ 
‘I didn’t quite mean that.’ 
‘O, but you are one of that sort, for you are just like me at heart!’ 
‘But not at head.’ 
She played on, and suddenly turned round; and by an 
unpremeditated instinct each clasped the other’s hand again. 
She uttered a forced little laugh as she relinquished his quickly. 
‘How funny!’ she said. ‘I wonder what we both did that for?’ 
‘I suppose because we are both alike, as I said before.’ 
‘Not in our thoughts! Perhaps a little in our feelings.’ 
‘And they rule thoughts… Isn’t it enough to make one blaspheme 
that the composer of that hymn is one of the most commonplace men I 
ever met!’ 
‘What—you know him?’ 
‘I went to see him.’ 
‘O you goose—to do just what I would have done! Why did you?’ 
‘Because we are not alike,” he said drily. 
‘Now we’ll have some tea,’ said Sue…. 259 
 
Jude wants Sue to be like him. He is a bad reader, over-sympathizing and putting himself 
in her place to such an extent that he squeezes her out. She rejects that sympathy 
haltingly but firmly, changing the subject when other options are exhausted. Significantly, 
the thing she changes the subject to involves a physical sensation—thirst—that cannot be 
shared. Even if she and Jude do the same things, she finds a way to make herself different. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Hardy, Jude, 202.  
	  
	   136	  
Drinking, eating, and what happens after: There are things, as Sancho Panza told Don 
Quixote, that no one can else can do for you.   
Such long and tortured exchanges of dialogue are typical in Jude, as are negative 
syntactical constructions. Silences, hyphens, and repetition express or serve as 
placeholders for feeling and enact the deformation language and social conventions do to 
experience. If this is the kind of conversation that results when one tries to discuss likes 
and dislikes, it is no wonder that Barthes settles for silence. In another novel, the scene 
could read as farce—the playful banter of a Trollopian swell and heroine, or a bit of 
Beckettian absurdity spoken from trash cans. In Brontë the exchange would have ended 
in some kind of frenzied embrace. But there is no play in Hardy. Indeed, play would 
require a different mode, something along the lines of playacting—the easy inhabiting 
and discarding of another role, trying someone else on for size, or a lark—in short, a 
game. 
According to Sue, she and Jude may be a little alike in their feelings and their 
actions, but not in their thoughts. Their simultaneous reaching for and clasping of one 
another’s hands expresses their likeness; what they share is a mutual attraction, what they 
call a matter of heart. Sue insists that her “head” and her thoughts are different and her 
own because she places a high priority on defining herself as an intellectual. But what 
does it mean that feelings are the source of identity or likeness in this scene? In Hardy, 
what rules thought is not “feelings” but temperament, bloodlines, the cosmos, the weight 
of history. And if the novel’s plot is any indicator, they rule thoughts only to tragic ends; 
it would be better if they did not.   
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When it is convenient—when it serves the greater function of disidentifying from 
Phillotson—Sue permits Jude to identify with her, even at the price of his 
misunderstanding. When the three visit an architectural model of Jerusalem, Sue first 
complains that the model must be historically inaccurate; she then dismisses it as too 
different to be of interest: “I fancy we have had enough of Jerusalem, considering we are 
not descended from the Jews.”260 Phillotson tells Jude that his cousin is “terribly clever,” 
which raises Sue’s hackles.   
‘No, Mr. Phillotson, I am not—altogether! I hate to be what is 
called a clever girl—there are too many of that sort now!’ answered Sue. 
‘I only meant—I don’t know what I meant—except it was that you don’t 
understand!’ 
‘I know your meaning,’ said Jude ardently (although he did not). 
‘And I think you are quite right.’ 
‘That’s a good Jude—I know you believe in me!’ She impulsively 
seized his hand, and leaving a reproachful look on the schoolmaster turned 
away to Jude…261  
 
Jude, the narrator makes clear, does not know what Sue means anymore than she does. In 
all the flux of over-identifying and dis-identifying, Sue has still been spared the burden of 
being known. Back in the classroom, Phillotson is surprised to find on the chalk-board a 
skillfully drawn perspective view of Jerusalem, with every building shown in its place. 
Sue claims to have “hardly” looked at the model, and yet she apprehended it powerfully. 
Disliking must be a profound way of knowing, a way that preserves distinctiveness and 
uniqueness while still intimately capturing the world. A dislike attributed to difference—
“we are not descended from the Jews”— has produced a likeness. One might take this as 
a suggestion that mimesis, which is so often characterized as either representing or 
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invoking likenesses, continuities between the world of life and the world of the text, has 
some deep stake in dislike. It produces necessary fictional boundaries.262   
Jude’s identification with Sue is based on misreading and misunderstanding, and 
the novel makes plain that it is a failure. What about Jude’s identifications with 
animals?263 Hardy regularly suggests that humans may know through animals more 
successfully than they know through other humans: Consider how Tess becomes aware of 
her own injury through an encounter with pheasants, or how Jude frees the trapped rabbit. 
He who in his childhood had saved the lives of the earthworms now began 
to picture the agonies of the rabbit from its lacerated leg. If it were a “bad 
catch” by the hind-leg, the animal would tug during the ensuing six hours 
till the iron teeth of the trap had stripped the leg-bone of its flesh, when 
should a weak-springed instrument enable it to escape, it would die in the 
fields from the mortification of the limb. If it were a “good catch,” namely, 
by the fore-leg, the bone would be broken, and the limb nearly torn in two 
in attempts at an impossible escape. 
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 Almost half-an-hour passed, and the rabbit repeated its cry. Jude 
could rest no longer till he had put it out of its pain…. The faint click of 
the trap as dragged about by the writhing animal guided him now, and 
reaching the spot he struck the rabbit on the back of the neck with the side 
of his palm, and it stretched itself out dead.264 
 
At this point Sue pops her head out of the window: She, too, has been unable to sleep, 
thinking of the rabbit’s suffering. But she did not put it out of its misery. The metaphor 
here is obvious—there is no freeing oneself, or another, from the traps set by the more 
powerful; the best Jude can hope for himself is the kind of quick death that he grants the 
quivering animal. (Indeed the last line of the novel will mirror the rabbit “stretched out 
dead,” when the circling plot comes to an end with Jude’s corpse laid out “straight as an 
arrow” under the bed sheet.265) But there is no one able to strike him down.  
Or is Sue the one who is trapped? She speaks from within the marital home in 
Shaston, where she lives unhappily with Phillotson. When Jude eventually springs her 
from that situation, she will continue to drag the past behind her, unable to ever shake it, 
and eventually will return to the trap of her own volition—as if once you are deformed by 
conventional marriage, you are no longer suited for life outside of its confines. (One is 
reminded of the old jokes about prisoners trying to get sent back jail, where at least you 
get three meals a day.) Sue doesn’t admit to identifying with the rabbit, but its cries 
disturb her. Her statement ironically points to her own condition: “They ought not to be 
allowed to set these steel traps, ought they!”266  
 My point in introducing the rabbit is to highlight that characters in Hardy can 
more readily identify with or otherwise relate to the animal world than they can to other 
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humans. This seems to have something to do with the silence of animals, who do not 
contest identifications or reinscriptions into new contexts. (If this rabbit could speak, 
would it tell Jude that it was “not like” him at all?) In this scene nature reflects the human 
predicament, but only for the reader. And yet the humans identify in the terms that 
characterize their tempers. Jude “pictures the agonies,” imaginatively inhabiting the 
suffering.267 Sue does the opposite: She puts the rabbit into a social and legislative 
context that she can understand, one of institutional rules.268 
Jude’s instinct toward nature is reparative: “Nature logic was too horrid for him to 
care for,” the narrator says. “That mercy towards one set of creatures was cruelty towards 
another sickened his sense of harmony.”269 Jude identifies with the individual suffering 
animal but not with nature qua nature; indeed, Jude contains the least amount of 
descriptive writing on nature of any of Hardy’s novels. It is a novel of towns and villages 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 It was Phillotson who first instructed Jude in the importance of compassion for the 
non-human. The schoolmaster’s parting instructions to the child were, “Be a good boy, 
remember; and be kind to animals and birds, and read all you can. And if ever you come 
to Christminster remember you hunt me out for old acquaintance’ sake” (Ibid, 10-11). 
We know that the advice to “read all you can” turns out badly, and that coming to 
Christminster and hunting up Phillotson turns out badly, too. So why does the advice to 
be kind to animals and birds come from this dubious source? I don’t think we are meant 
to read against Jude’s ethical interest in the non-human; Hardy’s work as a whole is far 
too invested in an animal-human relation for that. But it is peculiar nonetheless that 
Phillotson serves as the mouthpiece for this bit of practical wisdom. It seems to establish 
another link or doubling between Jude and the schoolmaster. Both are foolishly 
compassionate, and both are ultimately failures.  
268 Saul Kripke writes, “My suggestion is that it [Wittgenstein’s ‘image of pain’] enters 
into the formation and quality of my attitude toward the sufferer. I, who have myself 
experienced pain and can imagine it, can imaginatively put myself in place of the sufferer; 
and my ability to do this gives my attitude a quality that it would lack if I had merely 
learned a set of rules as to when to attribute pain to others and how to help them.” See 
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press), 1982: 140. Only Jude is Wittgensteinian in this sense; Sue’s rule-bound response 
to pain lacks the power of imagination. 
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and cities and humans, and absent of agricultural labor. Elaine Scarry’s essay “Work and 
the Body in Hardy,” which argues that “human character has for [Hardy] its deepest 
registration in the activity of work,” describes perfectly nearly every Hardy novel except 
this one.270 Work in Jude is not a rhythmic, reciprocal activity in which man makes 
nature and nature makes man. In fact, one might say that Jude figures the consequences 
of a professionalization that has splintered man and nature. When one cannot use nature 
or work with it in a meaningful way, “being kind” to its animals is all that remains.   
This kindness, though, carries a whiff of failure. It was Phillotson, after all, who 
first instructed Jude in the importance of compassion for the non-human. The 
schoolmaster’s parting instructions to the child were, “Be a good boy, remember; and be 
kind to animals and birds, and read all you can. And if ever you come to Christminster 
remember you hunt me out for old acquaintance’ sake.”271 We know that the advice to 
“read all you can” turns out badly, and that coming to Christminster and hunting up 
Phillotson turns out badly, too. So why does the advice to be kind to animals and birds 
come from this dubious source? We aren’t meant to read against Jude’s ethical interest in 
the non-human; Hardy’s work as a whole is far too invested in an animal-human relation 
for that. But it is peculiar nonetheless that Phillotson serves as the mouthpiece for this bit 
of practical wisdom. It seems to establish another link or doubling between Jude and the 
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Repetition and Remarriage 
The nineteenth-century novel is born in the marriage plots of Jane Austen and reaches 
fulfillment—its final destination—in the remarriage plots of Jude the Obscure. In this 
history the female protagonist loses some of her power. Unlike Austen’s “regulated 
haters,” fierce social critics and tacticians who try to transform a hostile world by 
assessing it correctly and diplomatically, Sue is an impotent neurotic, unable to 
accommodate to the rules of the game. Her targets are deserving, but her hatred is un-
regulated; its form of sociality is exile. 
Sue’s two late returns, her conversion to Christianity and her remarriage to 
Phillotson, should both be read as forms of dislike. The conversion is not a moral choice, 
but a spasm of frustrated grief. We should understand it not as a turn to an identification 
with Christianity, but as a turn away the world—a repudiation, not an embrace.272 More 
important, Sue does not remarry Phillotson because she has overcome her distaste for him 
(a dynamic from to the Austen marriage plot); she remarries him because of this distaste. 
(As for Jude, he is tricked into his remarriage, a repetition of the fall into his first.) Sue 
makes explicit that this final rejection of Jude is not due to her dislike of him: “You don’t 
see that it is a matter of conscience with me, and not of dislike to you,” she says, before 
the two share a frenzied moment of passionate parting.273 It is typical in this novel that 
Sue becomes most attracted to Jude when she is leaving him, which suggests that there is 
pleasure inherent in separation. 
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Christianity and hatred. One reverend even argued that hatred of the world was a sign of 
spiritual faith: “A strong, universal, and an ever-deepening hatred of the world is 
essentially the sign of the disciple” (Lane, 19).  
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When Freud observed the little boy playing “fort-da” with the wooden reel 
attached to the string, throwing it away and then dragging it back, he identified a few 
possible moments of pleasure in the game. There was the reclamation of the object, 
which represented joyful reunion with the mother who had gone away. However, the boy 
would often enact just the first part of the game—the throwing away. In that case, Freud 
thought, it could be that the child felt pleasure at mastering his unpleasurable experience. 
But Freud doesn’t linger on this explanation. He suggests that throwing the object away 
was a form of symbolic revenge against his mother, who had left him in the room. “‘All 
right, then, go away!’” he imagines the boy thinking. “‘I don’t need you. I’m sending you 
away myself.’”274 We could imagine Sue saying something a bit different: “All right, 
then, go away! I don’t need you. I’m myself.” It’s not agency that is at stake but 
individuation.  
Tess’s attachment to her infant Sorrow is also ambivalent, and marked by 
moments of closeness and rejection: 
When the infant had taken its fill [of breast milk] the young mother sat it 
upright in her lap, and looking into the far distance dandled it with a 
gloomy indifference that was almost dislike; then all of a sudden she fell 
to violently kissing it some dozens of times, as if she could never leave off, 
the child crying at the vehemence of an onset which strangely combined 
passionateness with contempt.275  
 
In Hardy, ambivalence is far from milquetoast indecision; nor is it, as in Trollope, 
disembodied rationalization. It’s indifference, difference, and violent attachment, all at 
once. The baby’s crying as a reaction to the vehemence is all too appropriate. At such 
moments of crisis in Hardy there is often nothing to say; no language can suffice, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.), 1989: 
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communicate, or hold up under this extreme psychic pain. What can a rabbit do when its 
leg is caught in a gin but cry? What can a baby do when its mother expresses her rage of 
love but cry? What can Jude say when Sue leaves him, again, for Phillotson? 
He clasped her, and kissed her weeping face as he had scarcely ever done 
before, and they remained in silence till she said, ‘Good-bye, good-bye!’ 
And then gently pressing him away she got free, trying to mitigate the 
sadness by saying: ‘We’ll be dear friends just the same, Jude, won’t we? 
And we’ll see each other sometimes—Yes!—and forget all this, and try to 
be as we were long ago?’ 
 Jude did not permit himself to speak, but turned and descended the 
stairs.276  
 
Raymond Williams links identification and marriage in his reading of Hardy 
when he describes marriage as a “choice primarily of a way to live, of an identity in the 
identification with this or that other person.”277 It’s important to remember that in the 
marriage vow taken by the two parties, one does not promise to be like the other person; 
one promises an identity of behavior: to love, honor, serve, obey the same regardless of 
the variety of circumstances, namely wealth, poverty, health, and sickness. If a couple 
acquires an identity based on identification, it is in the eyes of the law and society—an 
identity assigned by how others behave towards the unit. In Jude this is most apparent in 
the reaction of Jude and Arabella’s landlord. At first, the landlord doubts that the two are 
married, and observing Arabella kissing Jude one night only makes him more suspicious. 
“He was about to give them notice to quit, till by chance overhearing her one night 
haranguing Jude in rattling terms, and ultimately flinging a shoe at his head, he 
recognized the note of ordinary wedlock; and concluding that they must be respectable, 
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277 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford University Press), 
1973: 210. 
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said no more.”278 This example demonstrates that what passes as marriage is dictated by 
the outside world. 
Sue resists this identity-making function of marriage by preserving her difference, 
emphasizing the self as greater than or in excess of the union. Her remarriage does so 
doubly. Sue’s great fear is that she will not be recognized and read correctly—that she 
will be mistaken for being other than who she is. Repetition, paradoxically, is a defense 
against the possibility of misinterpretation: She can keep reminding Phillotson, and 
herself, who she is only by continually rejecting him. Her repeated disliking produces the 
possibility of representation in a conventional world.  
Often narrative repetitions take the form of symbols that add up—the color blue 
in Madame Bovary, the color red in Tess—or a Dickensian description that tags a 
character. Those repetitions seem to be for the reader, whether as memory aides or 
interpretive richness. In Jude the fabula itself repeats. This seems excessive—is the 
reader in danger of forgetting what happened last time? Actually, yes: Jude goes to show 
that readers are precisely in this danger. The point of the repetitions of the plot in Jude 
seems to be to create a situation in which misinterpretation is not possible: within the 
novelistic world and between the novel and reader. The plot as well as the character of 
Sue are driven by an anxiety of being misread. By repetition, Jude ensures that no one 
has to rely on faulty memory. No one has to “learn” anything about Sue, because she 
continuously issues new reminders of what and who she is. 
Jude is not governed by a seasonal or cyclical logic. Nor are its repetitions a 
matter of Proustian habit or what Gérard Genette calls the iterative. Neither does it deal in 
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the kind of historical repetition that is a concern in Far From the Madding Crowd, in 
which we learn that for the resident of Weatherbury, “the citizen’s Then is the rustic’s 
Now… his present is futurity.”279 Repetition in Jude is not about habit or narrative series 
or historical time. It has to do with the repetition of discrete actions—marrying the same 
wrong person twice, as both Jude and Sue do; moving back to Christminster; crossing 
and recrossing the same paths on different errands. These are repeated acts, but they are 
not “repetitive.” 
In an iterative narrative, the reader will have the challenge of figuring which 
singulative (occurring once) events are determinative and which are merely there—what 
matters, in other words, and what doesn’t. (Genette: “We should not, however, infer too 
quickly from this notion of internal determination that the interposition of a singular 
event always has the effect of ‘determining’ the iterative series.”280) In an oscillating 
structure like Jude’s, all the repeated acts acquire equal importance. This means that the 
plot is not characterized by a dynamic of “filler” and scenes of climax, but by scenes that 
pile on with no peaks or valleys. The reader feels that things are happening, but nothing is 
changing.  
Repeated acts also interfere with diachrony—in plain terms, how is the passage of 
time marked? In a bildungsroman we will know roughly “what time it is”—within the 
world of the novel and also how close the book is to completion—based on “where we 
are,” if the protagonist has identified the proper love object, courted or married, achieved 
social status, and so forth. But were it not for the fact of the narrative’s length, any 
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number of plot points could be a conclusion to Jude. While iterative repetition covers up 
the passage of time, the repetition of discrete acts draws attention to it without in any way 
clarifying it. It is like the structural equivalent of the many chiming clocks in 
Casterbridge, which ring six o’clock for a quarter of an hour. A listener knows without 
doubt that time is happening, but that same listener could not really say exactly what time 
it is.  
One should distinguish Jude from the problems of repetition that J. Hillis Miller 
investigated in Fiction and Repetition (1982). Miller’s deconstructive readings of Conrad, 
Emily Brontë, Thackeray, Hardy, and Woolf circle around the “aporia” of the absent 
center, gaining special power when they are in dialogue with characters who are set up as 
interpreters in endless signifying chains, like Lockwood in Wuthering Heights. But Jude 
Fawley is not an interpreter of texts; he is a failed translator. This sets up a different 
critical paradigm. There are authoritative texts in Jude. The problem is not that they are 
un-interpretable or prey to multiplying and spiraling meanings; the problem is that they 
are first, inaccessible and second, irrelevant. Jude does not present a hermeneutic riddle. 
Miller puts the question of Hardy’s late novels this way: “Why is it that most human 
beings go through life somnambulistically, compelled to repeat the same mistakes in love, 
so inflicting on themselves and on others the same suffering, again and again?”281 This is 
undoubtedly the question behind Tess; it is, however, not the question behind Jude. The 
question behind Jude is something like, “Why is it impossible to live according to the 
world’s rules, but also impossible to live outside of them?” Repetition and dislike are 
both consequences of this social problem.   
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Repetition is also a sign of naturalist compulsion, though Hardy wears the label of 
naturalism uneasily. Unlike Gissing, Zola, or Dreiser, he is not concerned with either 
commodities or urban life; nor does he take Zola’s strictly sociological or scientific 
approach. Naturalists were attentive to themes of consumption and specularity, with the 
consequence that the naturalist body has either been theorized as brutish (as in 
McTeague) or so shot through with desire and drive as to be scarcely coherent as a body 
at all (as in Sister Carrie). Neither body properly characterizes Hardy, even at his most 
sensual.282 Certain aspects of his work—his interest in the New Woman and 
degeneration—lumped him in with the “French realism” of his day, but he is a naturalist 
in really only one sense: in his investigation of, in Zola’s words, “temperament, not 
character.”283 
What does it mean to prioritize temperament? One may be tempted to read 
Hardy’s knowing, distant narrator as indeed “looking down,” like Tess’s President of the 
Immortals, on the players below. But I want to resist the simplifications of the so-called 
“spectator-brute dynamic,” which puts characters through the paces of a downward spiral. 
As Jennifer Fleissner has observed of the American context, rather than subjecting 
characters to cosmological forces, naturalism explores the participation of individual 
characters in their own failure. She writes, “Naturalism’s disturbing quality is not that it 
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world is forever rubbing up against and leaving traces of itself (its paint) on the human 
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283 Émile Zola, Preface to the Second Edition of Thérèse Raquin (New York: Penguin 
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removes agency, plain and simple, but that it ties the agency we desire, that hope of 
mastery and completion, to repetition and failure.”284 Indeed, to understand the characters 
in Jude as determined is to miss the many ways in which they assert responsibility for 
their actions. (This is why James Wood’s notion that Hardy was “consumed by a 
theological bitterness that made the freedom necessary to successful narrative almost 
impossible” and that he turned to poetry because “he could see that he had perforce 
abandoned narrative itself” is inadequate.285) No one could deny that the narrative is shot 
through with contemporary determinist discourses, but the form the determinism takes is 
unusual: It doesn’t take the form of genetic destiny or some kind of human automation; it 
takes the form of a conscious, and self-aware, inability to learn or change.  
Hardy is, like Zola, concerned with characters who are physiological. But to 
imagine that alcohol or sexual desire or Jude’s family history are “responsible” for Jude’s 
actions is already to have imagined that a taste for drink or feelings of desire or family 
were apart from or somehow put upon an authentic or unmarked rational subject named 
Jude Fawley. Jude is prone to drink, raised by an unsympathetic aunt because his parents 
disastrously wed, governed by sexual desires. I understand these characters in the way 
that Bernard Williams understands Agamemnon: as making decisions about how they 
will accept or live out their fate—as “put[ting] on the harness of necessity.”286 Sue 
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286 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press), 
2008: 135. Jude himself understands his situation as akin to Agamemnon’s. “Nothing can 
be done,” he says of the children’s death. “Things are as they are, and will be brought to 
their destined issue” (339). Interestingly, Sue immediately interprets this quotation not 
for what it says about their most recent tragic episode, but for what the very fact of 
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dislikes compulsively, but there is no other, more agreeable version of her that we can 
imagine. Critics who invoke the possibility that everything would have worked out fine if 
this couple had only used contraception miss the point.  
Repetition due to not-learning does not necessarily indicate mental deficiency or 
stupidity. As Avital Ronell writes, “Stupidity never admits to fault or error; it is 
dependent upon prejudicial entanglements and epistemological illusions.”287 Jude and 
Sue, however, frequently admit errors and mistakes. They entirely lack what Ronell calls 
stupidity’s “own satiety.” Repetition has to be done from scratch every time; it is the 
product of thinking. When Jude goes out to court Arabella instead of studying the New 
Testament, for example, the narrator calls him “the predestinate Jude,” giving credence to 
a reading that would privilege a preordained cosmic fall. Yet one sentence later we learn 
that “foreseeing such an event [going out with Arabella] he had already arrayed himself 
in his best clothes.”288 The same structure of decision applies to Jude’s drinking, after 
Arabella leaves him: “What could he do of a lower kind than self-extermination; what 
was there less noble, more in keeping with his present degraded position? He could get 
drunk. Of course that was it; he had forgotten.”289 In both cases Jude decides, but the 
definition of a decision is somewhat unusual: in the first instance he plans, and in the 
second, he remembers.  
Fleissner argues that repetition indicates an excessive attachment to 
developmental stages, which might indicate that Hardy’s remarriages are a way of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
knowing the reference reveals about Jude’s life as tragedy: “My poor Jude—how you’ve 
missed everything!—you more than I, for I did get you! To think you should know that 
by your unassisted reading, and yet be in poverty and despair!” (Hardy, Jude, 339) 
287 Avital Ronell, Stupidity (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 2002: 44. 
288 Hardy, Jude, 44. 
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“getting it right” or achieving “completion.” But as Jude makes clear, some 
developmental stages are more like formal constraints or ontological categories than 
actions or events one can get past. The repetition of action indicates some difficulty 
around completion, but I think Hardy’s point is not that Jude and Sue are uniquely bad at 
marrying, but that something about marrying resists finishing: How can you be done with 
it? (He also shows that divorce, as the dialectical other of marriage, is just as 
interminable.)  
Even in remarriage, Sue does not accept that a transformation has occurred; rather, 
she insists that no transformation has occurred—that things are just the same. She denies 
the passage of time altogether.290 This is important to the mood of the novel. According 
to Stanley Cavell, for a remarriage to be a comedy, the remarriers must accept the 
paradox of difference in sameness. “The concept that underlines both the classical 
problem of comedy and that of marriage,” he writes, is “the problem and concept of 
identity.” He argues that in certain Hollywood comedies, identity is figured through 
difference—“either the difference between men and women, or between innocence and 
experience, or between one person and another, or between one circumstance and 
another—all emblematized by the difference, hence the sameness, between a marriage 
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and a remarriage.”291 In the remarriage comedies he studies, the remarriers undergo 
profound changes so that their ceremonial repetition contains the possibility of new 
meaning. Sue refuses this possibility: She is not going to marry Phillotson again, thereby 
signifying some transformation; according to her, she is already married to Phillotson. 
She insists that not only is she not doing anything new, but she’s not doing anything at all, 
except formalizing the existing status quo. Her participation in her fate is to accept it. 
The first marriage to Phillotson is nearly elided, raced through without dialogue 
and dispensed of quickly.292 We learn only that Sue’s face was “nervously set,” and 
“Phillotson seemed not to notice, to be surrounded by a mist which prevented his seeing 
the emotions of others.”293 Jude is the witness to this event, necessary to complete the 
union from which he is excluded. Indeed throughout Jude, again and again, things can be 
spoken in the presence of third parties that cannot be spoken with just two.294 After the 
death of the children, Sue and Jude circle in fruitless exchanges about their own status as 
a couple. Only in front of Arabella is Sue able to make the fatal pronouncement, “I am 
not his wife.”295 A denial, like a vow of commitment, is something that gathers force 
from being performed and witnessed. The necessity of speech here is related to the fact 
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that being someone’s wife or not being someone’s wife is a social category: to tell your 
husband that you are no longer his wife has no force unless someone else hears you say 
it.296  
After marriage is made official, its consensual powers grow stronger and are 
reinforced by new and ongoing acts of witnessing. As we saw in the case of Jude and 
Arabella’s landlord, the meaning of a marriage resides in what is known or appears to be 
for others, or is performed in front of them. Even Sue, who does not admit the power of 
the world even as she reacts to it continually, says that her remarriage to Phillotson is also 
“for form’s sake, and to satisfy the world, which does not see things as they are. But of 
course I am his wife already. Nothing has changed that” (360). She knows that others will, 
and must, see the facts differently. “I am going to marry him again, as it would be called 
by you,” she says.  
The social confusion Sue recognizes—what is repetition for you is nothing for 
me—is also a form of social remedy. As Phillotson explains to his friend Gillingham 
(who, like Anny for Arabella, is always on hand to offer the world’s cheap wisdom) he 
hopes the remarriage will restore his standing in the community: “It will set me right in 
the eyes of the clergy and orthodox laity, who have never forgiven me for letting her 
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standardized anticipations that we have regarding her conduct and nature as an instance 
of the category ‘wife,’ for example, that she will look after the house, entertain our 
friends, and be able to bear children…. (Surely it is scandalous to speak of marriage as a 
particularistic relationship).” See Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled 
Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc.), 1963: 53.  
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go.”297 After the ceremony, he assures Sue that she needn’t fear that he will attempt to 
consummate the union sexually: “It is for our good socially to do this, and that’s it’s 
justification, if it was not my reason.”298  
In other words, there’s no need for her to jump out the window again. For a 
moment it seems that in the repetition of her dislike through remarriage, Sue has moved 
from being an intimidated body to an intimidating one, acquiring some of the privileges 
of Barthes’ liberal subject. After all, Phillotson says he is prepared to endure her celibacy. 
But after Jude comes to visit her and her passion for him is rekindled, she punishes 
herself by entering Phillotson’s bedroom to do her duty. “Weddings be funerals ’a b’lieve 
nowadays,” the Widow Edlin observes, and the witness to the marriage becomes a 
mourner.299  
The pre-marriage—the scene when, before the first ceremony with Phillotson, 
Jude walks Sue down the aisle in a nearly empty church—also occurs in the presence of a 
witness.  
[Jude] passively acquiesced with her wish to go in [to the church], and 
they entered by the western door. The only person inside the gloomy 
building was a charwoman cleaning. …Sue still held Jude’s arm, almost as 
if she loved him. …They strolled undemonstratively up the nave towards 
the altar railing, which they stood against in silence, turning then and 
walking down the nave again, her hand still on his arm, precisely like a 
couple just married.300  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Hardy, Jude, 365. 
298 Ibid, 370.	  
299 Ibid, 398. This is not the only time Hardy links remarriage to death. Not only does 
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Henchard and Susan’s remarriage as a funeral: Death is the subject that the Casterbridge 
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It is difficult to say just what occurs in this bit of “unceremonious companionship” at the 
church. Certainly the ceremoniousness of the wedding day has the power to spread, and 
turns their idling into something more than rehearsal or prospective parody; they walk 
down the aisle without walking down the aisle. It doesn’t mean what it would if they 
were marrying, but it doesn’t not mean that, either—instead of mocking or parodying the 
marriage to Phillotson, it precedes it, displaces it, and challenges it, casting what follows 
as the repetition or copy. Just about the only thing it isn’t is a joke. It is playacting free of 
playfulness. 
What does it mean to do the things that everyone else does? How is it possible to 
do something without “really” doing? Can you perform a norm privately, without 
activating its social meaning? This walk down the aisle is a moment of imitation: the 
imitation of a known convention as well as the imitation of one’s own life, a kind of 
mimetic “trying on” that fails to meet the official standard. And “precisely” this pose—
arms touching, “like a couple”—will be referenced again when Jude, after Sue’s divorce, 
is eager to “strut arm in arm, like any other engaged couple.”301 Crucially, the pre-
enactment is not a space of resistance or potential. It only brings sorrow: “The too 
suggestive incident, entirely of her making, nearly broke down Jude.”302  
 
The Tail of Hair 
I have been pursuing an argument centering on Sue, Jude, and Phillotson. But what of our 
fourth remarrier, Arabella? She too is part of this story, principally as an object that 
others dislike. Of course, when Arabella first throws the “characteristic part” of her 
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father’s pig at him, Jude’s attention is drawn to what he does like: a “round and 
prominent bosom, full lips, perfect teeth, and the rich complexion of a Cochin hen’s egg. 
She was a complete and substantial female human—no more, no less.”303 But then comes 
their wedding night.  
A little chill overspread him at her first unrobing. A long tail of 
hair, which Arabella wore twisted up in an enormous knob at the 
back of her head, was deliberately unfastened, stroked out, and 
hung upon the looking-glass which he had brought her. 
 ‘What—it wasn’t your own?’ he said, with a sudden 
distaste for her.304  
 
Arabella turns out to be both more and less than a complete female human. Her hair does 
not become visible until it was taken away, revealed as a part horribly detachable from 
the whole. She hangs the hair on a mirror, so that whoever stoops to examine himself 
must also confront her presence and difference in the form of the tail, this real fake thing 
that will not go away. And if hanging the hair in the mirror makes Arabella a less 
“complete” woman—does this mean she is made masculine, or is there a third term here 
between woman and man?—it also feminizes Jude, who sees himself and the hair in the 
same image. 
Hair is a common synecdoche for a woman—one’s a blonde, one a redhead, the 
other a brunette. (If the hat makes the man, does the hair makes the woman?) Elisabeth 
Gitter has studied the deep interest Victorians took in hair, which was portrayed as a trap 
as well as an art, and a sign of duplicity. “Victorian writers were fascinated not only by 
the problem of ‘reading’ women’s hair—interpreting its meaning and exploring its 
symbolic value—but also by the hair itself,” she writes. “No other writers have lavished 
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so much attention on the physical properties of women’s hair: texture, color, style, 
curliness.”305 Arabella’s hair is a forgery, and Jude is a poor reader of it. But what matters 
more is that Arabella’s hair is not discredited once and for all time. It is a repeated 
reference; it can never be put down, or up, for good.  
Hanging the hair on the mirror gets to be a habit. When Arabella shows up in 
Aldbrickham, Sue refuses to let her into the house. Then she goes to visit Arabella in the 
dirty public-house. Jude’s first wife has not removed from the bed. The scene is 
depressing. “Sue looked out at the rain, and at the dirty toilet-cover, and at the detached 
tail of Arabella’s hair hanging on the looking-glass, just as it had done in Jude’s time; and 
wished she had not come.”306 When Arabella sucks her cheek in her dimple appears; 
when she stops, it vanishes without a trace. But the hair always has to be somewhere, and 
when it’s “away” it’s most present, dangling in one’s self-reflection. It takes up so much 
space that there isn’t room for anyone else’s hair in Arabella’s life: Anny tells her that in 
mourning she ought to wear a lock of Cartlett’s hair, but Arabella hasn’t got one. Perhaps 
she’s only returning Cartlett’s dislike for her hair. At the agricultural fair we learn that 
“her charms and her idiosyncrasies, her supernumerary hair-coils, and her optional 
dimples, were becoming as a tale that is told.”307 There is only one person who likes 
Arabella’s hair—Arabella.  
But Arabella is not to be dismissed. In this world of idealizations, she has a 
privileged relationship to the real. She is the only person who is able to tell when Sue and 
Jude are “really” married. She knows, when she first comes to the house at Aldbrickham, 
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that they have not had sex; she knows, when Sue visits the next day, that they have. She 
understands Jude more than anyone, including Sue, even if this understanding is paired 
with disrespect: “Never such a tender fool as Jude is if a woman seems in trouble, and 
coaxes him a bit! Just as he used to be about birds and things.”308 Arabella is false in 
appearance, but this very falseness makes her able to penetrate it. She never idealizes—
Jude is exactly as handsome as she believes—and so is able to manipulate. She works 
towards the future uncompulsively.  
  Arabella is a flexible being who is always adapting and yet always herself—she 
never grows or changes, but she comfortably plays different roles, all of which are a 
version of the same role. Significantly, the only role she cannot play is that of mother. 
But she participates in narrative development: She moves the plot. Her marriage to Jude 
is the first consequential event and prevents him from his studies; her return jealously 
provokes Sue to consummate the non-marriage with Jude; she sends Father Time to Jude 
and Sue; she remarries Jude; she refuses to send his letter to Sue, which leads to his death. 
For Hardy, there is something crude about this flexibility and adaptability, something as 
distasteful as the tail of hair itself. But there is also something compelling, some efficacy, 
some truth. It is Arabella, after all, who gets the novel’s last word. 
 
How to Read Jude 
My argument has been woven through with references to the tragic aspects of Jude the 
Obscure, to its disturbing mood, its depiction of suffering, and to how difficult it is to like. 
And yet, according to the novel, its most-abused characters are not as bad off as all that. 
Hardy even makes a fleeting and curious reference to something unexpected—their 
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happiness. When Jude and Sue fail to get married, Sue “whisper[s] nervously” that Jude 
is not to tell Father Time the truth about their legal status. “If we are as happy as we are,” 
she asks, “what does it matter to anybody?” The next line of the novel begins a new 
chapter. 
The purpose of a chronicler of moods and deeds does not require him to 
express his personal views upon the grave controversey above given. That 
the twain were happy—between their times of sadness—was 
indubitable.309  
 
Indubitable happiness? In Jude the Obscure? Really?  
This happiness arrives at the midpoint of the novel, when Sue is divorced from 
Phillotson and Jude from Arabella. The two cousins are living together, passing as 
married, caring for the child of Jude’s first marriage. Work and accommodations have 
been difficult to keep, but they are holding on outside the law. Sue has nervously put their 
mood in a conditional: “If we are as happy as we are.”  
The question, of course, is not one of degree, of rating Sue’s happiness on a scale 
of one to ten to determine how happy they are. It is not even a question of whether or not 
we agree with Sue that she is “really” happy. The problem has to do with the nature of 
her happiness as it is claimed. Sue’s dislike, we saw in her exchange with the Widow 
Edlin, cannot be expressed; it can only be experienced. The opposite is true of happiness. 
Happiness in this novel cannot be experienced—it can only be expressed. The narrator 
asserts it confidently (“indubitable”), but Sue can only pose it as a conditional and as a 
question.310 One might say that the “happiness” referred to here is the sexual relationship. 
Matz puts it this way: “Hardy is at once coy and suggestive about their fornication. To 
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take one example: in one scene in Part Fifth, after Jude kisses Sue and bolts the door 
behind them, Hardy cuts to a line-break (an unusual typographical occurrence in the 
novel, and therefore all the more prominent here) and then this line: “The next morning it 
was wet.”311  
But Sue never claims to know happiness first-hand; she is explicitly more 
concerned with what their happiness has to do with others than with how it feels. I think 
that Hardy is suggesting something more, or in addition to, the elision or refusal to 
narrate sex. I think he is suggesting a theory of happiness itself: that happiness is always 
a bit apart, something that is impossible to experience.312 It is recognizable from the 
outside, but uninhabitable from within, something one might remember but never really 
feel. As Schopenhauer put it, “For only pain and want can be felt positively; and 
therefore they proclaim themselves; well-being, on the contrary, is merely negative.”313 
This is different than happiness in Brontë, which can be absorbed from the outside like “a 
divine dew.”314 Here it really can’t be. The suggestion is that the only thing that Sue can 
experience with confidence, even if that confidence is shaky, is dislike. 
One final question: How is this novel to be read? Sue’s hostile disliking, I think, 
has implications for our position vis-à-vis the text. She refuses to be identified with by 
Phillotson or Jude—or the reader. Thinking about what kind of reading practice Jude the 
Obscure proposes, we should use as a model the triangles in the novel, in which a 
witness’s presence allows a scene to be performed in a certain way. We do not read Jude 
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the Obscure in the spirit of a sympathetic going-along-with, or the consensual 
construction of reality—we readers are the necessary third party to Sue’s ongoing trials. 
Or could it be that Jude the Obscure asks us to think about reading as an act of dislike 
and disidentification akin to Sue’s own? Disidentifications, like a vows of commitment, 
gather force from being witnessed. Such an idea returns us to Barthes, casting the novel 
itself as the textual body that intimidates us, the readers. There is nothing to do with this 
book—it teaches no lessons and has no formal heirs. In Jude the Obscure, the marriage 
plot—and the nineteenth-century novel itself—comes to an end. We cannot 
instrumentalize our reading or put it to use. All we can do is endure it. 
And endure it, and endure it some more. To be sure, the repetitions of Jude make 
a repetition of reading it a somewhat unappealing undertaking. (It is difficult to imagine 
anyone rereading Jude every year, as Gilbert Ryle is said to have done with all six of Jane 
Austen’s novels.) And yet it seems that to read Jude well—to read it in the terms that it 
sets forth—one would have to be continually reading it. It operates outside the commonly 
understood raison d’être of narrative, what William Flesch summarizes as “being able to 
learn through the experiences that others narrate.”315 If Jude contains “lessons,” they are 
not about content. They are not, that is, lessons that could be learned from one reading.  
Nabokov thought that it was only through rereading that one could take in a book 
as a whole. “When we read a book for the first time the very process of laboriously 
moving our eyes from left to right, line after line, page after page, this complicated 
physical work upon the book, the very process of learning in terms of space and time 
what the book is about, this stands between us and artistic appreciation,” he wrote. For 
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him rereading was a technique of familiarization, a way of learning the book so that one 
can move around in it easily. “In reading a book, we must have time to acquaint ourselves 
with it.”316 As if we are putting on a pair of glasses, the less one is aware of the eyes, the 
more one sees.  
It is the very experience of doing it again—and again, and again, and again—that 
is at stake in Jude. In the case of Jude and Sue, repetition does not yield more knowledge, 
more fluidity, or more flexibility; Hardy does not see a necessary relation between habit 
and comfort. Hopefully a reader will gain something in the endeavor. The most profound 
way a reader can inhabit and take up the accumulated dislikings of Jude is through her 
own rereading. To get to rereading, one must, of course, first put the book down, just as 
Sue had to divorce Phillotson before she could remarry him. Perhaps that termination is 
the pleasure that gets compounded on repeated readings of Jude, an inversion of fort-da: 
the pleasure of putting it down, disliking it, rejecting it, once more. 
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That Burning Clime: 
Play and Pedagogy in Charlotte Brontë 
 
Charlotte Brontë and her critics code realism as the crowning stage in a developmental 
narrative.317 This is often taken up in the terms she set out in her good-bye letter to her 
youth, the brief piece “Farewell to Angria,” which spelled out her fatigue with the variety 
of that changeable landscape itself. “I long to quit for a while that burning clime where 
we have sojourned too long,” she wrote. “Its skies flame—the glow of sunset is always 
upon it. The mind would cease from excitement & turn now to a cooler region, where the 
dawn breaks grey and sober & the coming day for a time at least is subdued in clouds.”318  
 This chapter challenges the teleological account of Brontë’s oeuvre and suggests a 
new way of reading her career: not as a series of stages accomplished, overcome, and 
surpassed, but as a field of play in which an intermediate form—the school composition, 
or devoir—has a privileged place. The devoir helps us connect her juvenilia and novels, 
and reveals that what seemed to be left behind was in fact carried along and transformed, 
both formally and thematically. I argue that the devoir is best understood as a transitional 
text, which Brontë wrestled with, rejected, and disavowed, and ultimately used to give 
her novels their distinctive flavor and motifs.319 The hatred that circulates and seethes in 
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her novels, which Christopher Lane memorably characterized as an 
“aggression…inseparable from society,” is the residue of an ongoing struggle to put 
down the juvenile and adolescent impulses and structures.320 To begin, I examine the 
juvenilia in light of theories of play; then I take ideas of play and use them to analyze the 
devoir. It is the devoir, which permits Brontë to maintain a connection to her juvenilia, 
that makes it possible for her to engage with realism at all.   
 
Play 
“Play” has a rich history in literary criticism that follows a line of thinking from 
Romanticism through Derrida and Barthes.321 From Romanticism, play became 
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Jeffrey Franklin has also analyzed the nineteenth-century novel in terms of play, 
specifically vis-à-vis discourses of gambling, theatricality, and aesthetic theory. I am not 
as interested in analyzing scenes of play—the trope of the theater in Villette, for 
example—as I am in thinking about play as part of an authorial strategy across works. 
See Jeffrey Franklin, Serious Play: The Cultural Form of the Nineteenth-Century Realist 
Novel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 1999. 
Clinician Michael Parsons has warned of the difficulty of pinning down a 
definition of play: “The problem of trying too hard for a single, inclusive definition is 
illustrated by a statement like ‘playing a game by the rules may be derivative of play, but 
it is not play’ (Solnit, 19871, p. 215). It is true that rules may be used defensively to 
prevent more exploratory sorts of play, but nevertheless ‘games’ are ‘played’. Rather than 
seeking definitions, it is more helpful to think in terms of a family of concepts, in the 
Wittgensteinian sense, which includes play, plays, playfulness, games, sports, and so on” 
(Parsons 872). See Michael Parsons, “The Logic of Play in Psychoanalysis,” in The 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis 80 (1999): 871-884.  
Finally, though this chapter theorizes play, it does not do so in terms from “play 
studies.” For a reading of the Victorian period that does so, see Matthew Kaiser, “The 
World in Play: A Portrait of a Victorian Concept,” in New Literary History 40:1 (Winter 
2009): 105-129. Kaiser argues that play was a defining experience for the Victorians and 
part of their exposure to modernity, and outlines seven rhetorics of play from the time. 
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associated with autonomy, originality, innocence, and freedom, and a notion that all art is 
play, just as all humans possess capacities for play—and, indeed, according to Friedrich 
Schiller, are most human when they are most at play.322 I mean to describe something 
different, and to insist on a separation between play and the rule-bound art of realism. For 
even if the novel is the freest of forms—there is no authority who has laid out the proper 
rules—Brontë clearly experienced it in terms of rules or putting on some kind of restraint. 
As she wrote to George Lewes in 1847,  
You warn me to beware of melodrama, and you exhort me to adhere to the 
real. When I first began to write, so impressed was I with the truth of the 
principles you advocate, that I determined to take Nature and Truth as my 
sole guides, and to follow to their very footprints; I restrained my 
imagination, eschewed romance, repressed excitement; over-bright 
colouring, too, I avoided, and sought to produce something which should 
be soft, grave, and true.323  
 
And yet, she continues, the publishers told her that though she had been “faithful to 
nature,” her novel (The Professor) was “deficient in ‘startling incident’ and ‘thrilling 
excitement.’” What do they want? What counts as real? 
Dear sir, is not the real experience of each individual very limited? And, if 
a writer dwells upon that solely or principally, is he not in danger of 
repeating himself, and also becoming an egotist? Then, too, imagination is 
a strong, restless faculty, which claims to be heard and exercised: are we 
to be quite deaf to her cry, and insensate to her struggles? When she shows 
us bright pictures, are we never to look at them, and try to reproduce 
them? And when she is eloquent, and speaks rapidly and urgently in our 
ear, are we not to write to her dictation?324 
 
Brontë’s frustration resides in the rules she has internalized, the opposition between “real 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 “Man only plays when in the full meaning of the word he is a man, and he is only 
completely a man when he plays.” Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
in Charles W. Eliot, ed. Literary and Philosophical Essays, Vol. XXXII, The Harvard 
Classics (New York: P.F. Collier & Son), 1909-1914: Letter XV. 
323 The Brontës: Their Lives, Friendships and Correspondence, Volume II (Philadelphia: 
Porcupine Press, 1980): 152. 
324 Ibid, 153.	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experience” and “imagination,” which, she argues, is real experience. It is the very 
injunction to be only “real” that Brontë finds disabling. The demarcating line between 
make-believe and reality had a creative function for her. As Michael Parsons has 
explained, play is a framework that draws attention to the difference between what 
happens inside the area of play and the reality outside of it. Play signifies a willingness to 
make use of something as real and not real, and thus requires a degree of self-
consciousness: “Play becomes possible when organisms…are able to think and 
communicate about the nature of their behaviour and about its context.”325 That self-
consciousness is on display in Brontë’s “editorship” of the “Young Men’s Magazine,” for 
example. The boundary of play makes it possible for the juvenilia to be open.  
For Barthes, play is bound up with the distinction between the text and the work. 
The work is associated with “maturation or a hermeneutic course of deepening 
investigation,” but “the logic regulating the Text is not comprehensive (define ‘what the 
work means’) but metonymic; the activity of associations, contiguities, carrying-overs 
coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy.”326 The juvenilia are a good example of 
what Barthes could mean by text. They are irreducibly plural, defy genre, and they “cut 
across the work, several works” by reappearing within the novels.327 They show up in 
imagery, in the devoirs, in plot turns, and even in character—one way to understand Jane 
Eyre is as a fantastical creature extracted from the juvenilia and subjected to a marriage 
plot.  
Of course, though Barthes describes the text as playing, he is more interested in 
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the reader’s play with the text. 
In fact, reading, in the sense of consuming, is far from playing with the 
text. ‘Playing’ must be understood here in all its polysemy: the text 
itself plays (like a door, like a machine with ‘play’) and the reader plays 
twice over, playing the Text as one plays a game, looking for a practice 
which re-produces it, but, in order that that practice not be reduced to a 
passive, inner mimesis (the Text is precisely that which resists such a 
reduction), also playing the Text in the musical sense of the term.328  
 
In the next section, we will see that Brontë becomes the reader who plays both when she 
writes her devoirs, which often take off from reading another text, and then when she 
incorporates the devoir form into her novels. For now, Barthes helps us see that the 
juvenilia is open to certain kinds of interpretive moves due to its nature as text or play 
rather than work. We can then discard, first, the idea of finishedness or completion or 
past-ness that defines “a work” as that which is done; and secondly, an association of 
work with moral action.  
For psychoanalysis, play extends to the field of signification that is daily life. Play 
is not related to content (a taxonomy of nonsense or carnivalesque) but is a structure of 
thinking or a way of approaching reality. Productive playing—that which might yield 
insight rather than be simply “playing around”—must be spontaneous; the child (or 
patient) must be able to surprise herself. Playing is impossible without trust and the 
ability to bring in external reality; escapism is not play. Play is open and incomplete and 
amoral. It is symbolic but it not sublimated, and so while it can be interpreted and 
analyzed, it is not a replacement for another libidinal activity. It is itself the activity329. 
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Play is also collaborative, and cannot be reduced to either of its players: Winnicott wrote 
that “psychotherapy is done in the overlap of the two play areas, that of the patient and 
that of the therapist.”330 If we grasp the juvenilia as this kind of play, then we must 
commit ourselves to a somewhat different picture of Brontë’s childhood than the gloomy 
mournful stereotype: to a picture of the juvenilia as “essentially satisfying.”331 This is not 
to say that play is fun, or that Brontë’s childhood was good; play can be frightening or 
unpleasant, and Brontë’s childhood, as everyone knows, was filled with illness and death. 
But play also draws on rich resources, and is evidence of diverse emotional and cognitive 
capacities. 
The fact that Brontë’s playful juvenilia is a childhood production has theoretical 
implications. Children, as Brian Sutton-Smith puts it, “have their own distinctive forms 
of phantasmagorical play.”332  
Children’s play fantasies are not meant only to replicate the world, nor to 
be only its therapy; they are meant to fabricate another world that lives 
alongside the first one and carries on its own kind of life, a life often much 
more emotionally vivid than mundane reality. …Their play is not based 
primarily on a representation of everyday real events—as many prior 
investigators have supposed—so much as it is based on a fantasy of 
emotional events. …biologists… tell us that animal play also is not about 
realistic representations, that is, rather, fragmentary, disorderly, and 
exaggerative, which are not forms of “realism.”333 
 
Sutton-Smith helps us understand the juvenilia not as merely reflective of Brontë’s 
biography but as an emotionally vivid and complex construction. It also gives us a way to 
think about the plot twists and general disorder of Glass Town and Angria—not as bad 
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330 Winnicott, 54. 
331 Ibid, 70. 
332 Sutton-Smith, 171. 
333 Ibid, 158. 
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realism that she will learn to do better, but as governing rules for a non-realist aesthetic.  
The juvenilia is play but it also contains moments of represented play. The 
siblings’ writings consists of multiple sets of texts: the Glass Town saga and the Angrian 
stories, written by Charlotte and Branwell, and the Gondal saga, written by Emily and 
Anne. It began in literal plays, the acting-out of stories with a set of toy soldiers Patrick 
Brontë brought to Haworth from Liverpool. Then the children began to write down 
stories, first with the characters they claimed from the soldiers and then with new 
characters. Charlotte experimented with a wide range of genres, including a spoof 
magazine (the “Young Men’s Magazine,” a parody of Blackwood’s), scripts, poetry, and 
prose fiction. Some scholars describe Branwell as the political strategist and Charlotte as 
more romantic-minded, with her many plots concerning the Duke of Wellington 
(Zamorna)’s mistresses and wives. And yet Charlotte also practiced political rhetoric, and 
much of the Angrian material takes the form of speeches, exhortations, or attempts at 
persuasion. 
Brontë’s juvenilia plays with the rage that would later characterize her novels. 
That is, she first plays with aggression, and then later develops it “seriously.” (It falls 
outside the scope of this chapter to think deeply about the consequence of this for 
readings of her novels, but it may involve some relaxation around her use of anger and 
aggression. Might there a bit more playfulness in the depictions of fiery William 
Crimsworth and icy Lucy Snowe than we think?) Textual affects may come from many 
registers, including plot (suspense, for example) and syntax. But rage is a character-based 
affect, and unlike Trollope, who contains anger in minor characters and defuses it, Brontë 
situates rage in the narrator, and diffuses it. The habit of direct address, canonized in 
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“Reader, I married him,” took hold early. To be sure, as Ivan Kreilkamp, Amanda 
Anderson, and others have argued, Brontë’s narrators distance themselves from the 
reader and other characters, refusing bodily presence and registering new possibilities for 
female authorship. But it is undeniable that their way of speaking and passionate 
commenting on events is one of Brontë’s novelistic hallmarks. (This interest in speech 
also informs her interest in dialogue and dialect.) Indeed, the heat of Brontë’s novels—as 
opposed to the cooler register of an Eliot or Austen—resides to some extent not only in 
her exclamatory prose, Biblical incantations, sudden flashes of prophesy and anger, but in 
the intimacy of having her speak directly to you, though from on high.  
In the juvenilia, playful rage shows up most often in the narrator Lord Charles 
Wellesley, also known as Charles Townshend, the Duke of Wellington (aka Zamorna)’s 
much-maligned brother. Wellesley is positioned between upstairs and downstairs—a 
despised and kicked-around son of the elite, he is privy to the servants’ gossip. He is a 
permanent child, insofar as he lacks power but has access to those who wield it. A drama 
queen, he allows Brontë to at once give full expression to aggression while mocking it.    
 “An Interesting Passage in the Lives of Some Eminent Men of the Present Time” 
(1830) begins like so: 
I beleive [sic] that in great houses few know more of family concerns than 
servants, & even in middling establishments the case is the same. As I am 
generally kind to grooms, valets, footmen, lackeys, &c., &c., they often 
make me their confidante, entrusting me with many important secrets, 
which by degrees has enabled me to amass such a quantity of information 
respecting almost every grandee in Glass Town that if I chose I could 
unveil a scene of murders, thefts, hypocrisy, perjury & so forth which can 
scarcely be paralleled in the annals of any other city. 
 There are also many who have not waded so far or deep in the 
slough of criminality but are nevertheless filthily bespattered with more 
petty sins, such as deceit, meanness, toadism, underhand dealings, evil 
speaking, envy, &c. Of this latter class I purpose to make a selection, 
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reserving the remainder for some future period, when I shall no doubt 
avail myself of the wonderfully extensive miscellaneous information I 
possess to enlighten the public mind still further on this pleasant subject. 
 I am aware (to use a cant phrase) that my disclosures will cause a 
very considerable sensation among those who are implicated in the various 
transactions to which I shall allude, but as I care about them, their views & 
actions just as much as my monkey, all their censures will pass by me with 
as little effect as the zephyrs in a hot summer’s day fanning a sea-
surrounded rock. I shall now proceed to the subject of my present 
volume.334 
 
Wellesley establishes knowledge of two kinds—criminal knowledge, of murder, theft, 
and the more minor sins; and literary knowledge, of cant. He threatens to deploy the 
former and has, he says, already made use of the latter. Wellesley hopes his disclosures 
cause a sensation, which he imagines as a wind that will blow around the indifference 
that is his person. (Though he is angry and partial, he is steady and immutable in his 
anger.) The world around Wellesley is indeed a sea, changeable, but he—or, more 
precisely, his vengefulness—is steady.  
Wellesley is an attention-seeker. In text after text he desires to be recognized by 
Zamorna, but is instead insulted and punished by him. He embodies in embryo something 
that will become an obsession for Brontë—the idea that dependence of any kind is 
shameful. This is a theme that Gilbert and Gubar identify as belonging to the knowledge 
of female oppression, but in the juvenilia as well as in The Professor and Jane Eyre 
(1847), Brontë situates it in a familial context.335 Because he narrates from the first 
person, Wellesley’s plea for recognition seems to be directed as much at the reader as it is 
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at Zamorna. But although Wellesley wants to receive recognition, he withholds it from 
others; resentment makes him deeply contrarian. In the first section of “An Interesting 
Passage,” he perversely tells a valet de chambre who happens to be walking by that he 
finds the burning heat of summer to be “tolerably cool,” because he is “not wishing to 
coincide with” the valet’s remark about the weather.336 When the valet laughs it off, 
Wellesley becomes “disgusted.” Two paragraphs later, however, the valet is telling 
stories about his master. Wellesley’s hatred does not shut down the possibility of 
storytelling. He overcomes it enough to inquire after the valet’s master, and to “consent” 
to hear the story.337 
Wellesley’s self-professed vengeance, and the nesting of the valet’s storytelling, 
which is itself a betrayal of his employer, suggests that there is something vengeful in the 
act of storytelling itself. (The valet “slily” offers to speak.) Consider the preface to “The 
Spell” (1834):  
The Duke of Zamorna should not have excluded me from Wellesley 
House, for the following pages have been the result of that exclusion. 
Does he think I can patiently bear to be wholly separated from my sister-
in-law, a lady whom I love & honour more than any other in Verdopolis? 
Does he think I can calmly endure that she, by his orders, should turn from 
me if I chance to meet her in public places, & when I beg a seat in her 
carriage that she should, smiling & shaking her head, deny me with sweet 
reluctance & (the unkindest cut of all) offer me the indignity of ordering a 
footman to remove me when I commence, by tears & cries, to give vent to 
my indignation in the open street? I say, does he think I am to lie down 
like a flogged spaniel under all this? 
 If such are his ideas, let him be undeceived. Here I fling him my 
revenge. He will not like the morsel.338 
 
Wellesley wants not only access to Zamorna and his intimates (to be permitted in the 
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house), but acknowledgement from them. He compares his treatment to that of a dog that 
is expected to lie down and “take it.” (This image of the flogged spaniel has a curious 
premonitory power; later in “The Spell,” in a scene I will return to below, Wellesley 
seems to become this dog.) Notably, he tells us that he has been known to “give vent”—
like the wind—to his hurt feelings in the “open street” (or, maybe, en plein air). The 
prologue sets up the story to follow as vengeance, which is already imagined as so much 
hot air.  
Likewise, the preface to “Albion and Marina” (1830) informs the reader that “I 
have written this tale out of malignity for the injuries that have lately been offered to 
me.”339 From a young age, then, Brontë crafted a narrator driven by resentment and 
retribution, for whom writing was a corrective to lived injustice, and compared to 
something like a gale force. Though we can produce motives for William Crimsworth, 
Jane Eyre, and Lucy Snowe, those explanatory or meliorative backstories are secondary. 
For Brontë, narration is, primarily, a form of aggression, or a way of masking/shaping 
aggression; Wellesley’s excess and ridiculousness make his anger safe, something that 
she can manipulate and mold—something that she can play with. 
Consider the example of Wellesley’s becoming-dog in “The Spell.” At this point 
in the story, confusion around Zamorna’s inconsistent behavior has grown, and everyone 
is waiting for some explanation. It turns out Zamorna has a secret twin, a substitute 
brother that renders Wellesley even more superfluous than he already is. Perhaps it is this 
superfluity that allows Wellesley to function as a kind of floater and bearer of excess. 
I believe General Thornton will never forget that day. The trials of Job 
were nothing to what he suffered during its slow, hideous, leaden progress. 
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A thousand times did I beg him to pull out his watch & tell me the hour. 
Ten thousand times did I run to the door, open, look out, & then shut it. 
Towards night my impatience became incontrollable. I rolled on the 
carpet, gnawed the fringe of the rug, screamed, kicked, &, when he 
attempted to chasten me with the little stick he keeps beside him for that 
express purpose, I seized it in my teeth & fairly bit it in two.340 
 
The biting of the stick and gnawing of the carpet could be the actions of either an angry 
dog or a friendly, excited puppy. When General Thornton reaches for a stick to “flog” 
Wellesley the spaniel with, he bites it in two, refusing the chastisement just as the text 
“The Spell” refuses Zamorna’s chastisement. This refusal is performative. When a dog 
grabs and growls in play, there is no question of whether he “means it.” There is a 
framed-off area of context that determines that this growling and grabbing, though 
identical to other incidents of growling and grabbing, has a different meaning. Similarly, 
with Wellesley, the question is not if he is “really” playing or not. To be playing is to 
change the register of such questions altogether.  
 Wellesley’s vengeful play can be interrupted by Zamorna’s direct recognition of 
him. At the end of “An Interesting Passage,” Zamorna, here called the Marquis of Douro, 
takes hold of Wellesley’s hand and leads him away from a conversation he has rudely 
interrupted. 
I was going on, but Arthur restrained me with, ‘Charles, Charles, 
hush love.’ He then took hold of my hand & hurried me away from the 
walk. 
It was now evening & by the time we reached the palace, a flaming 
South African occident cast a transcendency of light over all the vast city 
that resounded with a loud murmur, & gloriously irradiated its stupendous 
tower, which rose encompassed with magnificent oaks now standing in 
undefined masses of darkness agains[t] a sky of gold. Far off the broad 
harbour lay dotted by innumerable white-sailed vessels. The ocean heaved 
in terrible beauty. Its mighty voice deepened with the hush of evening. A 
hundred streams of the vale pouring forth their emulous song were 
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unheard amid that awful thunder, which rolled over the fading earth 
through an atmosphere of balm & fragrance. My brother & I stood on the 
terrace for a long time wholly absorbed in admiration, till at length Finic 
came to remind us that the dew was falling & colds abroad in the air.341  
 
Wellesley’s mood has entirely shifted. He has been subdued—restrained—by the 
presence of Arthur, and has achieved complete satisfaction. The prologue to “An 
Interesting Passage” established storytelling as the power to disrupt and offend, and the 
imagery of the text began with him alone in nature—hot, uncomfortable, stifling—and 
out of joint with an interlocutor he finds there. But the conclusion has him in deep 
contemplation of nature’s grandeur in the company of the person he loves. Whereas it 
was far too hot when the story began and he feigned to be cool, now the wind really is 
cold. Thunder is gathering but it is characterized as “balm & fragrance”; the storm 
releases the tension and calms him.  
Wellesley’s desire for Zamorna is intermingled with his desire for power. But as 
Eve Sedgwick notes, power does not necessarily mean omnipotence; there is relief in 
establishing limited power. Sedgwick writes, glossing Klein, 
For the Kleinian subject, however, unlike the Freudian one, omnipotence 
is a fear at least as much as it is a wish. …Instead of the undifferentiatedly 
blind, pleasure- and power-seeking drives of the Freudian infant, which 
encounter no check but the originally external ones of prohibition or lack, 
the Kleinian infant experiences a greed whose aggressiveness and envious 
component is perceived as posing a mortal threat both to her loved and 
needed objects and to herself. Thus the perception of oneself as 
omnipotent is hardly less frightening than the perception of one’s parent as 
being so.  
 In fact, this all-or-nothing understanding of agency is toxic enough 
that it is a relief and relaxation for the child to discover a different reality. 
The sense that power is a form of relationality that deals in, for example, 
habits, negotiations, and small differentials, the middle ranges of agency—
the notion that you can be relatively empowered or disempowered without 
annihilating someone else or being annihilated, or even castrating or being 
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castrated—is a great mitigation of that endogenous anxiety, although it is 
something that requires to be discovered over and over.342  
 
Brontë does not quite arrive at the notion that power is a form of relationality vis-à-vis 
Wellesley and Zamorna, though she begins to explore it via questions of aggression and 
restraint between the brothers. This ideal of power residing in submission and mutual 
sexual recognition will, of course, be a strong element of her novels.  
My reading goes against what John Kucich identifies as the juvenilia’s abstraction 
of desire itself.343 For even if Angrian characters do not erotically desire particular sexual 
objects, rendering romantic couplings arbitrary and replaceable, the key narrator 
Wellesley is single-minded in his fixation on Zamorna. This affective and social through-
line also complicates what Kate E. Brown has described as the proliferation of plot in 
Angria, its “difference without change, substituting one enchanting lover for another, 
staging one more insurrection whose outcome will be the status quo.” Brown writes: 
Precisely because actions of the will are always efficacious in Angria, they 
are equally reversible. The characters’ plots are at once inevitably 
successful and curiously irrelevant to the unfolding of the narrative, whose 
events are propelled instead through chance encounters… If the plot of 
“the real” compares to an ascent of the hill of difficulty—a plot marked 
both by hardship and by the certainty of reward—the Angrian plot is 
"never-ending": contingent rather than causal, episodic rather than 
progressive, without impediment to desire and without principle of 
closure.344 
 
Brown’s analysis of plot complements my sense that the juvenilia separates agency from 
character. I do not mean to say that Brontë’s characters are “passive”; rather, that a 
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vocabulary of active/passive will not describe the kinds of power they exercise (or don’t) 
and the way plot is shaped by and around them. We might notice that while Angrian 
events have a zany quality, the human actors in them aren’t zanies—even though the 
chaotic whirl of activity around them might lead us to think so. Sianne Ngai describes 
zaniness as that which “promotes a sense of character as nothing but a series of projects 
and activities.”345 My reading privileges Brontë’s characters as moods, winds almost, that 
do not have the agency necessary to elaborate projects and activities in the first place. 
They are quite busy with a wide number of practical and political tasks that are, at any 
moment, subject to change. But they are not fundamentally working or laboring beings.  
 But Brown, like most scholars, reads the juvenilia as explicitly and solely a form 
of mourning or grieving, a response to the death of the Brontës’ mother and older 
siblings.346 Even Terry Castle imagines the juvenilia in terms of lack. In “The Juvenilia of 
Charlotte Brontë,” she writes, “Yet one cannot help but sense the element of wish 
fulfillment in these marvelous revivals. Brontë had discovered at an early age that the 
writing of fiction was a way of making the dead live again—if only on the page.”347 But 
despite—or really, because of—the aggressive style of play in the juvenilia, we ought to 
read the juvenilia not in terms of wishes, but in terms of fulfillment. The juvenilia is not 
(or not only) an emotional prosthetic but a space of humor and exuberance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press), 2012: 196. 
346 See Susan Carlson, “Fantasies of Death and Violence in the Early Juvenilia of 
Charlotte Brontë,” in Brontë Studies 27 (July 2002): 101-111.  
347 Terry Castle, “The Juvenilia of Charlotte Brontë” in Boss Ladies, Watch Out! Essays 
on Women, Sex, and Writing (New York: Routledge), 2002: 158. 
 
	  
	   178	  
The Devoir as Transitional Text 
The biographical details are well known: the time in Belgium at the Pensionnat Heger, 
the failed attempts to found a school in Haworth, the discovery of her sister’s poetry and 
the publication of Poems of Currer, Acton, and Ellis Bell (1846). But does a writer write 
“Farewell to Angria” one day and a novel the next? 
 Amanpal Garcha’s work on the sketch argues for the novel’s formal reliance on 
and incorporation of a transitional period of training or apprenticeship. He writes that the 
time Gaskell, Dickens, and Thackeray spent writing (and publishing) journalistic sketches 
“produced certain critically overlooked ideological sensibilities that inhere not in novels’ 
now frequently studied plots but rather in their plotlessness.”348 In other words, the sketch 
is a piece of plotless writing, and the fact that sketch-masters became novelists meant that 
novels also contain significant portions of plotlessness. For Garcha, sketches are 
significant because they enact the novel’s interest in time that is fragmented and whole, 
but also because they are stylistic calling-cards. He writes that 
the formal elements and content of their sketches reappear in their 
novels—and they reappear as among the most central, distinguishing 
characteristics of these authors’ fiction, as Dickens’s vibrant, lengthy 
descriptions, Gaskell’s detailed representations of impoverished domestic 
spaces, and Thackeray’s melancholic, essayistic digressions, all clearly 
linked to their sketch-writing, become key to these novelists’ aesthetic and 
ideological appeals in their most successful works.349 
  
Brontë never wrote sketches. But she did have a significant period of learning a 
non-novelistic writing craft that became her own stylistic marker: the school 
compositions or devoirs she wrote and revised under M. Heger. About a dozen and a half 
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of these texts have been translated and compiled by the scholar Sue Lonoff. They have 
titles such as “Sacrifice of an Indian Widow,” “The Sick Young Girl,” “The Immensity of 
God,” and “Human Justice.” In some cases, the compositions were based off of dictations 
that Heger asked the students to do. For example, the earliest surviving devoir, “The Sick 
Young Girl,” drafted in 1842, was inspired by Alexandre Soumet’s “The Poor Girl” 
(1814); Lonoff writes that “it may have been one of several poems about mistreated 
maidens that [Heger] read to them.”350 Brontë’s reimagining of the girl’s fate is suffused 
with the fairy-tale temporality and exclamatory enthusiasm of Angria, as well as a dollop 
of Protestant feverishness. It begins “Sleep is the friend of the fortunate, it seeks the bed 
of roses, but it rarely approaches the bed of thorns; alas! to me it is almost unknown,” and 
builds to a feverish prayer: “I have suffered long, I am weary of suffering. Oh God, have 
pity on me! Jesus heal they son healed the young daughter of Jairus; may he also heal me. 
Christ grant my prayer!”351 
Lonoff observes that writing compositions for Heger forced Brontë to expose 
herself, to move from the private, closed world of juvenilia into a more public, evaluative 
space. She emphasizes the formal modalities that the students were asked to master: the 
epistolary, the analytic, the descriptive, and the meditative. But even as Brontë practices 
rhetorical forms, and sheds, when necessary, descriptions of forests, glens, and fairies, 
her rhetorical style is immediately recognizable. She has what we now call a strong 
voice: She is not able to operate in a wide number of stylistic registers. “Dear Sir,” begins 
the assignment to write a “Letter of invitation to a clergyman”: 
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In fulfilling your duties as a pastor, have you never found yourself 
obliged to write a letter to a rich miser, to entreat him to contribute to a 
charitable fund? If you have found yourself in this circumstance you may 
very well imagine my feelings in addressing you at this moment.  
‘But,’ you say, ‘I am not a miser.’ Yes, sir, you are, and so much 
so that until now it has always been impossible for me to wrest from you 
the least part of that treasure you guard with such vigilance. That treasure, 
sir, is not money; it is time. I beseech you, be generous once more. Next 
Thursday I am giving a small party at home, and I entreat you to honor it 
with your presence. Be sure that in granting me a few hours of your so 
precious time, you will turn it to better account than by remaining at home, 
or perhaps even by visiting the poor of your parish. I need not tell you how 
much the presence of a pious and respectable clergyman in a society 
contributes to curbing all vain and idle remarks, nor how much the 
conversation of a learned man adds to the pleasure and profit of the 
gathering. Neither need I tell you that my friends share my feelings toward 
you, and that if you come your arrival will be a pleasure for all, whereas if 
you do not come your absence will be for all a disappointment. 
   Begging to remain, Sir, yours sincerely, 
       &c……352 
 
Brontë completes the assignment—she writes a letter to a clergyman. But she is very 
nearly derailed before she begins; it is not so hard to imagine that she would far rather 
write a scene about the rich miser that she introduces to fill out this fictive world than just 
ask the clergyman to tea on Tuesday at four o’clock. The letter implies a whole world—
friends unseen, fundraising campaigns sweated over, the poor, and a community falling 
into laxity, in need of a stern authority. The voice of the letter-writer is familiar from 
Angria: it hectors, quarrels with, and insults the very interlocutor it seeks to woo.  
Brontë also wrote the reply to this letter, in which Inclination and Duty converse, 
with the result that the clergyman refuses the invitation: “If I do not beg you to pardon 
me, it is because I am convinced that in obeying him [Duty] I only do what I have to 
do.”353 When Heger introduced her to abstractions, she handled them by personifying 
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them, turning them into high-strung characters as idiosyncratic and demanding as 
Zamorna himself—a device that nearly overtook her novels, where sometimes the 
capitalized concepts of Imagination, Will, or Genius are more present than any humans 
who serve as their vessels. So though there is a temptation to read the devoirs as 
examples of Brontë’s passion for Heger—her desire to please, and her attempts to mold 
herself to the image he demanded—there is more to be gained by tracing the continuities, 
what she made her own.354 Brontë’s voice is remarkably consistent. And what is most 
interesting is not what she wrote in school, but how what she wrote in school—and the 
fact of academic writing at all—shows up in the scenes and plots of her novels. 
The devoir is a transitional text or transitional object: the toy that the child grasps 
as being at once me and not-me, part of the external and internal world. By calling the 
devoir a transitional text, I am arguing that it is part-juvenilia and part-novel; part-fantasy 
and part-reality. I am also calling attention to the devoir as an instrument of play, 
formulated in a play relationship. In M. Heger Charlotte met for the first time an external 
authority with the power to push back against her vision of the world; however, he did 
not overtake it or demolish it. He only offered some limits on it through his role as a 
circumscribed authority. The final devoirs were a result of an area that existed in the 
overlap between student and teacher, one in which each had an assigned role. (I am not 
here commenting on Brontë’s desire to perhaps transgress or surpass or change those 
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roles, except to say that it may be the very fact of the roles in the first place—of roles as 
such—that created the conditions for whatever fantasies became attached to them.) 
Winnicott explained that the transitional object has to do with “the problem of the 
relationship between what is objectively perceived and what is subjectively conceived 
of… the [transitional] area is allowed to the infant between primary creativity and 
objective perception based on reality-testing.”355 I propose that the devoir be understood 
in terms of formal or generic “reality-testing.” And just as Winnicott stressed that it is not 
the object or toy that is transitional but the child’s relationship to the mother (as being 
internalized or separate) I would like to stress the relational context of the writing of the 
devoir as being as important as the formal qualities of the genre. Remember that the 
juvenilia were collaborative and the devoir, as we will see, dialogic. Of course, the 
relationships and overlap areas that Winnicott was theorizing were not peaceful, easy, or 
harmonious. The transitional object exists in order to survive aggression. Its whole 
reason of being is that it can receive and withstand hostility, rage, and destruction. We 
must see the devoir as serving this same purpose, and from both parties (Brontë and 
Heger).    
There are three ways in which we might discuss this period with respect to 
Brontë’s novels. The first is biographical and character-based. Paul Emmanuel and 
William Crimsworth are obviously pedagogues in Heger’s mode—fiery, dramatic, 
disciplinary, stern, charismatic, sexist. (Lonoff cites Brontë’s mocking of sentimentality 
and her anti-Catholicism as potential jabs at Heger; that seems plausible enough.) The 
second is to track Brontë’s evolution as a writer. It is hard to see that Brontë internalized 
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Heger’s values of “unity, economy, placement, proportion, consistency of tone, and 
plausibility.”356 If her tone as a novelist is consistent, it is consistently jagged, moving 
from erotically charged descriptions to Biblical exhortations to thundering critique and 
back to exposition. Economy, placement, and proportion do not describe her.  
In fact, it is very difficult to put one’s finger on just what it is that Brontë learned 
under Heger. More than any writerly skill, she seems to have learned mental habits. She 
learned, first, that writing is a dialogue or conversation, as well as a way of reaching 
beyond the family circle. Second, she learned that writing is a process of 
transformation—of taking received texts, internalizing them by memorization or writing, 
and recreating them by inhabiting them from multiple points of view. Finally, she 
practiced some version of literary criticism, which led to her ability to articulate her 
creative values. In “An Essay on Style: The Fall of the Leaves” (1843), she asks,  
“What impression strikes one on reading the piece entitled ‘The Fall of the 
Leaves’? It is not easy to shed light onto his question in a single answer, 
because one does not always feel the same impression. The first time one 
reads it, the effect is vivid; the second time, and forever after, 
sorrowful.”357 
 
Verbosely, she tries to analyze how it is that a single literary work can produce multiple 
impressions in the reader. She first panders to Heger’s love of “the principal of Unity,” 
then boldly suggests another explanation for the poem’s power: the genius of the poet.358 
I believe that all true poetry is but the faithful imprint of something that 
happens or has happened in the poet’s soul… I believe that genius, thus 
awakened, has no need to seek the details, that it scarcely pauses to reflect, 
that it does not think about unity. I believe that the details come quite 
naturally without the poet’s seeking them, that inspiration takes the place 
of reflection. …If Millevoye had been a cold, phlegmatic, and unfeeling 
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man, no matter that he had had the instruction of a hundred academies, the 
wisdom of a thousand philosophers; he would never have composed “The 
Fall of the Leaves.”359 
 
And so on. My point is that the compositions were intellectual as well as grammatical 
exercises, in which Brontë forcefully articulated the aesthetic principles that are germinal 
in her juvenilia. Her early obsession with genius evidenced in the heroes of the juvenilia 
here becomes an authorial principle that she will develop thematically in Shirley.  
The third way of understanding the devoir is generic: to define the devoir as a 
genre that appears within and shapes the genre of the novel.360 It is, after all, impossible 
to understand The Professor (1845-46), Shirley (1849), or Villette (1853) without 
interpreting the passages that are lifted straight from composition books; much of the plot 
of those novels hinges on how characters correct and interpret these passages. Like the 
sketch, they suspend time. The machinery of the narrative grinds to something of a halt 
when confronted with the tale of, for example, “The Genius and the Goddess” in Shirley. 
However, the compositions and the pedagogical apparatus around them are not “plotless” 
in Garcha’s sense; in fact, they contain an abundance of fairy-tale, once-upon-a-time 
plot.361  
Moreover, school composition and devoir are figured as plots. Consider how 
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William Crimsworth in The Professor conspires with himself over how to respond to 
Frances’s work and shape her future writing. If the sketch has as its principle “a faithful, 
if not exhaustive, realism,” the school composition has other aims: didacticism, allegory, 
the elaboration of moral values, and erotic play.362 The school composition is a form of 
dialogue, not complete until it is corrected. As Louis says about Shirley, “I worship her 
perfections; but it is her faults, or at least her, foibles that bring her near to me… these 
faults are the steps by which I mount to ascendancy over her.”363 
William approaches Frances’s homework as an opportunity to see inside her; it is 
a form of eavesdropping, and a way of making the hidden exterior: “‘Now,’ thought I, ‘I 
shall see a glimpse of what she really is; I shall get an idea of the nature and extent of her 
powers.”364 He is ostensibly speaking of her language skill, but he seems to also be 
speaking of something greater: of the composition’s expressiveness, of it serving as a 
window into Frances’s interior. Frances has impressed William as being worthy of these 
attentions because of her writing—but what sort of writer is she? William describes one 
of her compositions, which he reads aloud to the entire English class, as “powerfully 
written in language at once chaste and choice, in a style nerved with vigour and graced 
with harmony.”365 Clearly this is high praise—the composition has power; it exercises 
self-restraint; and it is pleasing, like a symmetrical face. (Jane Eyre describes her own 
plain face as lacking harmony.)  
Yet it is telling that Brontë herself is not able to produce the chaste, vigorous, 
graceful (masculine?) prose that Frances is said to have acquired. The absence of this 
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devoir is related to The Professor’s investment in the problems of description. This is a 
problem that is staged as one of ordinariness versus extraordinariness. There are three 
kinds of objects in this text: things that are ugly, things that are ordinary, and things that 
are extraordinary. The ordinary cannot be described. When William Crimsworth says that 
“there is no use in attempting to describe what is indescribable,” he is talking about the 
ordinary (in this case, his friend Hunsden’s face).366 The extraordinary, however, can be 
described—and yet it cannot be reproduced. Frances’s improved writing can be pointed 
at but not given.  
Brontë does give us Frances’s first writing, which we are encouraged to read in 
terms of ugliness. Crimsworth describes that early style as “short and somewhat rude 
sentences, and the style stood in great need of polish and sustained dignity.”367 It is 
strange that he calls the sentences “short,” because in the passages quoted, they spill to 
three, four, or five lines, and are divided with multiple semicolons. Moreover, the 
language is florid, not “rude.” Or is there another composition, one that we have not read, 
to which he refers? Is this not the ugly composition at all? Are we reading a translation—
smoothed over, reworked, prettified—of Frances’s poor English? The devoir seems to 
activate these anxieties about representation and description. What is quoted is a story 
narrated by a stranger, a secret nobleman who has taken shelter in a poor herdsman’s 
cottage. It bears some resemblance to chapter five of Brontë’s “Tales of the Islanders,” 
written in 1829, when she was 13 years old. That section of “Islanders” concerns some 
fairies who have disguised themselves as mortals and taken up residence in “a small 
thatched cottage which had once been the pleasant abode of a flourishing husbandman 
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who was now dead & his children had one by one forsaken it & the sweet spot where it 
stood each to pursue his own fortune till it was no entirely deserted & had fallen into a 
state of ruin & decay.”368 Both stories have to do with the classic hero’s situation of 
secret glory fallen on hard times, though Brontë filters it through Christian themes in both 
cases. In “Tales of the Islanders,” a man appears in a “moan[ing]” wind to tell a story 
about falling from the Church of England into Roman Catholicism; in Frances’s devoir, 
the hero turns, in Crimsworth’s words, to “the scriptural Jehovah for aid against the 
mythological Destiny.”369  
In The Professor, the devoir is not present as a stand-alone text but as an occasion 
for the cognitive and affective structures of surveillance and aggression that Wellesley 
embodied in the juvenilia. Those structures are here recoded as explicitly sexual. William 
gets Frances’s attention by not returning her devoir in class, but by keeping her after and 
forcing her to observe as he corrects each and every one of her mistakes. What would be 
humiliation in Dickens is here foreplay. At the end he rewards her by recognizing that she 
possesses (feminine) “taste and fancy”—not the “highest” virtues, but they’re better than 
nothing. In order to “best foster” the “proud and shy” Frances, whose feelings are 
“susceptible” and “deep-vibrating” William employs these means:  
Constancy of Attention—a kindness as mute as watchful, always standing 
by her, cloaked in the rough garb of austerity and making its real nature 
known only by a rare glance of interest, or a cordial and gentle word; real 
respect masked with seeming imperiousness, directing, urging her 
actions—yet helping her too and that with devoted care.370 
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The result is that Frances becomes herself a better, because more confident, sewing 
teacher. This is, of course, how Rochester treats Jane, and how Louis treats Shirley, and 
how Paul treats Lucy Snowe. This is Charlotte Brontë’s ideal: a game in which a strong, 
older man, with an invisible hand, guides the intellectual and sexual development of a 
younger woman, employing critique, chastisement, and judicious, hard-won praise. 
Playing is not pretending—there really is intellectual and sexual growth at stake—but 
playing enables plausible deniability, thereby making the reality palatable. All of these 
men will be referred to by their lovers, blasphemously and often mockingly, as “Master.” 
As John Kucich has written, Brontë’s “reciprocal combat defines passion as an 
aggressive opposition to others, rather than as an unguarded relaxing of personal 
boundaries.”371 I would add that reciprocal combat takes place within or, better, is 
generative of, the play framework that she first explored in the juvenilia. 
 
The Devoir as Transitional Text: Shirley 
The devoir has a prominent role in Shirley. Shirley’s former tutor Louis arrives, 
now in the employ of her uncle, just as two eligible men are unsuccessfully courting her. 
The devoir functions as both the location and the form of aggressive play—Louis and 
Shirley reminisce about what she used to write for him; he asks her to recite the texts he 
made her learn; he remembers her compositions and recites them back to her. This is a 
way of sneaking the classroom into the novel, but because the devoirs in question are so 
closely tied to themes from the juvenilia, also a way of keeping Angria alive. 
Furthermore, this nexus is central to any reading of the novel, because Brontë uses the 
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pedagogical play framework to resolve the national and regional differences that 
percolate throughout the story. On the one hand, then, the devoir in this novel can be read 
in terms of genre; on the other, it is integral to an analysis of the novel’s themes.  
Critical literature by Sally Shuttleworth, Judith Williams, and others has 
characterized Shirley in terms of the protagonist’s “capitulation” or “taming.” As 
Rosemarie Bodenheimer has noted, “paternalism is an assumption central to Brontë’s 
imagination of human relations.”372 Paternalism, in other words, is the frame within 
which power oscillates, the outside limits that “check” the play of authority and 
submission. It creates “the conditions for reciprocal feeling,” what Bodenheimer 
describes as the oscillation between order and violence.373 We might think of it as 
violence of order—the fertile or productive, but wounding, dynamism of regulation itself. 
Phrasing it as such highlights that the resulting order isn’t static but shifting; the firm 
hand trembles slightly. Shirley’s desire for a governor controls Louis, forcing him to act 
as one. He sometimes refers to her as his “pupil,” but sometimes as his “mistress,” 
indicating her social superiority. They both take pleasure in the oscillation of their roles. 
This peculiar relationship of governor to governed is premised not on stationary, 
prescribed modes of authority but on the self-conscious exploration and adoption of 
subject positions—the framework of play, in other words, that the relationship conjured 
by the devoir makes possible.  
Shirley and Louis continually goad each other, playing the roles they once had of 
tutor and student, and find erotic satisfaction in a power struggle that, like play, can exist 
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because it is framed—it is real affectively and emotionally but not real actually. Shirley 
has material power. The roles of student (Charlotte) and teacher (Heger) are here just 
roles, that can be put on and taken off. The past roles exist in the present as shadows of 
another world, imperfectly applied to their current selves. The classroom in Brontë is not 
a place but a relationship. It promises liberation (from family) and mobility (into 
employment). Nor is the classroom limited to actual children, as Shirley makes plain: The 
adults become juveniles, suggesting that childhood is itself a form of play that can be 
taken up and put down. The tutor relationship is in fact a transitional space between 
childhood and adulthood, where adults play at being children and children play at being 
adults. Since in Brontë’s novels dependency itself is the source of shame, and since 
dependency is a condition of childhood, childhood itself comes to be tainted. She makes 
pedagogical relationships playful and mutual and sexual in part, I think, to separate 
childhood from dependency: Her heroines are secret equals or superiors to their masters.   
I have been at pains to put the textual and generic play across Brontë’s writings in 
a Winnicottian frame, but it must be acknowledged she imagines the relationship between 
Louis and Shirley in terms that are strikingly Freudian. Louis and Shirley, by repeating 
and revising what happened earlier, come to master the past. To make it perfectly clear, 
Brontë drops a reference to Shirley’s old exercise—memorizing Jacques-Bénigne 
Bossuet’s “Le Cheval Dompté,” or “The Horse Tamed.” Still, even though there is talk of 
mastery and taming, there isn’t quite the sense of compulsion or neuroses between Louis 
and Shirley that characterizes Freud’s fort-da game; if there is a trauma, what was it? 
Perhaps the trauma is simply unconsummated desire—if anyone would find that 
traumatic, it would be Brontë. Yet this isn’t entirely satisfying: Something more theatrical 
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and less neurotic seems at stake. Someone bound by classical repetition-compulsion is, 
by definition, unaware; one repeats because one doesn’t know. Louis and Shirley are 
almost arch in their knowingness. What’s more, their game of repetition succeeds. To me, 
this suggests that under the game there is not a trauma that must be analyzed and worked 
through, but another game—play all the way down.  
While we’re on the subject of obviousness, what should we make of that reference 
to the horse tamed? There’s something embarrassing, almost tasteless, about the lack of 
subtlety in Brontë’s schoolroom scenes. Shouldn’t a novelist try to cover up what’s 
happening, make us guess a little? Rules of literary tact seem to call for more symbolism, 
or at least symbolism that is slightly less... juvenile. This is a hallmark of Brontë’s style, 
from the juvenilia through the devoir and the novels: moments when an extremely 
innocent, extremely self-aware, or oddly immature image erupts that over-explains a 
narrative tension. These are risky, unaesthetic moves, but they appear coherent when we 
understand them in toto, as part of a register of meaning that intersects with the novel but 
doesn’t belong to it. Whether or not it’s intentional, it becomes part of her rebellion 
against the perceived rules of realism.  
Louis recites Shirley’s composition to her after she has repeated his words; “she 
caught his accent in three minutes.”374 The play framework, which calls into being a 
conversation about accent, is what enables the flux around nationalism and regionalism. 
The “Yorkshire roughness” (in George Lewes’s phrase) of the novel was a way for 
Brontë to, in James Buzard’s reading, “denature” English—show that what is standard is 
in fact dialect, and has no special claim. Buzard concludes that Brontë’s ultimate aim is 
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to show that regionalism is a supplement, not a threat, to national identity, and that local 
customs and dialects are equally valid ways of being English. The problem with Yorke, 
for instance, is that his locality and cosmopolitanism isn’t mediated by the nation—
though he can speak standard English, he refuses, instead switching between perfect 
French and broad Yorkshire dialect. He refuses to be part of the shared national culture 
that Buzard claims Brontë is imagining.  
And no wonder. Brontë can only imagine this shared culture arising in a context 
of courtship—in a context established by the devoir specifically—in which custom and 
accent and literary texts are exchanged and made malleable. Brontë’s French is not 
perfect, but perfection isn’t the aim. She has a conversation partner. (If she spoke 
fluently, she would have no need of tutoring.) Interpersonal unions, and not trade 
agreements or political bodies, are the structures in which nationality and national 
difference can be preserved and yet subsumed to greater unity, where a kind of dialectical 
synthesis can be stabilized. But it must be stressed that in Shirley, “French” is a marker 
not of class, but of cosmopolitan or European identity. Shirley aspires to speak in Louis’s 
accent, but the unity they ultimately seek is not satisfied in being French; they must be 
English, robust, hearty English: 
Perhaps a simultaneous feeling seized them now, that their enthusiasm had 
kindled to a glow, which the slight fuel of French poetry no longer 
sufficed to feed; perhaps they longed for a trunk of English oak to be 
thrown as a Yule log to the devouring flame.375 
 
Unlike in other novels, Brontë reproduces her heroine’s student writing in 
Shirley—at least, she reproduces what Louis says, which we are told is the real thing. The 
treatment of the essay in/as the text creates an effect like nesting dolls, with the layers of 
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the narrator’s voice, character’s speech, translation and transcription, the oral and the 
written, all stacked inside one another. Something like how Thomas Pavel describes 
“existentially creative” salient structures is at work here: “those dual structures in which 
the primary universe does not enter into an isomorphism with the secondary universe.”376 
Multiple possible relationships exist between past people, present people, and a text that 
was once written, memorized, and now recited. Deploying the devoir in the context of a 
recital creates a multi-level structure where one is both aware of the lack of the “real” text 
and yet assured of its reality. 
Louis recites Shirley’s youthful devoir, “La Premiere Femme Savante,” in 
response to Shirley’s challenge that he will not be able to recall every line. Reading aloud 
is a throughline in Brontë’s writing: As children, the Brontës read their work aloud; in 
Belgium, however, M. Heger would have read the compositions, corrected, and returned 
them. (If The Professor is any guide, the students might have read their own work out 
loud, but the teacher would not have done so.) It is therefore significant that Louis’s way 
of praising Shirley is by reciting her work. 
The style of “La Premiere Femme Savante” is more like the juvenilia than what 
Brontë wrote for M. Heger. To be sure, Brontë wrote frequently on the theme of genius. 
But her Brussels writing is analytical, and even its prefatory remarks are focused on the 
theme. Her essay “The Death of Napoleon” begins “How should one envision this 
subject? With a great pomp of words or with simplicity? That depends on the idea that 
one has of Napoleon, or rather the idea of him that one is capable of having.”377 Compare 
that with the beginning paragraphs of “La Premiere Femme Savante”: 
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This was in the dawn of time, before the morning stars were set, 
and while they yet sang together. 
The epoch is so remote, the mists and dewy gray of matin twilight 
veil it with so vague an obscurity, that all distinct features of custom, all 
clear line of locality, evade perception and baffle research. It must suffice 
to know that the world then existed; that men peopled it; that man’s nature, 
with its passions, sympathies, pains, and pleasures, informed the planet 
and gave it soul.”378  
 
Now, the beginning of “The Twelve Adventurers,” from 1829, when Charlotte was 13 
years old: 
There is a tradition that some thousands of years ago twelve men 
from Britain, of a most gigantic size, and twelve men from Gaul came 
over to the country of Genii, and while there were continually at war with 
each other and, after remaining many years, returned again to Britain and 
Gaul. And in the inhabited [parts] of the Genii country there are now no 
vestiges of them, though it is sad that there have been found some colossal 
skeletons in that wild, barren land, the evil desert.  
But I have read a book called ‘The Travels of Captain Parnell’, out 
of which the following is an extract. 
‘About four in afternoon I saw a dark red cloud arise in the east, 
which gradually grew larger till it covered the whole sky. As the cloud 
spread the wind rose and blew a tremendous hurricane. The sand of the 
desert began to move and rolled like the waves of the sea.379 
 
The paragraph continues and the narrator discovers the bones of a skeleton, “one of the 
evil genii chained in these deserts by the fairy Maimoune.”380  
The writing in the Shirley composition, of course, surpasses that in the juvenilia in 
its sophistication and elegance. But the texts that Shirley are referencing are not the 
devoirs; they are the imaginary stories of supernatural occurrences and extraordinary 
anointings that Brontë pursued in “The Twelve Adventurers,” “The Spell,” “The 
Islanders,” and elsewhere. Moreover, while the devoirs answer prompts and formulate 
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arguments, the juvenilia, like the Shirley composition, tells an imaginative or fictional 
story. To be sure, Brontë’s Napoleon essay reaches lofty heights. “There he is—exiled 
and captive—bound to an arid rock,” she writes. “He has committed the crime of 
Prometheus, and he undergoes his punishment.”381 But this breathless imagining of the 
scene of Napoleon’s death is quite different than the description of a setting for a 
narrative, which is what the other two texts do.  
The Shirley text does share content from the juvenilia and the devoir. In addition 
to the theme of genius, there is Brontë’s typical interest in hermitage, which she analyzed 
in the devoir on “Peter the Hermit” and which is featured in “Tales of the Islanders” and 
elsewhere. As in “La Premiere Femme Savant,” many of her stories feature lonely 
cottages and huts nestled in isolated forests that offer shelter and magical opportunities to 
their inhabitants, special or chosen individuals that are masquerading, known to 
themselves or not, in nature. Like the devoirs, it is filled with rhetorical questions. It 
enacts a moment of learning, coded as divine inspiration: “I receive a revelation. The 
dark hint, the obscure whisper, which have haunted me from childhood, are 
interpreted.”382 It is, of course, far more explicitly sexual (“the bridal-hour of Genius and 
Humanity”) than the devoirs.383 But it is not really more sexual than the juvenilia, which 
merrily, if innocently, features a string women falling in love with Zamorna. The Duke’s 
wife during “The Spell,” Mary, remembers when she was only the Duke’s mistress: “He 
was a wild dream a superhuman vision, a rain-bow apparition which I chased & chased 
over hill, & plain, & valley, ever unwearied, never successful, wholly absorbed in the 
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vain yet delicious pursuit.”384 
Why embed a text like “La Premiere Femme Savant” in the confines of the novel? 
It serves, to be sure, as a metatext, in which the theme of education and female genius—
in Shirley Keeldar as well as Brontë herself—is refracted. It is also a maneuver that 
preserves the genres of devoir and juvenilia, acting as a kind of glue, while establishing 
them as clearly inferior or dependent on the novel form itself. “La Premiere Femme 
Savant” is a communication between Louis and Shirley: He proves his love by reciting it 
from memory, having treasured it for all these years. What it does between them is as 
important as what the words say. The recitation sets up the theme of speaking in 
another’s accent or voice, which is also what the devoir does, when it mimics or tries to 
mimic. All of this is the form of their flirtation. If Shirley remembers Louis returning that 
composition so covered in pen ink that she couldn’t see to correct it, Brontë does a 
similar thing by at once including the text and disavowing it.   
Louis is Shirley’s master just as realism is the master of the juvenilia/devoir—and 
the master of romance. The famous stoicism of Shirley follows Caroline Helstone’s early 
disappointment that “bonnie Robert” does not treat her with the love that she expects to 
find:  
Rude disappointment! Sharp cross! At first the eager girl would not 
believe in the change, though she saw and felt it. It was difficult to 
withdraw her hand from his, till he had bestowed at least something like a 
kind pressure; it was difficult to turn her eyes from his eyes, till his looks 
had expressed something more and fonder than that cool welcome. 
A lover masculine so disappointed can speak and urge explanation; 
a lover feminine can say nothing: if she did the result would be shame and 
anguish, inward remorse for self-treachery. Nature would brand such 
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demonstration as a rebellion against her instincts, and would vindictively 
repay it afterwards by the thunderbolt of self-contempt smiting suddenly 
in secret. Take the matter as you find it: ask no questions; utter no 
remonstrances: it is your best wisdom. You expected bread, and you have 
got a stone; break your teeth on it, and don’t shriek because the nerves are 
martyrized: do not doubt that your mental stomach—if you have such a 
thing—is strong as an ostrich’s—the stone will digest. You held out your 
hand for an egg, and fate put into it a scorpion. Show no consternation: 
close your fingers firmly upon the gift; let it sting through your palm. 
Never mind: in time, after your hand and arm have swelled and quivered 
long with torture, the squeezed scorpion will die, and you will have 
learned the great lesson how to endure without a sob.385 
 
The passage goes on in this spirit for another paragraph. That qualification of the mental 
stomach (“if you have such a thing”) seems to enact the correction the passage prescribes, 
qualifying the narrator’s flight into metaphor. However, the very length and passion of 
the passage raises doubts that it has been effective in its prescriptions.  
 The play of and around “La Premiere Femme Savant” is a way that Shirley evades 
the stoicism and the brutal crushing of the scorpion in one’s hand that this passage 
advocates. This passage is speaking the voice of reality and realism: the stifling of the 
romantic impulse, and the bitterness and rage that accompanies it. But this attempt is a 
failure, as the novel Shirley makes plain. For one, romance does win in the end, in the 
marriage plots. But more importantly, generically, the novel does not ultimately exclude 
fantasy, which turns stones into bread. Instead, it valorizes play. 
 The voice of the passage above seems to be in the grip of a vision, something like 
Shirley’s youthful vision of the island in her composition. “It is no sandy plain, nor any 
circumscribed and scant oasis I seem to realize. …Here, indeed, dwell human beings, but 
so few, and in alleys to thick branched and overarched, they were neither heard nor seen. 
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Are they savage?—doubtless.”386 The last paragraph of “La Premiere Femme Savant” is 
a lament that the writer, the child Shirley, is unable to tell the rest of the story of the 
union between Genius and Humanity. “Who shall rehearse the tale of their after-union? 
Who shall depict its bliss and bale?... Who shall, of these things, write the chronicle?” 
The story acknowledges that it cannot be written; it cannot occupy the vantage point of 
eternity that would be required, the place when “Time’s course closed.”387 “La Premiere 
Femme Savant” is mythological and prophetic. What can be written is the novel we have: 
not a story of faithful Seraphs and Time and Dreadless Angels but of a manufacturing 
crisis, daily life, marriages between mortals.  
And yet the novel’s conclusion evokes Shirley’s juvenile devoir. As if through the 
mists of time, the narrator’s old housekeeper recalls a long-ago past. Different 
temporalities swirl. The narrator first declares that it is the day of the double wedding. 
Then we’re told that “the other day” the narrator passed up the Hollow. Immediately 
following, Martha says that she “can remember the old mill being built,” and seeing 
“Mrs. Louis” and “Mrs. Robert” at that time. We seem to have suddenly jumped at once 
forward and backward in time. The effect is bewildering. When Martha remarks that 
“there is no such ladies [as Mrs. Louis and Mrs. Robert] now-a-days,” she cannot 
possibly mean that today, in the present (whatever that is), there are no women as there 
were in the days of Mrs. Louis and Mrs. Robert. Those days are these days. Not enough 
time has elapsed for any other reading. But the effect is that of placing Shirley and 
Caroline into a mythic past, as if we have gone from Technicolor to sepia tones.  
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We, supposed readers of the 1840s, suddenly look back on the events of 1811-12 
with all the benefits of hindsight. Those mists of time that obscured all tribal, regional 
and even national differences are lifted. In the parting of that veil we see that “in the 
Hollow there was neither mill, nor cot, nor hall, except Fieldhead, within two miles of 
it.”388 Fieldhead, it seems, was always there, has always been there, was always already 
there. The estate of Shirley and Louis has become the land before time where Genius and 
Humanity met. The sting of realism has become bearable, transformed by play into 
something juvenile. Brontë never left “that burning clime” entirely behind—she brought 
its atmosphere to the cooler regions, and made them habitable.  
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